Johnson’s Hidden Loyalties
Secret Ethnicity: As previously stated, the Johnson administration implemented a dramatic shift in US‑Middle East policy. Every president after Johnson has totally capitulated to Israel and ignored the plight of Palestinians. But Johnson marked the turning point. The reason he was so loyal to Israel lies within his own ethnicity. It appears that he and his wife were secretly Jewish. To many, this may seem laughable at first, but in reality Jews were an integral part of Texas history throughout the nineteenth century.
1). Jacob and Phineas De Cordova sold land and developed Waco. Simon Mussina founded Brownsville in 1848. Michael Seeligson was elected mayor of Galveston in 1853. Morris Lasker was elected to the state Senate in 1895. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html)
2). The list goes on. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html)
The first Jewish settlers of note in Texas were Samuel Issacks (1821) followed by N. Adolphus Sterne (1826). (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html) By 1838, Jews were living in Galveston, San Antonio, Velasco, Bolivar, Nacogdoches, and Goliad. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html) In the early part of the twentieth century, a large of number of Russian Jews migrated to Texas to escape persecution from the Russian Czar. Between 1900 and 1920, the Jewish population in Texas grew from 15,000 to 30,000. Major cities, Dallas, Houston, Fort Worth, and San Antonio, experienced enormous growth in Jewish populations. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html) The overall number of Jews in Texas has steadily increased ever since. After World War II, the abundance of Jewish residents grew from an estimated 50,000 in 1945 to 71,000 in the mid‑1970s and 92,000 in 1988. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html)
Before 1821, Texas was still a Spanish colony where only Catholics could take up residence. Jews who openly acknowledged their ethnicity could not legally live there. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html) Originally, Jews migrated to Texas to seek fortune and freedom. The earliest Jews, who arrived with the conquistadors, came from Sephardic (Spanish‑North African‑Israel) communities. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html) After the Mexican period, Jewry in Texas was essentially populated by immigrants from Germany, eastern Europe, and the Americas. (Rabbi James L. Kessler, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html)
Lyndon Johnson’s maternal ancestors, the Huffmans, apparently migrated to Frederick, Maryland from Germany sometime in the mid‑eighteenth century. Later they moved to Bourbon, Kentucky and eventually settled in Texas in the mid‑to‑late nineteenth century. (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints)
According to Jewish law, if a person’s mother is Jewish, then that person is automatically Jewish, regardless of the father’s ethnicity or religion. The facts indicate that both of Lyndon Johnson’s great‑grandparents, on the maternal side, were Jewish. These were the grandparents of Lyndon’s mother, Rebecca Baines. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 50) Their names were John S. Huffman and Mary Elizabeth Perrin. (Internet, family search.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) NOTE: I did a search on the parents of Ruth Ament Huffman, wife of Joseph Baines. The website search indicated that Ruth Ament Huffman’s parents were Mary Elizabeth Perrin and John S. Huffman) John Huffman’s mother was Suzanne Ament, a common Jewish name. Perrin is also a common Jewish name.
Huffman and Perrin had a daughter, Ruth Ament Huffman, (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p 850 (Index: Ruth Ament Huffman, "LBJ’s grandmother," is listed under "Baines.")) who married Joseph Baines (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 850 (Index: Joseph Wilson Baines, "LBJ’s grandfather," is listed under "Baines.")) and together they had a daughter, Rebekah Baines, (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 50) Lyndon Johnson’s mother. The line of Jewish mothers can be traced back three generations in Lyndon Johnson’s family tree. There is little doubt that he was Jewish.
To recap, the following is Lyndon Johnson’s maternal family tree:
Mother: Rebekah Baines (married Sam Johnson, Lyndon’s father)
Maternal grandparents: Ruth Ament Huffman and Joseph Baines
Maternal great‑grandparents (parents of Ruth Huffman): Mary Elizabeth Perrin and John S. Huffman, III
Maternal great‑great grandparents (parents of Mary Perrin): Dicea Kerby and William Perrin (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) NOTE: I did a search on the parents of Mary Perrin, wife of John Huffman. The website search indicated that Mary Perrin’s parents were Dicea Kerby and William Perrin)
Maternal great‑great grandparents (parents of John Huffman, III): Suzanne Ament and John S. Huffman, II (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) NOTE: I did a search on the parents of John S. Huffman, husband of Mary Elizabeth Perrin. The website search indicated that John S. Huffman’s parents were Suzanne Ament and John S. Huffman)
Maternal great‑great‑great grandparents (parents of John Huffman, II): Cathrine Lyter and John Huffman (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) NOTE: I did a search on the parents of John S. Huffman, husband of Mary Elizabeth Perrin. The website search indicated that John S. Huffman’s parents were Suzanne Ament and John S. Huffman))
As previously stated, many Jews migrated to Texas from Germany. A Johnson family friend, Cynthia Crider, observed that Lyndon’s mother, Rebekah Baines (Johnson), often boasted of her Baines ancestry, but rarely mentioned the maternal side, the Huffmans. In fact, Crider recalled that Lyndon’s father, Sam Johnson, used to tease his wife occasionally about her German heritage. When she would get stubborn about something, Sam would say, "That’s your German blood again. German blood! Look at your brother’s name. Huffman! Probably was Hoffmann once—in Berlin." Rebekah would respond, "Sam, you know it’s Holland Dutch." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 61)
As far as I can determine, Rebekah’s German ancestors, the Huffmans, came to America in the mid‑1700s and had a son, John Huffman, in about 1767 in Frederick, Maryland. I cannot find records of John Huffman’s parents. They were probably German immigrants. Huffman married Catherine Lyter in 1790 in Frederick, Maryland. (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints)) At some point Huffman and Lyter moved to Bourbon, Kentucky and had a son, John Huffman, II, who married Suzanne Ament. Huffman, II and Ament had a son, John S. Huffman, III, born on May 7, 1824 in Bourbon, Kentucky; and died on June 22, 1865 in Collin, Texas. John Huffman, III was Rebekah’s great‑grandfather. He married Mary Elizabeth Perrin. Huffman and Perrin had a daughter, Ruth Ament Huffman, who married Joseph Baines. Huffman and Baines were Rebekah’s parents, Lyndon’s grandparents.
As a young adult, Lyndon Johnson taught school in
Cotulla, a poor "Mexican" community south of San Antonio. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 166‑169) Many of his former students marvelled at his spirit, dedication and self‑discipline. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 166‑169) Lyndon strongly encouraged the young Mexicans to learn English in order to get ahead. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 166‑169) Possibly he truly had a yearning to help those in need; however, that does not fit most historical accounts of Lyndon Johnson the man. From early adulthood, virtually all of his actions were calculated. Given Lyndon’s Huffman, Perrin, Ament family line, it is more likely that he was assisting descendants of Sephardic Jews who migrated to Texas from Spain centuries earlier.
Recently it was disclosed that there are many hispanic Jews living in the San Antonio area. Richard Santos, a hispanic Jew and native of San Antonio, wrote a book entitled Silent Heritage: The Sephardim and the Colonization of the Spanish North American Frontier, 1492‑1600. (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,
http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html) Santos spoke of his "crypto‑Jewish" heritage at the Texas Jewish Historical Society’s 22nd conference on May 11, 2001. Crypto‑Jews are Sephardic groups of families who secretly retained their religion and culture after the 15th‑century Spanish royal decree deemed it punishable by death. Santos has spent his entire adult life trying to educate the masses about the secret history of his bloodline. (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,
http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html)
Stan Hordes, a former New Mexico state historian and professor at the University of New Mexico, described his observations at the same conference.
"One person told me, ‘My family just doesn’t eat pork—we’re allergic to pork,’" Hordes said, explaining the pockets of crypto‑Jews who maintain Jewish traditions without even realizing it. (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,
http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html)
Among the crypto‑Jews that Hordes described, some of the women light menorahs without realizing what they’re doing. (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,
http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html)
Given this new information about crypto‑Jews, plus Johnson’s heritage; it is highly plausible that he began his early adult life as a teacher at Cotulla not merely to help disadvantaged hispanics students, but rather to help descendants of Sephardic Jews—crypto‑Jews—from Spain who migrated to Mexico and what is now southern Texas. And the reason he felt obliged to help these crypto‑Jews was because of his own secret ethnicity.
This information about Sephardic Jews in southern Texas sheds new light on the ethnicity of Lyndon Johnson’s wife, Claudia Alta Taylor Johnson (aka, "Lady Bird"). She is apparently a Sephardic Jew of Mexican origin. Although her facial features are consistent with Semitic origin, that alone is not definitive proof. Claudia’s mother, Minnie Lee Pattillo, was likely a Sephardic Jew from Mexico. Pattillo is a common Spanish/Mexican name; however, there are no records of Minnie Pattillo’s parents so it is entirely possible that they were immigrants. It is quite odd that a first lady—one who lived in the White House less than 40 years ago—has maternal grandparents whose identity is unknown and undocumented.
Minnie Pattillo died in 1918 when Claudia was only five. (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,
http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html) Minnie was born in about 1890 in Karnack, Texas (Harrison County); (David Garza, The Secret History, May 11, 2001, The Austin Chronicle: Books,
http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2001‑05‑11/books_feature.html) however, she apparently lived in Alabama when Thomas Taylor married her. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 295) All that is known about Minnie Pattillo is that she had a "spinster" sister, Effie Pattillo (also from Alabama), who helped raise Claudia. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 296)
Claudia Taylor’s father was Thomas Jefferson Taylor, II, a prosperous businessman and philanthropist. (Mark Odintz, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/TT/fta26.html) He was the son of Thomas Jefferson Taylor and Emma Louisa Bates. (Internet, familysearch.org (geneology website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints)) Historian Robert Caro wrote that Claudia’s father was the "richest man in [Karnack, Texas]." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 294) Caro also indicated that Johnson’s previous two girlfriends—Carol Davis and Kitty Clyde of San Marcos and Johnson City, respectively—were also daughters of the richest men in town.
1931: Johnson Came to Washington as Congressman Kleberg’s Assistant
Lyndon Johnson began his career in 1931 as the legislative assistant of Congressman Richard M. Kleberg, a wealthy Jewish politician representing the 14th District of Texas. Kleberg was not a serious politician, rather an outwardly friendly man who inherited vast wealth. "A sweeter man that Dick Kleberg never lived," a friend said. "But he was a playboy. As for work, he had no interest in that whatsover." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 219)
Richard Kleberg was one of the wealthiest men in Texas. He inherited twenty percent interest in the King Ranch, the largest ranch in the continental United States; (Encyclopedia Britannica: King Ranch) a 2,000‑square‑mile estate with influence extending beyond its borders. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 219) In fact, Richard Kleberg’s father, Robert Kleberg, turned much of South Texas into "Kleberg County." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 219) Although the ranch dealt in cattle and horses, as well as in sorghum and wheat, (Encyclopedia Britannica: King Ranch) it also built entire towns, railroads, harbors, colleges, and banks. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 219) In the 1940s, it contracted oil and gas leases to provide additional income. By the mid‑1970s, the ranch owned millions of acres of land in such countries as Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Morocco; but falling market prices caused them to sell off much of this land in the 1980s. (Encyclopedia Britannica: King Ranch)
The King Ranch was founded in 1852 by Richard King (Richard Kleberg’s grandfather), and was expanded significantly by King’s son‑in‑law, Robert Kleberg (Richard Kleberg’s father). (Encyclopedia Britannica: King Ranch) In 1922 Robert Kleberg suffered a stroke and Richard was put in charge of the King Ranch. But Richard’s lack of business skills soon caused the King empire to fall into serious financial difficulties. In 1927, the executors of his father’s estate removed Richard from authority and put his younger brother in charge of managing the Ranch. Soon the empire was back on its feet. This did not bother Richard because he did not relish the notion of being a businessman. (Encyclopedia Britannica: King Ranch)
Richard Kleberg ran for an open congressional seat merely as a favor to friend, Roy Miller, former "boy mayor of Corpus Christi" and lobbyist for the gigantic Texas Gulf Sulphur Corporation. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 220) Kleberg replaced Harry Wurchbach who died on November 6, 1931. At that time, Wurchbach was the only Republican Congressman from Texas. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 218) With Kleberg’s election, the Democrats gained control of the House. The new Speaker of the House of Representative was John Nance Garner(Footnote 21) of Texas. Miller was a Garner ally, and in Miller’s view, the main qualification for the Democratic nominee to replace Wurchbach was electability. And no one was more popular in the 14th District than a member of the Kleberg family. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 220)
After easily winning the election, Kleberg gave Miller, the lobbyist, carte blanche permission to use his Capitol Hill office as if it were his own. Often Kleberg never went to the office at all. In essence, Miller was the unelected congressman for the 14th District and Kleberg was merely a figurehead; (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 220) however, the work of the Kleberg’s constituency was left to his legislative assistant, Lyndon Johnson. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 221)
Under Miller’s tutelage, Johnson learned to play hardball politics. When Kleberg’s bid for re‑election was challenged in the 1932 Democratic primary by a more liberal candidate, Carl Wright Johnson; Lyndon Johnson, Roy Miller and another Texas politician, Welly Hopkins, maligned the challenger’s character, calling him a "communist," guilty of "radicalism" and "similar filth and slime." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 272) Carl Johnson didn’t have a chance in a district so thoroughly controlled by the King Ranch. Newspapers gave him limited coverage. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 272) Needless to say, the challenger lost. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 293)
Ironically, Kleberg won ten of eleven counties in his district; but the one he lost was Lyndon Johnson’s home county of Blanco. Some residents of the county felt that Kleberg lost in Blanco because many of the voters disliked the congressman’s legislative assistant. According to Johnson’s aid, Gene Latimer, "He worked hard—he just broke his back—to get those people to like him, but they just didn’t." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p. 293)
Johnson’s Mentor, Senator Alvin Jacob Wirtz
Alvin Jacob Wirtz was a lawyer and legislator, first a state senator from Texas, then a United States Senator for the same state. In 1935, Wirtz came to Washington and helped organize the Lower Colorado River Authority. He specialized in oil and water law and was appointed general counsel to the newly established LCRA. Working closely with United States Representative Lyndon Johnson, he helped the river authority secure grants and loans from the Public Works Administration, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Rural Electrification Administration. (Michael L. Gillette, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/WW/fwi70.html)
More than any one person, Alvin Wirtz helped pave Lyndon Johnson’s early rise to power. Ed Clark, a colleague of Wirtz’ for years said of him, "What he wanted was P‑O‑W‑E‑R—power over other men. He wanted power, but he didn’t want to get it by running for office. He liked to sit quietly, smoke a cigar. He would sit and work in his library, and plan and scheme, and usually he would get somebody out in front of him so that nobody knew it was Alvin Wirtz who was doing it. He would sit and scheme in the dark. He wasn’t an outgoing person. But he was the kind of person who didn’t want to lose any fights. And he didn’t lose many." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 373)
As an attorney, Wirtz had a reputation among collegues for being ruthless. A San Antonio attorney observed that he was "a conniver—a conniver like I never saw before or since. Sharp, cunning." Another attorney commented that "He would gut you if he could. But you would probably never know he did it. I mean, that was a man who would do anything—and he would still be smiling when he slipped you the knife." (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 376)
In 1917 Wirtz moved his family to Seguin, where he continued his law practice until 1934. From 1922 to 1930 Wirtz served as state senator from Guadalupe County. During his time in the legislature, Wirtz became involved with a group of citizens interested in the development of the Guadalupe River as a source of hydroelectric power. (Michael L. Gillette, Handbook of Texas (online), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/WW/fwi70.html) As someone driven by a need to obtain power over men, Wirtz viewed dams as a means of acquiring it. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 376)
In 1934 Wirtz moved to Austin after being run out of Seguin by disgruntled farmers who believed his dam projects had cheated them out of their land. This was result of his dealings with businessman Samuel Insull of Chicago. Insull had retained Wirtz to procure land from farmers along the Guadalupe River for the purpose of building six small dams for irrigation. The farmers were unwilling to sell, but through legal maneuvering, Wirtz got the government to purchase the farmers’ land at low prices. On February 26, 1934, Tom Hollamon, Sr—a sixty‑seven‑year‑old farmer and former Texas Ranger—walked into Wirtz’s office, where he was meeting with Insull representatives, and began shooting. Before being disarmed, one Chicago financier was dead. Hollamon was arrested for murder, but Wirtz was quickly run out of town by the locals. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 376‑377)
In Austin Wirtz organized the law firm of Powell, Wirtz, Rauhut, and Gideon. Things seemed bleak for awhile, but Roosevelt’s New Deal gave him a chance to revive his dream of becoming a power mogul. During Roosevelt’s "Hundred Days" portion of the New Deal, $3.3 billion of federal money was slowly released into the economy for public works which included dams. Eventually a $10,000,000 dam project, the Marshall Ford Dam, became the vehicle by which Wirtz could acquire the power he sought. The contract was awarded to one of Wirtz’ clients, Brown & Root. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp 378‑379)
Brown & Root: Johnson’s Primary Financial Supporter
Throughout Lyndon Johnson’s career, Brown & Root was his biggest financial supporter. Today the company is a huge defense contractor. It was founded by Herman Brown in the 1920s. The son of a Belton, Texas shopkeeper, Herman’s career had a humble beginning. But Alvin Wirtz and Lyndon Johnson helped Brown & Root acquire huge defense contracts from President Roosevelt in the late 1930s. The company prospered a great deal after America’s entry into World War II. Brown & Root returned the favor by giving Johnson virtually any financial help he requested.
Brown & Root continued to grow as the primary contractor for building military bases. When Johnson got America into the Vietnam War, Brown & Root made a fortune constructing military bases in Southeast Asia. They built the Tan Son Nhut Air Base and reportedly built many of the infamous tiger cages used to brutalize and torture suspected enemies of the Saigon regime. (Reliable source within the intelligence community (deceased)) Tiger Cages were cells constructed below ground with just enough room to fit one person. Prisoners were put in these as punishment for various infractions of the rules.
As of this writing (2002) Brown & Root is owned by the Halliburton Company, a prestigious defense contractor based in Dallas, Texas. Until July 25, 2000, Vice‑President Dick Cheney was CEO and chairman of the board of the Halliburton Company. The following is a profile of the Halliburton Company from Yahoo.com stock quotes:
Business Summary
Halliburton Company provides services and equipment to energy, industrial and governmental customers. The Company operates in two business segments: Energy Services Group and Engineering and Construction Group. The Energy Services Group provides a range of discrete services and products to customers for the exploration, development and production of oil and gas. The segment serves independent, integrated and national oil companies. The Engineering and Construction Group segment, consisting of Kellogg Brown & Root and Brown & Root Services, provides a range of services to energy and industrial customers and government entities worldwide. Halliburton operates in 120 countries.
Financial Summary
Halliburton Company provides a variety of services, equipment, maintenance, and engineering and construction to energy, industrial and govermental customers. For the nine months ended 9/30/01, revenues rose 13% to $9.87 billion. Net income from continuing operations before account. Change increased 96% to $410 million. Revenues reflect higher rig counts and increased prices. Earnings also reflect increased utilization of equipment and personnel.
The Rags to Riches Story
of Brown & Root
At the age of sixteen (1909), Herman Brown got a job earning two dollars a day carrying a rod to assist surveyors. For ten years, he lived in a crowded tent for members of the construction crew. In fact, when he got married in 1917, he and his wife, Margaret Root, spent their wedding night in a tent, and a tent was their first home. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 369‑371)
At the age of twenty‑one, Herman became a contractor. At that time, successful contractors had to know how to handle mules and men. Herman quickly gained a reputation for getting the maximum amount of work from men working on construction contracts. Later, he took on two partners. As a favor to his wife, Margaret Root, Herman made her brother, Dan Root, a partner; along with Herman’s brother George. When Dan Root died, the firm’s name remained unchanged out of affection to Herman’s wife. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, p 371)
After the success of the Marshall Ford Dam, Herman Brown was looking for even bigger projects for his construction company. Something big was about to happen. In 1938, Congress, at President Roosevelt’s request, had authorized the expenditure of a billion dollars on a "two‑ocean" Navy. By early 1939 it had become clear that a substantial portion of that billion would be spent on the construction of naval bases and training stations for a greatly expanded Navy Air Force. On April 26, 1939, Roosevelt had signed into law a bill authorizing the expenditure of $66,800,000 for the first of such bases. Brown’s attention was already focused on the Navy because Lyndon Johnson was a member of the Naval Affairs Committee. He decided to bid on one of the bases—in San Juan, Puerto Rico—authorized in the April bill. Unfortunately, Johnson did not have enough influence within the White House, and Brown was not awarded the San Juan contract. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 581‑582)
An important political dynamic had developed between President Roosevelt and his Texan Vice‑President John Garner. In 1937 the conservative Garner broke with liberal Roosevelt over the latter's plan to enlarge the Supreme Court. In 1940 Garner challenged Roosevelt for the Democratic presidential nomination but lost. (Encyclopedia Britannica: John Garner) Meanwhile, there was talk of another naval air base for Texas, on the Gulf of Corpus Christi. Obviously Brown wanted that contract, but he had been a Garner supporter for years. So had Corpus Christi’s Congressman, Richard Kleberg. In fact, Kleberg’s primary handler, Roy Miller, was Garner’s campaign manager. Lyndon Johnson too, had long supported Garner. All parties knew that in order to get the Corpus Christi contract, they would have to unilaterally endorse Roosevelt over Garner. The Texans chose to drop Garner by sending a subtle political signal to Roosevelt rather than overtly pledging their support to him. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 582‑583)
In the midst of this turmoil, George Brown wrote a letter to Johnson pledging his support: In the past I have not been very timid about asking you to do favors for me and hope you will not get any timidity if you have anything at all that you think I can or should do. Remember that I am for you, right or wrong, and it makes no difference if I think you are right or wrong. If you want it, I am for it 100%. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 583)
In Houston, where Brown & Root’s headquarters were located, Herman Brown’s political influence was growing, and the city’s Congressman, Albert Thomas, a junior Representative with negligible clout in Washington, was known to take Herman’s orders unquestionably. In August, Congressman Thomas had said, "Of course every member of the Texas delegation is for Vice President Garner." In December 1939, Thomas made another statement. He was not for Garner after all, he said. He was for Roosevelt. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 583) This was a signal to Roosevelt, sent by Johnson et al, that they had dumped their longtime political ally, John Garner.
Roosevelt responded positively with two reciprocal signals. First, on January 2, 1940, he appointed Alvin J. Wirtz as Under Secretary of the Interior. Wirtz was the attorney for Brown & Root and had been recommended by Lyndon Johnson. Wirtz would be second in command only to Harold Ickes. Second, the White House went out of its way to cite Representative Lyndon Johnson as the person who "presented Wirtz’s name." Presidential Secretary Stephen Early stated that "neither Texas Senator was consulted," nor was Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn or Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones. To readers of political signals, it was clear that Lyndon Johnson had become a key White House ally. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 583‑584)
In addition, the Navy Department was quietly informed by the White House that Lyndon Johnson was to be consulted—and advice taken—on the awarding of Navy contracts in Texas. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 584)
Consequently, Brown & Root began obtaining coveted Navy Department contracts. The Corpus Christi Naval Air Station was awarded to Brown & Root without competitive bidding. Instead it was awarded on a "negotiated basis." Because the contract was so big, Brown & Root was directed by the Roosevelt administration to share the profits with another contractor, Kaiser. (Robert Caro, Path to Power, pp. 584‑585)
Friendship With J. Edgar Hoover
It has been well documented that Hoover and Johnson had been friends since 1945 when a young Senator Johnson and his family moved onto the same block of Washington’s Thirtieth Place where Hoover lived. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, p. 223)
John Edgar Hoover (1895 ‑ 1972) was born in Washington, DC—the youngest of four children—and rarely left the city his entire life. He lived with his mother at 413 Seward Square until her death in 1938. Afterward he continued living there with his companion and associate director at the FBI, Clyde Tolson. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, p. 214) It is common knowledge that the two were homosexual lovers.
In 1917, Hoover entered the Department of Justice as a file reviewer. Within two years he became special assistant to Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in the Woodrow Wilson administration. In that position, he oversaw the mass roundups and deportations of suspected Bolsheviks (Communists) after World War I. In May of 1924, he was named acting director of the Bureau of Investigation (as it was then called) and confirmed as director seven months later. Finding the Bureau in disarray because of the scandals of the Harding administration, he reorganized and rebuilt it, establishing a fingerprint file, which became the world's largest; a scientific crime‑detection laboratory; and the FBI National Academy, to which selected law enforcement officers from all parts of the country were sent for special training. (Encyclopedia Britannica: J. Edgar Hoover)
By the early 1930s, the Bureau was involved in the pursuit of Bonnie and Clyde and the Ma Barker Gang, the shooting and killing of notorious bank robber John Dillinger, investigating the kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh’s infant son, and countless other sensational stories. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, p. 218; Encyclopedia Britannica: John Dillinger)
In the summer of 1936, Hoover began to have secret meetings with President Roosevelt where the FBI was granted executive authority to expand into intelligence gathering—particularly in areas of subversive activities in America, including Communism and fascism. With Roosevelt’s support, the FBI grew from 391 agents in 1933 to nearly 5,000 by the end of World War II. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, p. 220)
After war, the Hoover exploited anticommunist hysteria of the Cold War to intensify the FBI’s intelligence activities. It is widely known that Hoover leaked derogatory material on Martin Luther King in the 1960s as part of his secret counterintelligence (COINTELPRO) program. Former assistant FBI Director William Sullivan commented on Hoover’s surveillance of Kennedy and King in a book, The Bureau, published posthumously in 1979.(Footnote 22) The following is an excerpt from that book:
Hoover was always gathering damaging material on Jack Kennedy, which the President, with his active social life, seemed more than willing to provide. We never put any technical surveillance on JFK, but whatever came up was automatically funneled directly to Hoover. I was sure he was saving everything he had on Kennedy, and on Martin Luther King, Jr., too, until he could unload it all and destroy them both. He kept this kind of explosive material in his personal files, which filled four rooms on the fifth floor of headquarters. (William Sullivan, The Bureau, p. 50) (The quotation from William Sullivan, regarding Hoover’s surveillance of JFK and MLK, was obtained from Jim Marrs’s book, Crossfire pp. 221 ‑ 222. Marrs cited William Sullivan’s posthumous book, The Bureau, p. 50)
Hoover’s view of organized crime was astonishing, to say the least. As late as January 1962, Hoover denied its existence in the United States. He stated that "No single individual or coalition of racketeers dominates organized crime across the nation." It was not until gangster Joe Valachi was brought to Washington by Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s Justice Department to testify before the Senate that Hoover was forced to admit that his opinion about organized crime in American needed some serious re‑thinking. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, pp. 216 ‑ 217)
In January 1964, shortly after Hoover’s 69th birthday (January 1st) and less than two months after Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson signed an Executive Order exempting Hoover from retiring on his 70th birthday, which was mandatory at that time. It should be noted that Johnson was also gearing up the Warren Commission to investigate Kennedy’s death in that timeframe. Consequently, it is not implausible to think that Johnson’s Executive Order may have been an incentive to Hoover not to conduct a serious investigation of the assassination. It might have been a reward as well, since many of the FBI’s cover‑up activities had already been accomplished by January. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, pp. 223 ‑ 224. Marrs cited Executive Order 11154 as the tool used by Johnson to exempt Hoover from mandatory retirement at age 70)
Sullivan also observed that the relationship between Johnson and Hoover changed after Johnson assumed the presidency. The following is an excerpt from Sullivan’s posthumous book, The Bureau:
They remained close when Johnson served as Vice President, but there was a change in their relationship when Johnson became President. The Director was over 65 by that time, past retirement age for federal employees, and he stayed in office only because of a special waiver which required the President’s signature each year. That waiver put Hoover right in Johnson’s pocket. With that leverage, Johnson began to take advantage of Hoover, using the Bureau as his personal investigative arm. His never‑ending requests were usually political, and sometimes illegal¼And Hoover hot‑footed it to Johnson’s demands¼he found himself very much in the back seat, almost a captive of the President¼(William Sullivan, The Bureau, pp. 60 ‑ 61, The quotation from William Sullivan, regarding Johnson and Hoover’s relation, was obtained from Jim Marrs’s book, Crossfire, p. 224. Marrs cited William Sullivan’s posthumous book, The Bureau, pp. 60 ‑ 61)
LBJ’s "Passionate Attachment" to Israel
As some readers may know, the term "passionate attachment" was used by George Washington in his farewell address in 1796. Washington advised citizens of the new republic to renounce any "passionate attachment"(Footnote 23) with another nation, and also to repudiate "inveterate hatred" toward another country. In the Twentieth Century, the United States failed to heed Washington’s warnings on both counts. Shortly after World War II, we developed an "inveterate hatred" of the Soviet Union and formed a "passionate attachment" to Israel, although the latter accelerated dramatically under the Johnson Administration.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was the last American president in the Twentieth Century to successfully stand up to the pressures and unyielding annoyances of the Israeli government and its American supporters. Although President Kennedy shared his predecessor’s views intellectually, he entered the White House after an extremely close election. Consequently, he had to assume a more cautious approach.
The Eisenhower administration’s Middle East policy is important for two reasons. First of all, it demonstrated that a strong American president can stand up to Israel. Secondly, it reveals that Lyndon Johnson; then Senate Majority Leader, was Eisenhower’s most influential political adversary regarding Israel.
Two major incidents occurred on Eisenhower’s watch where Israel acted as an aggressor toward its neighbors and toward Palestinians living in the region. The first incident occurred in 1953 and involved Israel’s effort to secretly divert waters of the Jordan. The second incident occurred in 1957 when Israel conspired with France and Britain to attack Egypt and overthrow that country’s leader, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, after he nationalized the Suez Canal in defiance of Israel and the Western powers. In the latter incident, Lyndon Johnson used all of his political muscle as Senate Majority Leader to prevent the UN
from imposing sanctions on Israel; the sanctions were fully supported by the Eisenhower administration, for its flagrant
disregard for international law. In both instances, Eisenhower forced Israel to behave by temporarily cutting off American aid.
The Jordan River Diversion
Israel secretly planned to use the Palestinian village of Banat Ya’qub for a major water diversion project that would move waters of the Jordan Valley to central Israel and the North Negev. The UN, the US, and the Palestinians who lived in that area were unaware of Israel’s plans. Earlier, the Eisenhower administration had offered to implement an American‑sponsored regional water‑usage plan, and Israel had promised to cooperate in that effort. But in reality, Israel secretly wanted complete control of the flow of water in the region, despite its commitments to the Americans. Consequently, a dispute ensued over the control of Palestinian territory near Banat Ya’qub.
Unaware of Israel’s hidden agenda, UN Representative, Dr. Ralph Bunche, worked out a truce agreement where disputed lands would be evacuated by Syrian forces. The agreement stipulated that Israel must allow Arab inhabitants to continue farming there. Israel also agreed that it would not occupy the disputed area, but would allow it to be a neutral zone.
Immediately after the Syrian troops withdrew, the Israelis broke their promise and drove the Palestinian farmers from the land. The Syrian troops responded by opening fire to drive out the settlers. Israel responded by complaining that the Syrians had violated the truce and asserted a right to occupy the areas. UN Truce Observers immediately cited Israel as the instigator and essentially stated that the Syrian troops were justified in retaliating against Israel for violating the truce agreement.
The Israelis took the strategy that if they completed the water diversion project at Banat Ya’qub, then the UN would back down because the work simply could not be undone. So the Israelis began working aggressively on the project. They worked non‑stop, twenty‑four hours a day using searchlights at night to hasten completion. But secrecy was still key. They omitted appropriations for the project from their published budget. In addition, they did not mention it to Americans working with them on other water projects; however, US intelligence soon detected their activity.
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles realized that Israel had openly deceived them and had no intention of keeping its earlier promise to cooperate in the American‑sponsored regional water‑usage plan. To show its displeasure, the Eisenhower administration withheld $26 million under the Mutual Security Act and suspended economic aid until Israel agreed to cooperate with UN observers.
In addition, President Eisenhower directed the Treasury to prepare an Executive Order removing tax‑deductible status from contributions by Jewish Americans to such Zionist organizations as the United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Eisenhower did not make these actions public because he did not want to humiliate the Israelis; however, the Israelis interpreted his magnanimous gesture as a sign of weakness. As a result, they continued work on the project; convinced that the Americans would back down. Israel’s strategy might have worked had Israel not launched a bloody raid on the village of Kibya on the night of October 14, 1953. In that attack, twenty‑five‑ year‑old Ariel Sharon and his three hundred Israeli commandos, known as Force 101, massacred fifty‑three Palestinian civilians. According to a UN report, Sharon’s forces drove the villagers into their homes then blew them up.
The Eisenhower administration condemned the raid and, for the first time, publicly revealed that it had already suspended construction funds for Israel’s water supply. Their was a huge backlash against Eisenhower. The US government was denounced by Hadassah, a Jewish charitable organization. An attaché at the Israeli Embassy attempted to divert attention from the water controversy by claiming; in a widely publicized speech, that the Kibya raid was in response to Jordanian aggression. Pro‑Israeli congressmen and David Ben‑Gurion accused Eisenhower and his advisers of anti‑Semitism.
But Eisenhower stood firm and continued to withhold funds from Israel. Fearing a financial burden, Israeli representatives informed President Eisenhower; on October 19, that work had ceased on the water diversion project and that Israel would cooperate with the Security Counsil’s efforts to solve the Jordan River Development problem. Within twenty‑four hours, America restored aid to Israel.
Eisenhower demonstrated that Israel responded faster to cutting off the money flow than anything else; however, the Israelis interpreted America’s quick restoration of aid as proof that they could manipulate the superpower by applying adequate pressure. Ultimately, Israel completed the project in a slightly altered manner.1)
Nov. 1956: The Suez Crisis
The stage was set for the Suez Crisis in 1955 when the Eisenhower administration began pressuring Israel to demonstrate its commitment to peace in the Middle East.
On February 28, 1955, President Gamal Adbel Nasser made a speech full of warnings against Israeli atrocities. He emphasized a bloody raid on the Gaza Strip by the Israelis, allegedly a retaliation for raids made from Gaza. Nasser was also upset with the United States for denying his request for arms a few months earlier. In his speech he repeated the request for Egypt to buy arms but was ignored.
On September 4, 1955, Egypt announced that it had received a proposal from the Soviet Union for an arms sale. The Eisenhower administration treated this as an idle threat which angered Nasser. As a result, he brokered a cotton‑for‑arms barter agreement with Czechoslovakia on September 27 in which Egypt received $200 million worth of arms; tanks, MiG planes, artillery, submarines, and small arms.
Israel immediately renewed its joint arms agreement with the United States, France, and Britain. In addition, Israel requested a treaty guaranteeing its security, but it was denied by the Western powers because they knew that Israel’s military strength was vastly superior to the neighboring Arab nations.
On August 26, 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a speech before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York in which he outlined terms for peace in the Middle East. He stated that the problem of Palestinian refugees could be solved, but Israel should not be expected to assume the full cost. He proposed that Congress approve an international loan to finance the resettlement or repatriating of Palestinian refugees. The loan would also help develop irrigation projects to assist refugees in cultivating their land for growing crops.
The Israelis were somewhat agitated by Dulles’s speech because he mentioned a possible boundary revision. Dulles promptly responded to clarify the American position. He stated in no uncertain terms that if Sharett and Ben‑Gurion (Israeli leaders) wanted American diplomatic, political, and military aid, they would have to demonstrate their peaceful intentions by helping resolve the sensitive problems of Palestinian refugees and boundary disputes. On November 9, President Eisenhower; who was in a Denver hospital convalescing from a heart attack, confirmed Dulles’s position in a formal statement made from his hospital bed.2)
At that point, it became clear that the United States could no longer be counted on to support Israel’s continuing efforts to expand its borders. Consequently, Israel turned to the European powers for support. Over the next year, trouble began to arise over the Suez Canal.
The Suez Canal is a sea‑level waterway running north‑south across the Isthmus of Suez in Egypt to connect the Mediterranean and the Red seas. The canal separates the African continent from Asia, and it provides the shortest seagoing route between Europe and the lands lying around the Indian and western Pacific oceans. It is one of the world's most heavily used shipping lanes.3)
On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Nasser angered Israel and the European powers when he nationalized the Suez Canal. He took this bold action because he felt that friends of Israel in America had cheated him out of US aide for the Aswan Dam that Egypt needed for irrigation and power. The dam cost $1.3 billion and Nasser had been given the impression by the Eisenhower administration that US aide would be forthcoming; however, friends of Israel in America pressured the Senate Appropriations Committee into blocking funding for the dam.
On July 16, 1956, funding was officially denied; much to the chagrin of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. To make matters worse, the State Department issued a statement, on July 19, critically appraising Egypt’s international credit. Nasser felt that this was a ruse created by friends of Israel in America, and he responded by seizing control of the canal and nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in order to obtain funds for the dam.4)
On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt and advanced toward the Suez Canal. On November 1, British and French forces also invaded Egypt and began occupation of the canal zone, but growing opposition from President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskjöld, and Soviet threats of intervention put an immediate stop to British and French support, but Israeli troops still occupied the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip in defiance of a UN resolution.5) Eisenhower was so angered by European involvement in the attack that he telephoned British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and gave him such a tongue‑lashing that the Prime Minister was reduced to tears.6) (Footnote 24)
Eisenhower told Dulles: "Foster, you tell’em, goddamn it, we’re going to apply sanctions, we’re going to the United Nations, we’re going to do everything that there is to stop this thing." He later explained, "We just told the Israelis it was absolutely indefensible and that if they expect our support in the Middle East and in maintaining their position, they had better behave¼We went to town right away to give them hell."
UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld shared Eisenhower’s view that Israel needed to learn to behave. Consequently, Hammarskjöld and Ben‑Gurion engaged in some heated exchanges after the UN Secretary General publicly condemned Israel for its retaliatory actions against Palestinians. In 1956 Ben‑Gurion complained that Hammarskjöld’s remarks had encouraged assaults on Israel by Egypt and Jordan. Hammarskjöld replied as follows:
You are convinced that the threat of retaliation has a deterrent effect. I am convinced that it is more of an incitement to individual members of the Arab forces than even what has been said by their own governments. You are convinced that acts of retaliation will stop further incidents. I am convinced that they will lead to further incidents¼.You believe that this way of creating respect for Israel will pave the way for sound coexistence with the Arab people. I believe that the policy may postpone indefinitely the time for such coexistence¼I think the discussion of this question can be considered closed since you, in spite of previous discouraging experiences, have taken the responsibility of large‑scale tests of the correctness of your belief.7)
On February 2, 1957, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding Israel’s withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip, but Ben‑Gurion refused. Fed up with Israel’s treachery, Eisenhower wrote a strong letter to Ben‑Gurion demanding Israel’s withdrawal. Still Ben‑Gurion refused.8)
Feburary 1957:
LBJ Rescued Israel From UN Sanctions
It had been rumored that UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden was quietly pushing for sanctions; with the full support of the Eisenhower administration, against Israel if it continued to maintain troops in the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza in defiance of US and UN demands for immediate withdrawal. In response, Lyndon Johnson; then Senate Majority Leader, wrote a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urging the Eisenhower Administration not to support UN sanctions against Israel. Johnson’s letter to Dulles appeared in the New York Times on February 20, 1957. The Senate Majority Leader’s argument was that it was an unfair double‑standard to punish a small country like Israel when large countries like the Soviet Union were allowed to openly defy UN resolutions without being punished.9)
In addition, Johnson rallied Senate Democrats to oppose Israel sanctions.(Footnote 25) He used partisan politics to pressure Eisenhower into retreating from principle, but Eisenhower stood his ground and kept applying pressure to Israel by cutting off or delaying financial assistance. When Israel began to run out of money, in March 1957, Prime Minister David Ben‑Gurion finally agreed to withdraw troops from the occupied territories. President Eisenhower triumphed, but Johnson had protected Israel from the humiliation of UN sanctions. Sadly, Eisenhower was the last US president to stand up to the Israeli government and it’s American supporters. At least he proved it could be done.10)
Ironically, one of the best accounts of Lyndon Johnson’s involvement in the Suez Crisis was written by Louis Bloomfield in his 1957 book entitled Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba. In the ensuing years, Johnson’s involvement in that conflict has been erased from history. Although his pro‑Israel stance appeared on the front page of the New York Times on February 20, 1957, his name is not mentioned in Western history books about the Suez Crisis (none that I have found anyway, except Bloomfield’s). The power elite within the book publishing industry have apparently been concealing Johnson’s loyalty to Israel as a means of preventing inquiries by historians, researchers, and investigators about a possible Jewish conspiracy behind the assassination of President Kennedy years later.
This is how Bloomfield described Johnson’s pro‑Israel stance during the Suez/Gulf of Aqaba Crisis:
“On February 11th, 1957, Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, submitted certain Proposals to the Israeli Government which were, in effect, that:
"Israel should withdraw her troops from the Gulf of Aqaba region and the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly.
“The United States should use all its influence to establish the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway for the innocent passage of all nations, including Israel.
“Meanwhile the United States should do everything it could to see that United Nations troops replaced the Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip and that that area should become a kind of de facto United Nations trusteeship where United Nations officials would watch and if possible stop any fighting between Israel and Egypt.
“Subsequent discussion between the United States Secretary of State and Mr. Abba Eban did not bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from these two areas and rumours began to circulate in the American press that the Afro‑Asian bloc would introduce resolutions calling for economic and military sanctions to force Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions.
On February 19th, 1957, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate Majority Leader, wrote to Mr. John Foster Dulles urging that the United States oppose imposing of economic sanctions against Israel by the United Nations. The letter was endorsed by the Senate Democratic Policy Committee.” (Louis Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf of Aqaba, p. 152)
July 2, 1957: Senator Kennedy
Made a Controversial Speech About Algeria
On July 2, 1957, John F. Kennedy; then a US Senator, made a speech, "Facing Facts on Algeria," which denounced France’s colonial occupation of Algeria and the brutality of the French‑Algerian War. The speech also demonstrated an understanding of Indochina that would likely have prevented him from escalating US military involvement in Vietnam had he not been killed.
Historian Richard Mahoney summarized the speech and events that preceded and followed it:
“Early in 1957, Kennedy decided to make a major critique of the [Eisenhower] administration’s position on France’s colonial war in Algeria. By 1957, the French had committed over 500,000 troops to the effort to suppress the nationalist rebellion. Torture, atrocity, and terror on both sides had turned the pride of France’s empire into a chamber of horrors¼the Eisenhower administration had been maintaining a policy of strict silence in Algeria – at least until Kennedy’s attack, which The New York Times called "the most comprehensive and outspoken arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an American in public office.
On July 2, 1957, Kennedy accused the Eisenhower administration of courting disaster in Algeria. He charged that Eisenhower’s policy of non‑involvement in Africa and Asia was really made up of ‘tepid encouragement and moralizations to both sides, cautious neutrality on all the real issues, and a restatement of our obvious dependence upon our European friends, and our obvious dedication nevertheless to the principles of self‑determination, and our obvious desire not to become involved.’ The result, Kennedy said, was that, ‘We have deceived ourselves into believing that we have thus pleased both sides and displeased no one¼when, in truth, we have earned the suspicion of all.’
“The previous decade had proven that the tide of nationalism in the Third World – from Indochina to India to Indonesia – was ‘irresistible,’ Kennedy declared. It was time for France to face the fact that Algeria had to be freed. When would the West learn, he asked, that colonies ‘are like fruit that cling to the tree only till they ripen?’ Didn’t the French debacle in Indochina, which ended at Dien Bien Phu, serve as a warning of what lay ahead for France in Algeria if something were not done? (Referring to lessons that should have been learned from France’s Indochina debacle, Kennedy stated,)
"Did that tragic episode not teach us whether France likes it or not, admits it or not, or has our support or not, that their overseas territories are sooner or later, one by one, going to break free and look with suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to independence?¼Nationalism in Africa cannot be evaluated purely in terms of the historical and legal niceties argued by the French and thus far accepted by the State Department. National self‑identification frequently takes place by quick combustion which the rain of repression simply cannot extinguish.
“In the United States, a storm of protest greeted Kennedy’s address on ‘Facing Facts on Algeria.’ President Eisenhower complained about ‘young men getting up and shouting about things.’ Secretary [of State John Foster] Dulles commented acidly that if the senator wanted to tilt against colonialism, perhaps he might concentrate on the communist variety. Most prominent Democrats were equally scornful. Adlai Stevenson dismissed Kennedy’s speech as .terrible.’ Dean Acheson described the speech as "foolish words that wound¼a dispirited ally.
“In France, the speech provoked an even more furious outcry. Paris’s largest daily, ‘Le Figaro,’ remarked: ‘It is shameful that our business is so badly directed that we are forced to endure such idiocies.’ U.S. News and World Report noted that ‘An American has unified France – against himself!’ Responding to Kennedy’s speech, French President Rene Coty told the French Senate that France would ‘never negotiate with cutthroats since independence would give the 1,200,000 Europeans living in Algeria one alternative – leaving their homeland or living at the mercy of fanaticism.’ French Defense Minister Andre Morice publicly wondered whether Kennedy was ‘having nightmares.’ Talk of independence, Morice said, ‘will cost many more innocent lives,’ Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. reported to Kennedy from Paris that summer that "Algeria is beginning to poison France.
“In Algeria itself, feeling among the European colonists against the speech ran so high that French authorities warned American newsmen and residents to stay off the streets to avoid reprisals. Two days after the speech a bomb exploded outside the American consulate in Algiers. The French Resident Minister in Algiers, Robert Lacoste, called the bomb ‘a Communist joke’ and challenged Kennedy to come to Algeria. The senator declined...
“Practically no one in the American foreign‑policy establishment regarded the Algeria speech as anything more than a partisan political blast designed to attract attention. But foreign correspondents such as Alistair Cooke of the Manchester Guardian and Henri Pierre of Le Monde recognized what their American counterparts had not – that Kennedy knew what he was talking about on Third World issues. In a letter to the editor of The New York Times, Pierre wrote: ‘Strangely enough, as a Frenchman I feel that on the whole Mr. Kennedy is more to be commended than blamed for his forthright, frank and provocative speech.’
Although Le Monde opposed Kennedy’s call for Algerian independence, it identified the senator as one of the few serious students of history in American politics: ‘The most striking point of the speech of Mr. Kennedy is the important documentation it revealed and his thorough knowledge of the French milieu.’" (Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, pp. 19‑22)
Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Algeria
In his 1957 speech about Algeria, "Senator" Kennedy was highly critical of the Eisenhower administration; however, the political dynamic involved must be considered. Kennedy’s views about Israel and the Middle East in general were closer to Eisenhower’s than Johnson’s. Having stated that, it is significant to understand that Kennedy’s public endorsement of an independent Algeria was a subtle criticism of Israel. It is widely known that Israel opposed Algeria’s independence because it (Israel) wanted to oppress or dominate all Muslim/Arab states.
Although Eisenhower had not publicly supported Algerian independence, it seems plausible that he may have agreed with Kennedy but lacked the political courage to denounce France as the young Senator had boldly done in his speech. Upon reflection, Eisenhower may have secretly admired Kennedy for publicly denouncing America’s World War II ally. After all, France had recently betrayed Eisenhower by secretly conniving with Israel and Britain to attack Egypt after President Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal. (Footnote 26)
Kennedy surely understood how much he and Eisenhower agreed on Middle Eastern issues, but Eisenhower belonged to the opposing political party; and Kennedy and Johnson both had their eyes on the White House in the upcoming 1960 presidential campaign. Consequently, one of Kennedy’s objectives when making the Algerian speech was likely to differentiate himself from the sitting Republican President and his Democratic adversary, Johnson. Although Kennedy and Johnson held opposing views about Israel, they could not openly criticize each other because they were both Democrats. But since Eisenhower was a Republican, it made sense politically for a Democratic Senator to criticize him for not supporting Algerian independence. The speech also sent a message to informed political observers that unlike Johnson, Kennedy would not be a minion for Israel if elected president.
Even more important, Kennedy’s Algerian speech made the front page of the New York Times which put him in the same league as Senate Majority Leader Johnson. Recall that Johnson had made the front page of the New York Times five months earlier (Feb. 1957) for opposing Eisenhower’s efforts to place UN sanctions on Israel in the wake of that country’s failed attempt to seize land from Egypt and overthrow Nasser in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and 57.
June 5, 1967: The Six Day War
Ten years after the Suez Crisis, Israel attacked Egypt again; but this time with success. The event is known as the Six Day War which began on June 5, 1967. Things had changed a great deal over the ten years leading up to the Six Day War. Israel’s most influential adversaries had either died or left public office. Eisenhower had retired years earlier and was in failing health. John Foster Dulles had died of cancer in 1959. Dag Hammarskjöld had been killed in a mysterious plane crash in the Congolese province of Katanga in 1961. President Kennedy of course had been assassinated in Dallas in 1963.
And Israel’s old ally, Lyndon Johnson, had become Commander‑in‑Chief of the United States. In July of 1965, President Johnson had appointed Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg as US ambassador to the UN. Goldberg—a Jew and ardent supporter of Israel—replaced Adlai Stevenson as US delegate to the UN after Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14, 1965. (Footnote 27) The Yemen War had been eroding Arab unity since the conflict began in 1962.(Footnote 28) By 1967, Egyptian forces had suffered heavy losses and were weakened after five years of military involvement in the Yemen War.
Whether these events were random or planned is anyone’s guess, but they were definitely advantageous to Israel by the time the Six Day War occurred in 1967.
The Six Day War was a watershed event that transformed Israel from a small nation into a colonial empire. Although Israel became a nation in 1948, it expanded dramatically after the Six Day War. Israel took from the Arabs; through military force, the Old City of Jerusalem, the Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, on the Israeli‑Syrian border.11) In addition to acquiring new land, Israel gained control of an additional 900,000 Arabs who became the discontented subjects of the new Israeli empire. Since 1967, the number of Arabs under Israel’s military control has grown to over 1.75 million.12)
Amnesty International has documented Israel’s inhumane treatment of its Palestinian subjects citing arbitrary arrests, torturing detainees, destroying or sealing the homes of Arab suspects and their relatives, confiscating land, destroying crops, and diverting precious water from thirsty Palestinians in the desert to fill the swimming pools and water the lawns of Israeli settlers.13) This conduct is condoned, embraced, and encouraged by the United States through its steadfast financial and military support of Israel. Today, US tax payers spend approximately $3 billion annually to subsidize, support, and arm Israel. Although Israel is a wealthy country by western standards, it receives the highest amount of American foreign aid money, 28 percent.14)
Jewish scholars Michael Kazin and Maurice Isserman described in their book, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s, the passion ignited within American Jews by the Six Day War. They wrote the following:
“The swift, complete victory was followed by a long and wrenching occupation of Palestinian lands. For many American Jews, the 1967 conflict awakened and inspired passions that did much to transform the meaning of their identity. No longer was Israel just a reason for Jewish pride, a desert miracle of orange groves and thriving kibbutzes, whose creation was romanticized in Exodus‑a popular novel and film of the late '50s and early '60s. Israel was now the homeland of fellow Jews who had fought alone for their survival and were resigned to living in perpetual danger.
The threat came not just from Arab militants but from communist powers, their Third World allies, and a good many American leftists who were eager to prove their ‘anti‑imperialist’ credentials. In the face of extinction, Israel became ‘the ultimate reality in the life of every Jew living today,’ as a young professor at Brandeis University put it, ‘In dealing with those who oppose Israel, we are not reasonable and we are not rational. Nor should we be.’"15)
Those are troubling words, but they reflect the true agenda of those who support the Jewish state of Israel.
Background on the Six Day War
Understanding the Six Day War requires some background regarding the politics of the Middle East in 1967. The following men were heads of state for the countries involved in the Six Day War:
Nation Head of State
Egypt President Gamal Abdel Nasser
Sryia General Salah al‑Jadid
Jordan King Hussein [ibn Talal]
Israel Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
US President Lyndon Baines Johnson
USSR Chairman Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin
UN Secretary General U Thant (of Burma, now Myanmar)
Egyptian President Nasser was a key figure in Middle Eastern affairs for seventeen years. In 1954 he became prime minister of Egypt, and in 1956 he became that country’s president—remaining in that position until his sudden death in 1970.16) Nasser had been Israel’s primary enemy because he was a charismatic Muslim leader who advocated Arab unity (also known as pan‑Arabism).
Egypt has no oil of any consequence, but it has a more advanced culture than the other oil‑producing Arab nations. It was the home of one of the principal civilizations of the ancient Middle East. It is also one of the earliest urban and literate societies.17) Consequently, the other Arab nations have historically looked to Egypt for leadership.
The original antagonist of Israel in the Six Day War was Syria, led by General Salah al‑Jadid, head of the Ba‘th regime.18) Although Syria; under the Ba‘th regime, was an aggressive enemy of Israel, Syria’s erratic behavior toward other Arab nations actually helped Israel. In fact, Israel used Syrian raids along the its border as a pretext for attacking Egypt and starting the Six Day War.
In March 1963 Ba‘thist supporters seized power from the "secessionist" regime in a military coup. With the Ba‘th in power, Nasser had three Arab nations against him. Those nations were Saudi Arabia and Jordan (because they supported the ousted Imam in the Yemen war) and Syria.
In April 1967 Syrian bombardments of Israeli villages had been intensified. When the Israeli Air Force shot down six Syrian MiG planes in reprisal, Egypt mobilized its forces near the Sinai border.19) Egypt had a mutual defense agreement with the Syrians, who now felt themselves in danger. As an advocate of pan‑Arabism, Nasser felt obliged to help Syria. He ordered part of the Egyptian Army to move into Sinai. He thought that the presence of Egyptian forces would discourage the Israelis from attacking Syria. It was a purely defensive move designed to draw off Israeli forces from Syria. If Israel had attacked Syria, then the Egyptian Army would have carried out operations in support of the Syrians. But no offensive operations against Israel were consider.20)
A standoff between Egypt and Israel ensued, and tensions mounted between the superpowers. The Soviet Union supported Egypt and the United States supported Israel. This raced the stakes considerably because it introduced the possibility of nuclear war.21)
Historians now know that Israel secretly launched an attack against Egypt, but lied about it claiming that Nasser had launched the attack first. In fact Israeli Prime Minister Menachem
Begin made this admission in a speech on August 8, 1982 before the National Defense College in Jerusalem. He stated that the Six Day War was not a "war of necessity" but rather a "war of choice¼Nasser did not attack us. We decided to attack him."22) This was a major admission by Begin.
On June 3, 1967, just two days before the Israelis attacked, the United States sent the aircraft carrier Intrepid through the Suez Canal with all its planes lined up on deck. Nasser thought this was an unnecessary show of force. The Egyptian people became furious. They lined the bank of the Canal and threw old shoes at the carrier. At the same time the Sixth Fleet flexed its muscles and prepared for a war situation. It was an excessive show of force by the United States.23)
After Israel’s victory, Nasser was disgusted with Johnson. He felt that Johnson was dishonest and had colluded with Israel to strike first and blame it on Egypt. He was suspicious of America’s UN ambassador Arthur Goldberg, an ardent Zionist. Goldberg had immediately backed Israel in the UN when it claimed that Egypt "fired the first shot." Nasser accused Johnson of collusion, broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, and ordered all Americans out of Egypt. Several other Arab states did the same. Soon Johnson, already angered by the charge of collusion, had to watch the humiliating spectacle of twenty‑four thousand American men, women, and children being thrown out of the Middle East. Johnson never forgot and never forgave.24)
After Egypt’s humiliating defeat in the Six Day War, Nasser attempted to resign, but massive street demonstrations and a vote of confidence by the National Assembly induced him to remain in office. The Soviet Union immediately began replacing all the destroyed war equipment and installed surface‑to‑air missiles along the Suez as a cover for Egypt’s artillery installations.25)
An important footnote to the Six Day War is an incident that occurred in Yemen months earlier. In early 1967, fighting in Yemen still continued. One day there was shooting in Taiz (in Yemen). Direction finders indicated that two bazooka shots came from the headquarters of the United States Point Four Aid Program; which was the CIA's cover organization. Yemeni government forces attacked the building and arrested the four people inside. The safes were opened and an enormous number of documents were found and subsequently photographed by Egyptian intelligence experts.(Footnote 29) The United States was furious at the attack on the building and demanded the documents. They were returned three weeks later, but by that time their secrets were known. Many people within the United States military became extremely hostile toward Nasser because of this event. Some believe the Six Day War was a form of retribution.26)
UN Resolution 242
Within six months after the Six Day War, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 242 which called for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." In theory the UN should enforce the resolution itself, but unfortunately, reality is much different. The sad truth is the UN is unable to enforce much of anything without the support of the United States, and the United States has maintained a "passionate attachment" to Israel ever since President Johnson was in office.
Ironically, Resolution 242 was issued on the fourth anniversary of President Kennedy’s death, November 22, 1967.27) It is an extremely important document because virtually all disputes between Israel and the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states could be resolved by its enforcement.
In addition, the Israelis managed to secure ambiguous, legalistic wording for Resolution 242 which makes even more difficult to enforce;28) however, the resolution remains a highly sensitive area for American presidents and politicians to roam. The following is the entire text of the resolution:
“The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
“Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1). Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2). Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3). Requests the Secretary‑General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4). Requests the Secretary‑General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.” (UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967)
June 8, 1967: Israel Attacked the USS Liberty
In the midst of the Six Day War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty spy vessel killing 34 American sailors and wounding 75.
George Ball wrote a riveting account of Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967. Ball’s comments are significant because he was undersecretary of state in the Johnson and Kennedy administrations. The following text is an excerpt from Ball’s book, The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement With Israel, 1947 to the Present:
“During the [Six Day] War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty. The Liberty was an American intelligence‑ gathering vessel, then cruising in international waters near Egypt and reading the radio transmissions on both sides. It flew the American flag and was painted in US Navy colors, complete with number and name.
“On the fourth day of the war [June 8, 1967], with both Jordan and Egypt routed, the Israelis turned their attention to Syria, the original cause of all this trouble. Guns mounted on the Golan Heights had subjected Galilee to sporadic bombardment for years and the Israelis had every intention of capturing those Heights before hostilities were over. Meanwhile, the United Nations had adopted a cease‑fire resolution and they feared there might not be enough time to accomplish this objective without, as it were, going into overnight.
“The Liberty’s presence and function were known to Israeli leaders. They presumably thought it vital that the Liberty be prevented from informing Washington of their intentions to violate any cease‑fire before they had completed their occupation of the Golan. Their solution was brutal and direct.
“Israel aircraft determined the exact location of the ship and undertook a combined air‑naval attack. Apprised of Israel’s plans from various sources, the US Navy Department faced a delicate problem. Due regard for the lives of America’s naval personnel should have impelled the Navy to urge the State Department to warn off Israel in no uncertain terms; meanwhile, the Navy have alerted the Liberty to its danger and dispatched ships or planes for its protection. But none of these actions was taken in time.
“There has, for years, been a continuing argument about the tragic lapse. Some say that a warning to Israel might have exposed U.S. sources of secret intelligence. Whatever the motive, the President or one of his aides took the decision to risk the ship and its crew, and merely ordered them, without explanation, to steam west at top speed. Unhappily, that notice was too little and taken too late. Israeli ships and planes attacked, killing 34 American sailors, wounding 75, and leaving 821 rocket and machine‑gun holes in the Liberty. It was only when the Israelis were preparing to board the ship that American planes belatedly appeared from the west and forced them to retire.
“The sequel was unedifying. The [Johnson] administration tried vigorously to downplay the whole matter. Although it silenced the crew, casualties to the sailors and damage to the ship could not possibly be concealed. Thus, an elaborate charade was performed. The United States complained pro forma to Israel, which reacted by blaming the victims. The ship, they rejoined, had not been clearly marked but looked like an Arab ship; which was definitely untrue. Nor did the Israelis even pretend that they had queried the American Embassy in Tel Aviv regarding the status of the well‑marked ship. In the end, the Israelis tendered a reluctant and graceless apology; indemnities for the victims and damaged ship were both parsimonious and slow in coming. The sordid affair has still not been erased from the history books; an organization of devoted survivors has kept the cause alive over the years by publishing a newsletter and holding well‑advertised meetings.
Yet the ultimate lesson of the Liberty attack had far more effect on policy
in Israel than America. Israel’s leaders concluded that nothing they
might do would offend the Americans to the point of reprisal. If
America’s leaders did not have the courage to punish Israel for the
blatant murder of American citizens, it seemed that their American
friends would let them get away with almost anything.
(George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 57 ‑ 58)
Arthur Goldberg, UN Point Man
As previously stated, Adlai Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14, 1965.29 Until his untimely death, Stevenson
had represented the United States in the UN. Arthur Goldberg was a Supreme Court Justice appointed by Kennedy to a
traditionally Jewish slot in the high court.(Footnote 30) At President Johnson’s request, Goldberg resigned from his position as
Supreme Court justice to take the lower position of US ambassador to the UN.30 This was an extraordinary move.
Goldberg was an interesting figure. In addition to serving on the Supreme Court and as a UN diplomat, he had an impressive
background in the world of espionage. During World War II, he worked with Haganah and OSS in Palestine.
After the events of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a
military spy agency and precursor to the CIA.31 New York attorney William Donovan was appointed to run the newly formed
agency. With Donovan in charge of the OSS, Roosevelt had created the first civilian‑run spy organization in modern US
history. Donovan immediately recruited another New York attorney, Allen Dulles, to help establish the organization. Goldberg
was given the rank of major and he assisted Donovan and Dulles establish an OSS field office in New York. Shortly thereafter,
Goldberg became—for all intents and purposes—an international spy working for the OSS. He was assigned various spy
missions in Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Morocco.32
With the experience he acquired in espionage, he returned to Washington, DC and created an intelligence gathering operation.
After that, he was sent on a secret mission in Palestine where he met with leaders of the illegal army of Jewish settlers,
Haganah. This operation meant a great deal to Goldberg personally because he had become a Zionist rather late in life. The
Haganah worked with him to coordinate a joint OSS‑Haganah parachute mission into Italy to gather critical intelligence
information. After the Palestine encounter, Goldberg was sent to London to recruit anti‑Nazi Germans, who had been captured
as spies when the allies invaded France.33
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Endnotes
1.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 43 ‑ 45
2.ibid, pp. 45 ‑ 46
3.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Canal
4.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 46
5.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Crisis
6.Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, Chapter 1
7.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 251. Eisenhower’s instructions to Dulles were on p. 47 of Ball’s book. The Hammarskjöld
quote regarding Ben‑Gurion and Israel was on p. 251. Ball cited Brian Urquhart’s biography of Dag Hammarskjöld: Hammarskjöld, p.
157.
8.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 47
9.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 46 ‑ 49; multiple articles about Senate Majority Leader Johnson’s support for Israel in the
New York Times on February 20, 1957
10.ibid
11.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War
12.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 58
13.ibid, p. 179
14.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 256
15.Kazin and Isserman, America Divided, p. 253
16.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser
17.Encyclopedia Britannica: Egypt
18.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War; Salah al‑Jadid; George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 53‑56; Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo
Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249
19.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War
20.Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249
21.ibid
22.Ball, p 56
23.Heikal
24.ibid
25.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser
26.Heikal
27.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 62
28.ibid, pp. 62‑63
29.Encyclopedia Britannica: Adlai Stevenson
30.ibid, Arthur Goldberg
31.Edward B. Shils, Ph.D, Monthly Labor Review (January 1997), pp. 59 ‑ 60 (excerpt from Arthur Goldberg: proof of the American dream)
32.ibid
33.ibid
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Chapter 10: LBJ’s "Passionate Attachment" to Israel
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Background
As some readers may know, the term "passionate attachment" was used by George Washington in his farewell address in
1796. Washington advised citizens of the new republic to renounce any "passionate attachment"(Footnote 23) with another
nation, and also to repudiate "inveterate hatred" toward another country. In the Twentieth Century, the United States failed to
heed Washington’s warnings on both counts. Shortly after World War II, we developed an "inveterate hatred" of the Soviet
Union and formed a "passionate attachment" to Israel, although the latter accelerated dramatically under the Johnson
Administration.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was the last American president in the Twentieth Century to successfully stand up to the
pressures and unyielding annoyances of the Israeli government and its American supporters. Although President Kennedy
shared his predecessor’s views intellectually, he entered the White House after an extremely close election. Consequently, he
had to assume a more cautious approach.
The Eisenhower administration’s Middle East policy is important for two reasons. First of all, it demonstrated that a strong
American president can stand up to Israel. Secondly, it reveals that Lyndon Johnson—then Senate Majority Leader—was
Eisenhower’s most influential political adversary regarding Israel.
Two major incidents occurred on Eisenhower’s watch where Israel acted as an aggressor toward its neighbors and toward
Palestinians living in the region. The first incident occurred in 1953 and involved Israel’s effort to secretly divert waters of the
Jordan. The second incident occurred in 1957 when Israel conspired with France and Britain to attack Egypt and overthrow
that country’s leader, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, after he nationalized the Suez Canal in defiance of Israel and the Western
powers. In the latter incident, Lyndon Johnson used all of his political muscle as Senate Majority Leader to prevent the UN
from imposing sanctions on Israel—the sanctions were fully supported by the Eisenhower administration—for its flagrant
disregard for international law. In both instances, Eisenhower forced Israel to behave by temporarily cutting off American aid.
1953: The Jordan River Diversion
Israel secretly planned to use the Palestinian village of Banat Ya’qub for a major water diversion project that would move
waters of the Jordan Valley to central Israel and the North Negev. The UN, the US, and the Palestinians who lived in that area
were unaware of Israel’s plans. Earlier, the Eisenhower administration had offered to implement an American‑sponsored
regional water‑usage plan, and Israel had promised to cooperate in that effort. But in reality, Israel secretly wanted complete
control of the flow of water in the region, despite its commitments to the Americans. Consequently, a dispute ensued over the
control of Palestinian territory near Banat Ya’qub.
Unaware of Israel’s hidden agenda, UN Representative, Dr. Ralph Bunche, worked out a truce agreement where disputed
lands would be evacuated by Syrian forces. The agreement stipulated that Israel must allow Arab inhabitants to continue
farming there. Israel also agreed that it would not occupy the disputed area, but would allow it to be a neutral zone.
Immediately after the Syrian troops withdrew, the Israelis broke their promise and drove the Palestinian farmers from the land.
The Syrian troops responded by opening fire to drive out the settlers. Israel responded by complaining that the Syrians had
violated the truce and asserted a right to occupy the areas. UN Truce Observers immediately cited Israel as the instigator and
essentially stated that the Syrian troops were justified in retaliating against Israel for violating the truce agreement.
The Israelis took the strategy that if they completed the water diversion project at Banat Ya’qub, then the UN would back
down because the work simply could not be undone. So the Israelis began working aggressively on the project. They worked
non‑stop, twenty‑four hours a day using searchlights at night to hasten completion. But secrecy was still key. They omitted
appropriations for the project from their published budget. In addition, they did not mention it to Americans working with them
on other water projects; however, US intelligence soon detected their activity.
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles realized that Israel had openly deceived them and had no
intention of keeping its earlier promise to cooperate in the American‑sponsored regional water‑usage plan. To show its
displeasure, the Eisenhower administration withheld $26 million under the Mutual Security Act and suspended economic aid
until Israel agreed to cooperate with UN observers. In addition, President Eisenhower directed the Treasury to prepare an
Executive Order removing tax‑deductible status from contributions by Jewish Americans to such Zionist organizations as the
United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Eisenhower did not make these actions public because he did not want to humiliate the Israelis;
however, the Israelis interpreted his magnanimous gesture as a sign of weakness. As a result, they continued work on the
project—convinced that the Americans would back down.
Israel’s strategy might have worked had Israel not launched a bloody raid on the village of Kibya on the night of October 14,
1953. In that attack, twenty‑five‑year‑old Ariel Sharon and his three hundred Israeli commandos, known as Force 101,
massacred fifty‑three Palestinian civilians. According to a UN report, Sharon’s forces drove the villagers into their homes then
blew them up.
The Eisenhower administration condemned the raid and, for the first time, publicly revealed that it had already suspended
construction funds for Israel’s water supply. Their was a huge backlash against Eisenhower. The US government was
denounced by Hadassah, a Jewish charitable organization. An attaché at the Israeli Embassy attempted to divert attention from
the water controversy by claiming—in a widely publicized speech—that the Kibya raid was in response to Jordanian
aggression. Pro‑Israeli congressmen and David Ben‑Gurion accused Eisenhower and his advisers of anti‑Semitism.
But Eisenhower stood firm and continued to withhold funds from Israel. Fearing a financial burden, Israeli representatives
informed President Eisenhower—on October 19—that work had ceased on the water diversion project and that Israel would
cooperate with the Security Counsil’s efforts to solve the Jordan River Development problem. Within twenty‑four hours,
America restored aid to Israel.
Eisenhower demonstrated that Israel responded faster to cutting off the money flow than anything else; however, the Israelis
interpreted America’s quick restoration of aid as proof that they could manipulate the superpower by applying adequate
pressure. Ultimately, Israel completed the project in a slightly altered manner.1
Nov. 1956: The Suez Crisis
The stage was set for the Suez Crisis in 1955 when the Eisenhower administration began pressuring Israel to demonstrate its
commitment to peace in the Middle East.
On February 28, 1955, President Gamal Adbel Nasser made a speech full of warnings against Israeli atrocities. He emphasized
a bloody raid on the Gaza Strip by the Israelis, allegedly a retaliation for raids made from Gaza. Nasser was also upset with the
United States for denying his request for arms a few months earlier. In his speech he repeated the request for Egypt to buy
arms but was ignored.
On September 4, 1955, Egypt announced that it had received a proposal from the Soviet Union for an arms sale. The
Eisenhower administration treated this as an idle threat which angered Nasser. As a result, he brokered a cotton‑for‑arms
barter agreement with Czechoslovakia on September 27 in which Egypt received $200 million worth of arms—tanks, MiG
planes, artillery, submarines, and small arms.
Israel immediately renewed its joint arms agreement with the United States, France, and Britain. In addition, Israel requested a
treaty guaranteeing its security, but it was denied by the Western powers because they knew that Israel’s military strength was
vastly superior to the neighboring Arab nations.
On August 26, 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a speech before the Council of Foreign Relations in New
York in which he outlined terms for peace in the Middle East. He stated that the problem of Palestinian refugees could be
solved, but Israel should not be expected to assume the full cost. He proposed that Congress approve an international loan to
finance the resettlement or repatriating of Palestinian refugees. The loan would also help develop irrigation projects to assist
refugees in cultivating their land for growing crops.
The Israelis were somewhat agitated by Dulles’s speech because he mentioned a possible boundary revision. Dulles promptly
responded to clarify the American position. He stated in no uncertain terms that if Sharett and Ben‑Gurion (Israeli leaders)
wanted American diplomatic, political, and military aid, they would have to demonstrate their peaceful intentions by helping
resolve the sensitive problems of Palestinian refugees and boundary disputes. On November 9, President Eisenhower—who
was in a Denver hospital convalescing from a heart attack—confirmed Dulles’s position in a formal statement made from his
hospital bed.2
At that point, it became clear that the United States could no longer be counted on to support Israel’s continuing efforts to
expand its borders. Consequently, Israel turned to the European powers for support. Over the next year, trouble began to arise
over the Suez Canal.
The Suez Canal is a sea‑level waterway running north‑south across the Isthmus of Suez in Egypt to connect the Mediterranean
and the Red seas. The canal separates the African continent from Asia, and it provides the shortest seagoing route between
Europe and the lands lying around the Indian and western Pacific oceans. It is one of the world's most heavily used shipping
lanes.3
On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Nasser angered Israel and the European powers when he nationalized the Suez Canal.
He took this bold action because he felt that friends of Israel in America had cheated him out of US aide for the Aswan Dam
that Egypt needed for irrigation and power. The dam cost $1.3 billion and Nasser had been given the impression by the
Eisenhower administration that US aide would be forthcoming; however, friends of Israel in America pressured the Senate
Appropriations Committee into blocking funding for the dam. On July 16, 1956, funding was officially denied—much to the
chagrin of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. To make matters worse, the State Department
issued a statement, on July 19, critically appraising Egypt’s international credit. Nasser felt that this was a ruse created by
friends of Israel in America, and he responded by seizing control of the canal and nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in
order to obtain funds for the dam.4
On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt and advanced toward the Suez Canal. On November 1, British and French
forces also invaded Egypt and began occupation of the canal zone, but growing opposition from President Eisenhower,
Secretary of State Dulles, UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskjöld, and Soviet threats of intervention put an immediate stop
to British and French support, but Israeli troops still occupied the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip in defiance of a UN
resolution.5 Eisenhower was so angered by European involvement in the attack that he telephoned British Prime Minister
Anthony Eden and gave him such a tongue‑lashing that the Prime Minister was reduced to tears.6 (Footnote 24)
Eisenhower told Dulles: "Foster, you tell’em, goddamn it, we’re going to apply sanctions, we’re going to the United Nations,
we’re going to do everything that there is to stop this thing." He later explained, "We just told the Israelis it was absolutely
indefensible and that if they expect our support in the Middle East and in maintaining their position, they had better behave¼
We went to town right away to give them hell."
UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld shared Eisenhower’s view that Israel needed to learn to behave. Consequently,
Hammarskjöld and Ben‑Gurion engaged in some heated exchanges after the UN Secretary General publicly condemned Israel
for its retaliatory actions against Palestinians. In 1956 Ben‑Gurion complained that Hammarskjöld’s remarks had encouraged
assaults on Israel by Egypt and Jordan. Hammarskjöld replied as follows:
You are convinced that the threat of retaliation has a deterrent effect. I
am convinced that it is more of an incitement to individual members of
the Arab forces than even what has been said by their own
governments. You are convinced that acts of retaliation will stop further
incidents. I am convinced that they will lead to further incidents¼.You
believe that this way of creating respect for Israel will pave the way for
sound coexistence with the Arab people. I believe that the policy may
postpone indefinitely the time for such coexistence¼. I think the
discussion of this question can be considered closed since you, in spite
of previous discouraging experiences, have taken the responsibility of
large‑scale tests of the correctness of your belief.7
On February 2, 1957, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding Israel’s withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba
and the Gaza Strip, but Ben‑Gurion refused. Fed up with Israel’s treachery, Eisenhower wrote a strong letter to Ben‑Gurion
demanding Israel’s withdrawal. Still Ben‑Gurion refused.8
Feb. 1957: LBJ Rescued Israel From UN Sanctions
It had been rumored that UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden was quietly pushing for sanctions—with the
full support of the Eisenhower administration—against Israel if it continued to maintain troops in the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza in
defiance of US and UN demands for immediate withdrawal. In response, Lyndon Johnson—then Senate Majority
Leader—wrote a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urging the Eisenhower Administration not to support UN
sanctions against Israel. Johnson’s letter to Dulles appeared in the New York Times on February 20, 1957. The Senate
Majority Leader’s argument was that it was an unfair double‑standard to punish a small country like Israel when large countries
like the Soviet Union were allowed to openly defy UN resolutions without being punished.9
In addition, Johnson rallied Senate Democrats to oppose Israel sanctions.(Footnote 25) He used partisan politics to pressure
Eisenhower into retreating from principle, but Eisenhower stood his ground and kept applying pressure to Israel by cutting off
or delaying financial assistance. When Israel began to run out of money, in March 1957, Prime Minister David Ben‑Gurion
finally agreed to withdraw troops from the occupied territories. President Eisenhower triumphed, but Johnson had protected
Israel from the humiliation of UN sanctions. Sadly, Eisenhower was the last US president to stand up to the Israeli government
and it’s American supporters. At least he proved it could be done.10
Ironically, one of the best accounts of Lyndon Johnson’s involvement in the Suez Crisis was written by Louis Bloomfield in his
1957 book entitled Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba. In the ensuing years, Johnson’s involvement in that conflict has been
erased from history. Although his pro‑Israel stance appeared on the front page of the New York Times on February 20, 1957,
his name is not mentioned in Western history books about the Suez Crisis (none that I have found anyway, except
Bloomfield’s). The power elite within the book publishing industry have apparently been concealing Johnson’s loyalty to Israel
as a means of preventing inquiries by historians, researchers, and investigators about a possible Jewish conspiracy behind the
assassination of President Kennedy years later.
This is how Bloomfield described Johnson’s pro‑Israel stance during the Suez/Gulf of Aqaba Crisis:
On February 11th, 1957, Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States
Secretary of State, submitted certain Proposals to the Israeli
Government which were, in effect, that:
"Israel should withdraw her troops from the Gulf of Aqaba region and the
Gaza Strip, in accordance with the recommendations of the United
Nations General Assembly.
The United States should use all its influence to establish the Strait of
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway for the
innocent passage of all nations, including Israel.
Meanwhile the United States should do everything it could to see that
United Nations troops replaced the Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip and
that that area should become a kind of de facto United Nations
trusteeship where United Nations officials would watch and if possible
stop any fighting between Israel and Egypt."
Subsequent discussion between the United States Secretary of State
and Mr. Abba Eban did not bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli
forces from these two areas and rumours began to circulate in the
American press that the Afro‑Asian bloc would introduce resolutions
calling for economic and military sanctions to force Israel to comply with
the withdrawal resolutions.
On February 19th, 1957, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate
Majority Leader, wrote to Mr. John Foster Dulles urging that the United
States oppose imposing of economic sanctions against Israel by the
United Nations. The letter was endorsed by the Senate Democratic
Policy Committee.
(Louis Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf of Aqaba, p. 152)
Jul. 2, 1957: Senator Kennedy Made a Controversial Speech About Algeria
On July 2, 1957, John F. Kennedy—then a US Senator—made a speech, "Facing Facts on Algeria," which denounced
France’s colonial occupation of Algeria and the brutality of the French‑Algerian War. The speech also demonstrated an
understanding of Indochina that would likely have prevented him from escalating US military involvement in Vietnam had he not
been killed.
Historian Richard Mahoney summarized the speech and events that preceded and followed it:
Early in 1957, Kennedy decided to make a major critique of the
[Eisenhower] administration’s position on France’s colonial war in
Algeria. By 1957, the French had committed over 500,000 troops to the
effort to suppress the nationalist rebellion. Torture, atrocity, and terror
on both sides had turned the pride of France’s empire into a chamber of
horrors. ¼the Eisenhower administration had been maintaining a policy
of strict silence in Algeria – at least until Kennedy’s attack, which The
New York Times called "the most comprehensive and outspoken
arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an
American in public office."
On July 2, 1957, Kennedy accused the Eisenhower administration of
courting disaster in Algeria. He charged that Eisenhower’s policy of
non‑involvement in Africa and Asia was really made up of "tepid
encouragement and moralizations to both sides, cautious neutrality on
all the real issues, and a restatement of our obvious dependence upon
our European friends, and our obvious dedication nevertheless to the
principles of self‑determination, and our obvious desire not to become
involved." The result, Kennedy said, was that, "We have deceived
ourselves into believing that we have thus pleased both sides and
displeased no one ¼ when, in truth, we have earned the suspicion of
all."
The previous decade had proven that the tide of nationalism in the Third
World – from Indochina to India to Indonesia – was "irresistible,"
Kennedy declared. It was time for France to face the fact that Algeria
had to be freed. When would the West learn, he asked, that colonies
"are like fruit that cling to the tree only till they ripen?" Didn’t the French
debacle in Indochina, which ended at Dien Bien Phu, serve as a
warning of what lay ahead for France in Algeria if something were not
done?
[Referring to lessons that should have been learned from France’s
Indochina debacle, Kennedy stated,]
"Did that tragic episode not teach us whether France likes it or not,
admits it or not, or has our support or not, that their overseas territories
are sooner or later, one by one, going to break free and look with
suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to
independence? ¼ Nationalism in Africa cannot be evaluated purely in
terms of the historical and legal niceties argued by the French and thus
far accepted by the State Department. National self‑identification
frequently takes place by quick combustion which the rain of repression
simply cannot extinguish."
In the United States, a storm of protest greeted Kennedy’s address on
"Facing Facts on Algeria." President Eisenhower complained about
"young men getting up and shouting about things." Secretary [of State
John Foster] Dulles commented acidly that if the senator wanted to tilt
against colonialism, perhaps he might concentrate on the communist
variety. Most prominent Democrats were equally scornful. Adlai
Stevenson dismissed Kennedy’s speech as "terrible." Dean Acheson
described the speech as "foolish words that wound ¼ a dispirited ally."
In France, the speech provoked an even more furious outcry. Paris’s
largest daily, "Le Figaro," remarked: "It is shameful that our business is
so badly directed that we are forced to endure such idiocies." U.S.
News and World Report noted that "An American has unified France –
against himself!" Responding to Kennedy’s speech, French President
Rene Coty told the French Senate that France would "never negotiate
with cutthroats since independence would give the 1,200,000
Europeans living in Algeria one alternative – leaving their homeland or
living at the mercy of fanaticism." French Defense Minister Andre Morice
publicly wondered whether Kennedy was "having nightmares." Talk of
independence, Morice said, "will cost many more innocent lives,"
Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. reported to Kennedy from
Paris that summer that "Algeria is beginning to poison France."
In Algeria itself, feeling among the European colonists against the
speech ran so high that French authorities warned American newsmen
and residents to stay off the streets to avoid reprisals. Two days after
the speech a bomb exploded outside the American consulate in Algiers.
The French Resident Minister in Algiers, Robert Lacoste, called the
bomb "a Communist joke" and challenged Kennedy to come to Algeria.
The senator declined.
¼Practically no one in the American foreign‑policy establishment
regarded the Algeria speech as anything more than a partisan political
blast designed to attract attention. But foreign correspondents such as
Alistair Cooke of the Manchester Guardian and Henri Pierre of Le Monde
recognized what their American counterparts had not – that Kennedy
knew what he was talking about on Third World issues. In a letter to the
editor of The New York Times, Pierre wrote: "Strangely enough, as a
Frenchman I feel that on the whole Mr. Kennedy is more to be
commended than blamed for his forthright, frank and provocative
speech."
Although Le Monde opposed Kennedy’s call for Algerian independence,
it identified the senator as one of the few serious students of history in
American politics: "The most striking point of the speech of Mr. Kennedy
is the important documentation it revealed and his thorough knowledge
of the French milieu."
(Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, pp. 19‑22)
Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Algeria
In his 1957 speech about Algeria, "Senator" Kennedy was highly critical of the Eisenhower administration; however, the
political dynamic involved must be considered. Kennedy’s views about Israel and the Middle East in general were closer to
Eisenhower’s than Johnson’s. Having stated that, it is significant to understand that Kennedy’s public endorsement of an
independent Algeria was a subtle criticism of Israel. It is widely known that Israel opposed Algeria’s independence because it
(Israel) wanted to oppress or dominate all Muslim/Arab states. Although Eisenhower had not publicly supported Algerian
independence, it seems plausible that he may have agreed with Kennedy but lacked the political courage to denounce France
as the young Senator had boldly done in his speech. Upon reflection, Eisenhower may have secretly admired Kennedy for
publicly denouncing America’s World War II ally. After all, France had recently betrayed Eisenhower by secretly conniving
with Israel and Britain to attack Egypt after President Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal.(Footnote 26)
Kennedy surely understood how much he and Eisenhower agreed on Middle Eastern issues, but Eisenhower belonged to the
opposing political party; and Kennedy and Johnson both had their eyes on the White House in the upcoming 1960 presidential
campaign. Consequently, one of Kennedy’s objectives when making the Algerian speech was likely to differentiate himself from
the sitting Republican President and his Democratic adversary, Johnson. Although Kennedy and Johnson held opposing views
about Israel, they could not openly criticize each other because they were both Democrats. But since Eisenhower was a
Republican, it made sense politically for a Democratic Senator to criticize him for not supporting Algerian independence. The
speech also sent a message to informed political observers that unlike Johnson, Kennedy would not be a minion for Israel if
elected president.
Even more important, Kennedy’s Algerian speech made the front page of the New York Times which put him in the same
league as Senate Majority Leader Johnson. Recall that Johnson had made the front page of the New York Times five months
earlier (Feb. 1957) for opposing Eisenhower’s efforts to place UN sanctions on Israel in the wake of that country’s failed
attempt to seize land from Egypt and overthrow Nasser in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and 57.
Jun. 5, 1967: The Six Day War
Ten years after the Suez Crisis, Israel attacked Egypt again; but this time with success. The event is known as the Six Day War
which began on June 5, 1967. Things had changed a great deal over the ten years leading up to the Six Day War. Israel’s most
influential adversaries had either died or left public office. Eisenhower had retired years earlier and was in failing health. John
Foster Dulles had died of cancer in 1959. Dag Hammarskjöld had been killed in a mysterious plane crash in the Congolese
province of Katanga in 1961. President Kennedy of course had been assassinated in Dallas in 1963. And Israel’s old ally,
Lyndon Johnson, had become Commander‑in‑Chief of the United States. In July of 1965, President Johnson had appointed
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg as US ambassador to the UN. Goldberg—a Jew and ardent supporter of
Israel—replaced Adlai Stevenson as US delegate to the UN after Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14,
1965.(Footnote 27) The Yemen War had been eroding Arab unity since the conflict began in 1962.(Footnote 28) By 1967,
Egyptian forces had suffered heavy losses and were weakened after five years of military involvement in the Yemen War.
Whether these events were random or planned is anyone’s guess, but they were definitely advantageous to Israel by the time
the Six Day War occurred in 1967.
The Six Day War was a watershed event that transformed Israel from a small nation into a colonial empire. Although Israel
became a nation in 1948, it expanded dramatically after the Six Day War. Israel took from the Arabs—through military
force—the Old City of Jerusalem, the Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River known as the
West Bank, and the Golan Heights, on the Israeli‑Syrian border.11 In addition to acquiring new land, Israel gained control of an
additional 900,000 Arabs who became the discontented subjects of the new Israeli empire. Since 1967, the number of Arabs
under Israel’s military control has grown to over 1.75 million.12
Amnesty International has documented Israel’s inhumane treatment of its Palestinian subjects citing arbitrary arrests, torturing
detainees, destroying or sealing the homes of Arab suspects and their relatives, confiscating land, destroying crops, and
diverting precious water from thirsty Palestinians in the desert to fill the swimming pools and water the lawns of Israeli settlers.13
This conduct is condoned, embraced, and encouraged by the United States through its steadfast financial and military support
of Israel. Today, US tax payers spend approximately $3 billion annually to subsidize, support, and arm Israel. Although Israel is
a wealthy country by western standards, it receives the highest amount of American foreign aid money, 28 percent.14
Jewish scholars Michael Kazin and Maurice Isserman described in their book, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s,
the passion ignited within American Jews by the Six Day War. They wrote the following:
The swift, complete victory was followed by a long and wrenching
occupation of Palestinian lands. For many American Jews, the 1967
conflict awakened and inspired passions that did much to transform the
meaning of their identity. No longer was Israel just a reason for Jewish
pride, a desert miracle of orange groves and thriving kibbutzes, whose
creation was romanticized in Exodus‑a popular novel and film of the late
'50s and early '60s. Israel was now the homeland of fellow Jews who
had fought alone for their survival and were resigned to living in
perpetual danger. The threat came not just from Arab militants but from
communist powers, their Third World allies, and a good many American
leftists who were eager to prove their "anti‑imperialist" credentials. In the
face of extinction, Israel became "the ultimate reality in the life of every
Jew living today," as a young professor at Brandeis University put it, "In
dealing with those who oppose Israel, we are not reasonable and we
are not rational. Nor should we be."15
Those are troubling words, but they reflect the true agenda of those who support the Jewish state of Israel.
Background on the Six Day War
Understanding the Six Day War requires some background regarding the politics of the Middle East in 1967. The following
men were heads of state for the countries involved in the Six Day War:
Nation
Head of State
Egypt
President Gamal Abdel Nasser
Sryia
General Salah al‑Jadid
Jordan
King Hussein [ibn Talal]
Israel
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
US
President Lyndon Baines Johnson
USSR
Chairman Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin
UN
Secretary General U Thant (of Burma, now Myanmar)
Egyptian President Nasser was a key figure in Middle Eastern affairs for seventeen years. In 1954 he became prime minister of
Egypt, and in 1956 he became that country’s president—remaining in that position until his sudden death in 1970.16 Nasser had
been Israel’s primary enemy because he was a charismatic Muslim leader who advocated Arab unity (also known as
pan‑Arabism).
Egypt has no oil of any consequence, but it has a more advanced culture than the other oil‑producing Arab nations. It was the
home of one of the principal civilizations of the ancient Middle East. It is also one of the earliest urban and literate societies.17
Consequently, the other Arab nations have historically looked to Egypt for leadership.
The original antagonist of Israel in the Six Day War was Syria, led by General Salah al‑Jadid, head of the Ba‘th regime.18
Although Syria—under the Ba‘th regime—was an aggressive enemy of Israel, Syria’s erratic behavior toward other Arab
nations actually helped Israel. In fact, Israel used Syrian raids along the its border as a pretext for attacking Egypt and starting
the Six Day War.
In March 1963 Ba‘thist supporters seized power from the "secessionist" regime in a military coup. With the Ba‘th in power,
Nasser had three Arab nations against him. Those nations were Saudi Arabia and Jordan (because they supported the ousted
Imam in the Yemen war) and Syria.
In April 1967 Syrian bombardments of Israeli villages had been intensified. When the Israeli Air Force shot down six Syrian
MiG planes in reprisal, Egypt mobilized its forces near the Sinai border.19 Egypt had a mutual defense agreement with the
Syrians, who now felt themselves in danger. As an advocate of pan‑Arabism, Nasser felt obliged to help Syria. He ordered
part of the Egyptian Army to move into Sinai. He thought that the presence of Egyptian forces would discourage the Israelis
from attacking Syria. It was a purely defensive move designed to draw off Israeli forces from Syria. If Israel had attacked
Syria, then the Egyptian Army would have carried out operations in support of the Syrians. But no offensive operations against
Israel were consider.20
A standoff between Egypt and Israel ensued, and tensions mounted between the superpowers. The Soviet Union supported
Egypt and the United States supported Israel. This raced the stakes considerably because it introduced the possibility of
nuclear war.21
Historians now know that Israel secretly launched an attack against Egypt, but lied about it claiming that Nasser had launched
the attack first. In fact Israeli Prime Minister Menachem
Begin made this admission in a speech on August 8, 1982 before the National Defense College in Jerusalem. He stated that the
Six Day War was not a "war of necessity" but rather a "war of choice¼ Nasser did not attack us. We decided to attack
him."22 This was a major admission by Begin.
On June 3, 1967, just two days before the Israelis attacked, the United States sent the aircraft carrier Intrepid through the Suez
Canal with all its planes lined up on deck. Nasser thought this was an unnecessary show of force. The Egyptian people became
furious. They lined the bank of the Canal and threw old shoes at the carrier. At the same time the Sixth Fleet flexed its muscles
and prepared for a war situation. It was an excessive show of force by the United States.23
After Israel’s victory, Nasser was disgusted with Johnson. He felt that Johnson was dishonest and had colluded with Israel to
strike first and blame it on Egypt. He was suspicious of America’s UN ambassador Arthur Goldberg, an ardent Zionist.
Goldberg had immediately backed Israel in the UN when it claimed that Egypt "fired the first shot." Nasser accused Johnson of
collusion, broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, and ordered all Americans out of Egypt. Several other Arab
states did the same. Soon Johnson, already angered by the charge of collusion, had to watch the humiliating spectacle of
twenty‑four thousand American men, women, and children being thrown out of the Middle East. Johnson never forgot and
never forgave.24
After Egypt’s humiliating defeat in the Six Day War, Nasser attempted to resign, but massive street demonstrations and a vote
of confidence by the National Assembly induced him to remain in office. The Soviet Union immediately began replacing all the
destroyed war equipment and installed surface‑to‑air missiles along the Suez as a cover for Egypt’s artillery installations.25
An important footnote to the Six Day War is an incident that occurred in Yemen months earlier. In early 1967, fighting in
Yemen still continued. One day there was shooting in Taiz (in Yemen). Direction finders indicated that two bazooka shots came
from the headquarters of the United States Point Four Aid Program—which was the CIA's cover organization. Yemeni
government forces attacked the building and arrested the four people inside. The safes were opened and an enormous number
of documents were found and subsequently photographed by Egyptian intelligence experts.(Footnote 29) The United States was
furious at the attack on the building and demanded the documents. They were returned three weeks later, but by that time their
secrets were known. Many people within the United States military became extremely hostile toward Nasser because of this
event. Some believe the Six Day War was a form of retribution.26
UN Resolution 242
Within six months after the Six Day War, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 242 which called for "withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." In theory the UN should enforce the resolution itself, but
unfortunately, reality is much different. The sad truth is the UN is unable to enforce much of anything without the support of the
United States, and the United States has maintained a "passionate attachment" to Israel ever since President Johnson was in
office.
Ironically, Resolution 242 was issued on the fourth anniversary of President Kennedy’s death, November 22, 1967.27 It is an
extremely important document because virtually all disputes between Israel and the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states
could be resolved by its enforcement.
In addition, the Israelis managed to secure ambiguous, legalistic wording for Resolution 242 which makes even more difficult to
enforce;28 however, the resolution remains a highly sensitive area for American presidents and politicians to roam. The
following is the entire text of the resolution:
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle
East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and
the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the
area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the
Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in
accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which
should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for
and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international
waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence
of every State in the area, through measures including the
establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary‑General to designate a Special
Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain
contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and
assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary‑General to report to the Security Council on
the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as
possible.
(UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967)
Jun. 8, 1967: Israel Attacked the USS Liberty
In the midst of the Six Day War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty spy vessel killing 34 American sailors and wounding 75.
George Ball wrote a riveting account of Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967. Ball’s comments are significant
because he was undersecretary of state in the Johnson and Kennedy administrations. The following text is an excerpt from
Ball’s book, The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement With Israel, 1947 to the Present:
During the [Six Day] War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty. The Liberty
was an American intelligence‑gathering vessel, then cruising in
international waters near Egypt and reading the radio transmissions on
both sides. It flew the American flag and was painted in US Navy colors,
complete with number and name.
On the fourth day of the war [June 8, 1967], with both Jordan and Egypt
routed, the Israelis turned their attention to Syria, the original cause of all
this trouble. Guns mounted on the Golan Heights had subjected Galilee
to sporadic bombardment for years and the Israelis had every intention
of capturing those Heights before hostilities were over. Meanwhile, the
United Nations had adopted a cease‑fire resolution and they feared
there might not be enough time to accomplish this objective without, as
it were, going into overnight.
The Liberty’s presence and function were known to Israeli leaders. They
presumably thought it vital that the Liberty be prevented from informing
Washington of their intentions to violate any cease‑fire before they had
completed their occupation of the Golan. Their solution was brutal and
direct.
Israel aircraft determined the exact location of the ship and undertook a
combined air‑naval attack. Apprised of Israel’s plans from various
sources, the US Navy Department faced a delicate problem. Due
regard for the lives of America’s naval personnel should have impelled
the Navy to urge the State Department to warn off Israel in no uncertain
terms; meanwhile, the Navy have alerted the Liberty to its danger and
dispatched ships or planes for its protection. But none of these actions
was taken in time.
There has, for years, been a continuing argument about the tragic
lapse. Some say that a warning to Israel might have exposed U.S.
sources of secret intelligence. Whatever the motive, the President or
one of his aides took the decision to risk the ship and its crew, and
merely ordered them, without explanation, to steam west at top speed.
Unhappily, that notice was too little and taken too late. Israeli ships and
planes attacked, killing 34 American sailors, wounding 75, and leaving
821 rocket and machine‑gun holes in the Liberty. It was only when the
Israelis were preparing to board the ship that American planes belatedly
appeared from the west and forced them to retire.
The sequel was unedifying. The [Johnson] administration tried
vigorously to downplay the whole matter. Although it silenced the crew,
casualties to the sailors and damage to the ship could not possibly be
concealed. Thus, an elaborate charade was performed. The United
States complained pro forma to Israel, which reacted by blaming the
victims. The ship, they rejoined, had not been clearly marked but looked
like an Arab ship—which was definitely untrue. Nor did the Israelis even
pretend that they had queried the American Embassy in Tel Aviv
regarding the status of the well‑marked ship. In the end, the Israelis
tendered a reluctant and graceless apology; indemnities for the victims
and damaged ship were both parsimonious and slow in coming. The
sordid affair has still not been erased from the history books; an
organization of devoted survivors has kept the cause alive over the
years by publishing a newsletter and holding well‑advertised meetings.
Yet the ultimate lesson of the Liberty attack had far more effect on policy
in Israel than America. Israel’s leaders concluded that nothing they
might do would offend the Americans to the point of reprisal. If
America’s leaders did not have the courage to punish Israel for the
blatant murder of American citizens, it seemed that their American
friends would let them get away with almost anything.
(George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 57 ‑ 58)
Arthur Goldberg, UN Point Man
As previously stated, Adlai Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14, 1965.29 Until his untimely death, Stevenson
had represented the United States in the UN. Arthur Goldberg was a Supreme Court Justice appointed by Kennedy to a
traditionally Jewish slot in the high court.(Footnote 30) At President Johnson’s request, Goldberg resigned from his position as
Supreme Court justice to take the lower position of US ambassador to the UN.30 This was an extraordinary move.
Goldberg was an interesting figure. In addition to serving on the Supreme Court and as a UN diplomat, he had an impressive
background in the world of espionage. During World War II, he worked with Haganah and OSS in Palestine.
After the events of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a
military spy agency and precursor to the CIA.31 New York attorney William Donovan was appointed to run the newly formed
agency. With Donovan in charge of the OSS, Roosevelt had created the first civilian‑run spy organization in modern US
history. Donovan immediately recruited another New York attorney, Allen Dulles, to help establish the organization. Goldberg
was given the rank of major and he assisted Donovan and Dulles establish an OSS field office in New York. Shortly thereafter,
Goldberg became—for all intents and purposes—an international spy working for the OSS. He was assigned various spy
missions in Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Morocco.32
With the experience he acquired in espionage, he returned to Washington, DC and created an intelligence gathering operation.
After that, he was sent on a secret mission in Palestine where he met with leaders of the illegal army of Jewish settlers,
Haganah. This operation meant a great deal to Goldberg personally because he had become a Zionist rather late in life. The
Haganah worked with him to coordinate a joint OSS‑Haganah parachute mission into Italy to gather critical intelligence
information. After the Palestine encounter, Goldberg was sent to London to recruit anti‑Nazi Germans, who had been captured
as spies when the allies invaded France.33
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Endnotes
1.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 43 ‑ 45
2.ibid, pp. 45 ‑ 46
3.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Canal
4.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 46
5.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Crisis
6.Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, Chapter 1
7.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 251. Eisenhower’s instructions to Dulles were on p. 47 of Ball’s book. The Hammarskjöld
quote regarding Ben‑Gurion and Israel was on p. 251. Ball cited Brian Urquhart’s biography of Dag Hammarskjöld: Hammarskjöld, p.
157.
8.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 47
9.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 46 ‑ 49; multiple articles about Senate Majority Leader Johnson’s support for Israel in the
New York Times on February 20, 1957
10.ibid
11.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War
12.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 58
13.ibid, p. 179
14.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 256
15.Kazin and Isserman, America Divided, p. 253
16.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser
17.Encyclopedia Britannica: Egypt
18.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War; Salah al‑Jadid; George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 53‑56; Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo
Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249
19.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War
20.Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249
21.ibid
22.Ball, p 56
23.Heikal
24.ibid
25.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser
26.Heikal
27.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 62
28.ibid, pp. 62‑63
29.Encyclopedia Britannica: Adlai Stevenson
30.ibid, Arthur Goldberg
31.Edward B. Shils, Ph.D, Monthly Labor Review (January 1997), pp. 59 ‑ 60 (excerpt from Arthur Goldberg: proof of the American dream)
32.ibid
33.ibid
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Chapter 10: LBJ’s "Passionate Attachment" to Israel
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Background
As some readers may know, the term "passionate attachment" was used by George Washington in his farewell address in
1796. Washington advised citizens of the new republic to renounce any "passionate attachment"(Footnote 23) with another
nation, and also to repudiate "inveterate hatred" toward another country. In the Twentieth Century, the United States failed to
heed Washington’s warnings on both counts. Shortly after World War II, we developed an "inveterate hatred" of the Soviet
Union and formed a "passionate attachment" to Israel, although the latter accelerated dramatically under the Johnson
Administration.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was the last American president in the Twentieth Century to successfully stand up to the
pressures and unyielding annoyances of the Israeli government and its American supporters. Although President Kennedy
shared his predecessor’s views intellectually, he entered the White House after an extremely close election. Consequently, he
had to assume a more cautious approach.
The Eisenhower administration’s Middle East policy is important for two reasons. First of all, it demonstrated that a strong
American president can stand up to Israel. Secondly, it reveals that Lyndon Johnson—then Senate Majority Leader—was
Eisenhower’s most influential political adversary regarding Israel.
Two major incidents occurred on Eisenhower’s watch where Israel acted as an aggressor toward its neighbors and toward
Palestinians living in the region. The first incident occurred in 1953 and involved Israel’s effort to secretly divert waters of the
Jordan. The second incident occurred in 1957 when Israel conspired with France and Britain to attack Egypt and overthrow
that country’s leader, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, after he nationalized the Suez Canal in defiance of Israel and the Western
powers. In the latter incident, Lyndon Johnson used all of his political muscle as Senate Majority Leader to prevent the UN
from imposing sanctions on Israel—the sanctions were fully supported by the Eisenhower administration—for its flagrant
disregard for international law. In both instances, Eisenhower forced Israel to behave by temporarily cutting off American aid.
1953: The Jordan River Diversion
Israel secretly planned to use the Palestinian village of Banat Ya’qub for a major water diversion project that would move
waters of the Jordan Valley to central Israel and the North Negev. The UN, the US, and the Palestinians who lived in that area
were unaware of Israel’s plans. Earlier, the Eisenhower administration had offered to implement an American‑sponsored
regional water‑usage plan, and Israel had promised to cooperate in that effort. But in reality, Israel secretly wanted complete
control of the flow of water in the region, despite its commitments to the Americans. Consequently, a dispute ensued over the
control of Palestinian territory near Banat Ya’qub.
Unaware of Israel’s hidden agenda, UN Representative, Dr. Ralph Bunche, worked out a truce agreement where disputed
lands would be evacuated by Syrian forces. The agreement stipulated that Israel must allow Arab inhabitants to continue
farming there. Israel also agreed that it would not occupy the disputed area, but would allow it to be a neutral zone.
Immediately after the Syrian troops withdrew, the Israelis broke their promise and drove the Palestinian farmers from the land.
The Syrian troops responded by opening fire to drive out the settlers. Israel responded by complaining that the Syrians had
violated the truce and asserted a right to occupy the areas. UN Truce Observers immediately cited Israel as the instigator and
essentially stated that the Syrian troops were justified in retaliating against Israel for violating the truce agreement.
The Israelis took the strategy that if they completed the water diversion project at Banat Ya’qub, then the UN would back
down because the work simply could not be undone. So the Israelis began working aggressively on the project. They worked
non‑stop, twenty‑four hours a day using searchlights at night to hasten completion. But secrecy was still key. They omitted
appropriations for the project from their published budget. In addition, they did not mention it to Americans working with them
on other water projects; however, US intelligence soon detected their activity.
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles realized that Israel had openly deceived them and had no
intention of keeping its earlier promise to cooperate in the American‑sponsored regional water‑usage plan. To show its
displeasure, the Eisenhower administration withheld $26 million under the Mutual Security Act and suspended economic aid
until Israel agreed to cooperate with UN observers. In addition, President Eisenhower directed the Treasury to prepare an
Executive Order removing tax‑deductible status from contributions by Jewish Americans to such Zionist organizations as the
United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Eisenhower did not make these actions public because he did not want to humiliate the Israelis;
however, the Israelis interpreted his magnanimous gesture as a sign of weakness. As a result, they continued work on the
project—convinced that the Americans would back down.
Israel’s strategy might have worked had Israel not launched a bloody raid on the village of Kibya on the night of October 14,
1953. In that attack, twenty‑five‑year‑old Ariel Sharon and his three hundred Israeli commandos, known as Force 101,
massacred fifty‑three Palestinian civilians. According to a UN report, Sharon’s forces drove the villagers into their homes then
blew them up.
The Eisenhower administration condemned the raid and, for the first time, publicly revealed that it had already suspended
construction funds for Israel’s water supply. Their was a huge backlash against Eisenhower. The US government was
denounced by Hadassah, a Jewish charitable organization. An attaché at the Israeli Embassy attempted to divert attention from
the water controversy by claiming—in a widely publicized speech—that the Kibya raid was in response to Jordanian
aggression. Pro‑Israeli congressmen and David Ben‑Gurion accused Eisenhower and his advisers of anti‑Semitism.
But Eisenhower stood firm and continued to withhold funds from Israel. Fearing a financial burden, Israeli representatives
informed President Eisenhower—on October 19—that work had ceased on the water diversion project and that Israel would
cooperate with the Security Counsil’s efforts to solve the Jordan River Development problem. Within twenty‑four hours,
America restored aid to Israel.
Eisenhower demonstrated that Israel responded faster to cutting off the money flow than anything else; however, the Israelis
interpreted America’s quick restoration of aid as proof that they could manipulate the superpower by applying adequate
pressure. Ultimately, Israel completed the project in a slightly altered manner.1
Nov. 1956: The Suez Crisis
The stage was set for the Suez Crisis in 1955 when the Eisenhower administration began pressuring Israel to demonstrate its
commitment to peace in the Middle East.
On February 28, 1955, President Gamal Adbel Nasser made a speech full of warnings against Israeli atrocities. He emphasized
a bloody raid on the Gaza Strip by the Israelis, allegedly a retaliation for raids made from Gaza. Nasser was also upset with the
United States for denying his request for arms a few months earlier. In his speech he repeated the request for Egypt to buy
arms but was ignored.
On September 4, 1955, Egypt announced that it had received a proposal from the Soviet Union for an arms sale. The
Eisenhower administration treated this as an idle threat which angered Nasser. As a result, he brokered a cotton‑for‑arms
barter agreement with Czechoslovakia on September 27 in which Egypt received $200 million worth of arms—tanks, MiG
planes, artillery, submarines, and small arms.
Israel immediately renewed its joint arms agreement with the United States, France, and Britain. In addition, Israel requested a
treaty guaranteeing its security, but it was denied by the Western powers because they knew that Israel’s military strength was
vastly superior to the neighboring Arab nations.
On August 26, 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a speech before the Council of Foreign Relations in New
York in which he outlined terms for peace in the Middle East. He stated that the problem of Palestinian refugees could be
solved, but Israel should not be expected to assume the full cost. He proposed that Congress approve an international loan to
finance the resettlement or repatriating of Palestinian refugees. The loan would also help develop irrigation projects to assist
refugees in cultivating their land for growing crops.
The Israelis were somewhat agitated by Dulles’s speech because he mentioned a possible boundary revision. Dulles promptly
responded to clarify the American position. He stated in no uncertain terms that if Sharett and Ben‑Gurion (Israeli leaders)
wanted American diplomatic, political, and military aid, they would have to demonstrate their peaceful intentions by helping
resolve the sensitive problems of Palestinian refugees and boundary disputes. On November 9, President Eisenhower—who
was in a Denver hospital convalescing from a heart attack—confirmed Dulles’s position in a formal statement made from his
hospital bed.2
At that point, it became clear that the United States could no longer be counted on to support Israel’s continuing efforts to
expand its borders. Consequently, Israel turned to the European powers for support. Over the next year, trouble began to arise
over the Suez Canal.
The Suez Canal is a sea‑level waterway running north‑south across the Isthmus of Suez in Egypt to connect the Mediterranean
and the Red seas. The canal separates the African continent from Asia, and it provides the shortest seagoing route between
Europe and the lands lying around the Indian and western Pacific oceans. It is one of the world's most heavily used shipping
lanes.3
On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Nasser angered Israel and the European powers when he nationalized the Suez Canal.
He took this bold action because he felt that friends of Israel in America had cheated him out of US aide for the Aswan Dam
that Egypt needed for irrigation and power. The dam cost $1.3 billion and Nasser had been given the impression by the
Eisenhower administration that US aide would be forthcoming; however, friends of Israel in America pressured the Senate
Appropriations Committee into blocking funding for the dam. On July 16, 1956, funding was officially denied—much to the
chagrin of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. To make matters worse, the State Department
issued a statement, on July 19, critically appraising Egypt’s international credit. Nasser felt that this was a ruse created by
friends of Israel in America, and he responded by seizing control of the canal and nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in
order to obtain funds for the dam.4
On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt and advanced toward the Suez Canal. On November 1, British and French
forces also invaded Egypt and began occupation of the canal zone, but growing opposition from President Eisenhower,
Secretary of State Dulles, UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskjöld, and Soviet threats of intervention put an immediate stop
to British and French support, but Israeli troops still occupied the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip in defiance of a UN
resolution.5 Eisenhower was so angered by European involvement in the attack that he telephoned British Prime Minister
Anthony Eden and gave him such a tongue‑lashing that the Prime Minister was reduced to tears.6 (Footnote 24)
Eisenhower told Dulles: "Foster, you tell’em, goddamn it, we’re going to apply sanctions, we’re going to the United Nations,
we’re going to do everything that there is to stop this thing." He later explained, "We just told the Israelis it was absolutely
indefensible and that if they expect our support in the Middle East and in maintaining their position, they had better behave¼
We went to town right away to give them hell."
UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld shared Eisenhower’s view that Israel needed to learn to behave. Consequently,
Hammarskjöld and Ben‑Gurion engaged in some heated exchanges after the UN Secretary General publicly condemned Israel
for its retaliatory actions against Palestinians. In 1956 Ben‑Gurion complained that Hammarskjöld’s remarks had encouraged
assaults on Israel by Egypt and Jordan. Hammarskjöld replied as follows:
You are convinced that the threat of retaliation has a deterrent effect. I
am convinced that it is more of an incitement to individual members of
the Arab forces than even what has been said by their own
governments. You are convinced that acts of retaliation will stop further
incidents. I am convinced that they will lead to further incidents¼.You
believe that this way of creating respect for Israel will pave the way for
sound coexistence with the Arab people. I believe that the policy may
postpone indefinitely the time for such coexistence¼. I think the
discussion of this question can be considered closed since you, in spite
of previous discouraging experiences, have taken the responsibility of
large‑scale tests of the correctness of your belief.7
On February 2, 1957, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding Israel’s withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba
and the Gaza Strip, but Ben‑Gurion refused. Fed up with Israel’s treachery, Eisenhower wrote a strong letter to Ben‑Gurion
demanding Israel’s withdrawal. Still Ben‑Gurion refused.8
Feb. 1957: LBJ Rescued Israel From UN Sanctions
It had been rumored that UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden was quietly pushing for sanctions—with the
full support of the Eisenhower administration—against Israel if it continued to maintain troops in the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza in
defiance of US and UN demands for immediate withdrawal. In response, Lyndon Johnson—then Senate Majority
Leader—wrote a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urging the Eisenhower Administration not to support UN
sanctions against Israel. Johnson’s letter to Dulles appeared in the New York Times on February 20, 1957. The Senate
Majority Leader’s argument was that it was an unfair double‑standard to punish a small country like Israel when large countries
like the Soviet Union were allowed to openly defy UN resolutions without being punished.9
In addition, Johnson rallied Senate Democrats to oppose Israel sanctions.(Footnote 25) He used partisan politics to pressure
Eisenhower into retreating from principle, but Eisenhower stood his ground and kept applying pressure to Israel by cutting off
or delaying financial assistance. When Israel began to run out of money, in March 1957, Prime Minister David Ben‑Gurion
finally agreed to withdraw troops from the occupied territories. President Eisenhower triumphed, but Johnson had protected
Israel from the humiliation of UN sanctions. Sadly, Eisenhower was the last US president to stand up to the Israeli government
and it’s American supporters. At least he proved it could be done.10
Ironically, one of the best accounts of Lyndon Johnson’s involvement in the Suez Crisis was written by Louis Bloomfield in his
1957 book entitled Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba. In the ensuing years, Johnson’s involvement in that conflict has been
erased from history. Although his pro‑Israel stance appeared on the front page of the New York Times on February 20, 1957,
his name is not mentioned in Western history books about the Suez Crisis (none that I have found anyway, except
Bloomfield’s). The power elite within the book publishing industry have apparently been concealing Johnson’s loyalty to Israel
as a means of preventing inquiries by historians, researchers, and investigators about a possible Jewish conspiracy behind the
assassination of President Kennedy years later.
This is how Bloomfield described Johnson’s pro‑Israel stance during the Suez/Gulf of Aqaba Crisis:
On February 11th, 1957, Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States
Secretary of State, submitted certain Proposals to the Israeli
Government which were, in effect, that:
"Israel should withdraw her troops from the Gulf of Aqaba region and the
Gaza Strip, in accordance with the recommendations of the United
Nations General Assembly.
The United States should use all its influence to establish the Strait of
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway for the
innocent passage of all nations, including Israel.
Meanwhile the United States should do everything it could to see that
United Nations troops replaced the Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip and
that that area should become a kind of de facto United Nations
trusteeship where United Nations officials would watch and if possible
stop any fighting between Israel and Egypt."
Subsequent discussion between the United States Secretary of State
and Mr. Abba Eban did not bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli
forces from these two areas and rumours began to circulate in the
American press that the Afro‑Asian bloc would introduce resolutions
calling for economic and military sanctions to force Israel to comply with
the withdrawal resolutions.
On February 19th, 1957, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate
Majority Leader, wrote to Mr. John Foster Dulles urging that the United
States oppose imposing of economic sanctions against Israel by the
United Nations. The letter was endorsed by the Senate Democratic
Policy Committee.
(Louis Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf of Aqaba, p. 152)
Jul. 2, 1957: Senator Kennedy Made a Controversial Speech About Algeria
On July 2, 1957, John F. Kennedy—then a US Senator—made a speech, "Facing Facts on Algeria," which denounced
France’s colonial occupation of Algeria and the brutality of the French‑Algerian War. The speech also demonstrated an
understanding of Indochina that would likely have prevented him from escalating US military involvement in Vietnam had he not
been killed.
Historian Richard Mahoney summarized the speech and events that preceded and followed it:
Early in 1957, Kennedy decided to make a major critique of the
[Eisenhower] administration’s position on France’s colonial war in
Algeria. By 1957, the French had committed over 500,000 troops to the
effort to suppress the nationalist rebellion. Torture, atrocity, and terror
on both sides had turned the pride of France’s empire into a chamber of
horrors. ¼the Eisenhower administration had been maintaining a policy
of strict silence in Algeria – at least until Kennedy’s attack, which The
New York Times called "the most comprehensive and outspoken
arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an
American in public office."
On July 2, 1957, Kennedy accused the Eisenhower administration of
courting disaster in Algeria. He charged that Eisenhower’s policy of
non‑involvement in Africa and Asia was really made up of "tepid
encouragement and moralizations to both sides, cautious neutrality on
all the real issues, and a restatement of our obvious dependence upon
our European friends, and our obvious dedication nevertheless to the
principles of self‑determination, and our obvious desire not to become
involved." The result, Kennedy said, was that, "We have deceived
ourselves into believing that we have thus pleased both sides and
displeased no one ¼ when, in truth, we have earned the suspicion of
all."
The previous decade had proven that the tide of nationalism in the Third
World – from Indochina to India to Indonesia – was "irresistible,"
Kennedy declared. It was time for France to face the fact that Algeria
had to be freed. When would the West learn, he asked, that colonies
"are like fruit that cling to the tree only till they ripen?" Didn’t the French
debacle in Indochina, which ended at Dien Bien Phu, serve as a
warning of what lay ahead for France in Algeria if something were not
done?
[Referring to lessons that should have been learned from France’s
Indochina debacle, Kennedy stated,]
"Did that tragic episode not teach us whether France likes it or not,
admits it or not, or has our support or not, that their overseas territories
are sooner or later, one by one, going to break free and look with
suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to
independence? ¼ Nationalism in Africa cannot be evaluated purely in
terms of the historical and legal niceties argued by the French and thus
far accepted by the State Department. National self‑identification
frequently takes place by quick combustion which the rain of repression
simply cannot extinguish."
In the United States, a storm of protest greeted Kennedy’s address on
"Facing Facts on Algeria." President Eisenhower complained about
"young men getting up and shouting about things." Secretary [of State
John Foster] Dulles commented acidly that if the senator wanted to tilt
against colonialism, perhaps he might concentrate on the communist
variety. Most prominent Democrats were equally scornful. Adlai
Stevenson dismissed Kennedy’s speech as "terrible." Dean Acheson
described the speech as "foolish words that wound ¼ a dispirited ally."
In France, the speech provoked an even more furious outcry. Paris’s
largest daily, "Le Figaro," remarked: "It is shameful that our business is
so badly directed that we are forced to endure such idiocies." U.S.
News and World Report noted that "An American has unified France –
against himself!" Responding to Kennedy’s speech, French President
Rene Coty told the French Senate that France would "never negotiate
with cutthroats since independence would give the 1,200,000
Europeans living in Algeria one alternative – leaving their homeland or
living at the mercy of fanaticism." French Defense Minister Andre Morice
publicly wondered whether Kennedy was "having nightmares." Talk of
independence, Morice said, "will cost many more innocent lives,"
Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. reported to Kennedy from
Paris that summer that "Algeria is beginning to poison France."
In Algeria itself, feeling among the European colonists against the
speech ran so high that French authorities warned American newsmen
and residents to stay off the streets to avoid reprisals. Two days after
the speech a bomb exploded outside the American consulate in Algiers.
The French Resident Minister in Algiers, Robert Lacoste, called the
bomb "a Communist joke" and challenged Kennedy to come to Algeria.
The senator declined.
¼Practically no one in the American foreign‑policy establishment
regarded the Algeria speech as anything more than a partisan political
blast designed to attract attention. But foreign correspondents such as
Alistair Cooke of the Manchester Guardian and Henri Pierre of Le Monde
recognized what their American counterparts had not – that Kennedy
knew what he was talking about on Third World issues. In a letter to the
editor of The New York Times, Pierre wrote: "Strangely enough, as a
Frenchman I feel that on the whole Mr. Kennedy is more to be
commended than blamed for his forthright, frank and provocative
speech."
Although Le Monde opposed Kennedy’s call for Algerian independence,
it identified the senator as one of the few serious students of history in
American politics: "The most striking point of the speech of Mr. Kennedy
is the important documentation it revealed and his thorough knowledge
of the French milieu."
(Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, pp. 19‑22)
Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Algeria
In his 1957 speech about Algeria, "Senator" Kennedy was highly critical of the Eisenhower administration; however, the
political dynamic involved must be considered. Kennedy’s views about Israel and the Middle East in general were closer to
Eisenhower’s than Johnson’s. Having stated that, it is significant to understand that Kennedy’s public endorsement of an
independent Algeria was a subtle criticism of Israel. It is widely known that Israel opposed Algeria’s independence because it
(Israel) wanted to oppress or dominate all Muslim/Arab states. Although Eisenhower had not publicly supported Algerian
independence, it seems plausible that he may have agreed with Kennedy but lacked the political courage to denounce France
as the young Senator had boldly done in his speech. Upon reflection, Eisenhower may have secretly admired Kennedy for
publicly denouncing America’s World War II ally. After all, France had recently betrayed Eisenhower by secretly conniving
with Israel and Britain to attack Egypt after President Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal.(Footnote 26)
Kennedy surely understood how much he and Eisenhower agreed on Middle Eastern issues, but Eisenhower belonged to the
opposing political party; and Kennedy and Johnson both had their eyes on the White House in the upcoming 1960 presidential
campaign. Consequently, one of Kennedy’s objectives when making the Algerian speech was likely to differentiate himself from
the sitting Republican President and his Democratic adversary, Johnson. Although Kennedy and Johnson held opposing views
about Israel, they could not openly criticize each other because they were both Democrats. But since Eisenhower was a
Republican, it made sense politically for a Democratic Senator to criticize him for not supporting Algerian independence. The
speech also sent a message to informed political observers that unlike Johnson, Kennedy would not be a minion for Israel if
elected president.
Even more important, Kennedy’s Algerian speech made the front page of the New York Times which put him in the same
league as Senate Majority Leader Johnson. Recall that Johnson had made the front page of the New York Times five months
earlier (Feb. 1957) for opposing Eisenhower’s efforts to place UN sanctions on Israel in the wake of that country’s failed
attempt to seize land from Egypt and overthrow Nasser in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and 57.
Jun. 5, 1967: The Six Day War
Ten years after the Suez Crisis, Israel attacked Egypt again; but this time with success. The event is known as the Six Day War
which began on June 5, 1967. Things had changed a great deal over the ten years leading up to the Six Day War. Israel’s most
influential adversaries had either died or left public office. Eisenhower had retired years earlier and was in failing health. John
Foster Dulles had died of cancer in 1959. Dag Hammarskjöld had been killed in a mysterious plane crash in the Congolese
province of Katanga in 1961. President Kennedy of course had been assassinated in Dallas in 1963. And Israel’s old ally,
Lyndon Johnson, had become Commander‑in‑Chief of the United States. In July of 1965, President Johnson had appointed
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg as US ambassador to the UN. Goldberg—a Jew and ardent supporter of
Israel—replaced Adlai Stevenson as US delegate to the UN after Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14,
1965.(Footnote 27) The Yemen War had been eroding Arab unity since the conflict began in 1962.(Footnote 28) By 1967,
Egyptian forces had suffered heavy losses and were weakened after five years of military involvement in the Yemen War.
Whether these events were random or planned is anyone’s guess, but they were definitely advantageous to Israel by the time
the Six Day War occurred in 1967.
The Six Day War was a watershed event that transformed Israel from a small nation into a colonial empire. Although Israel
became a nation in 1948, it expanded dramatically after the Six Day War. Israel took from the Arabs—through military
force—the Old City of Jerusalem, the Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River known as the
West Bank, and the Golan Heights, on the Israeli‑Syrian border.11 In addition to acquiring new land, Israel gained control of an
additional 900,000 Arabs who became the discontented subjects of the new Israeli empire. Since 1967, the number of Arabs
under Israel’s military control has grown to over 1.75 million.12
Amnesty International has documented Israel’s inhumane treatment of its Palestinian subjects citing arbitrary arrests, torturing
detainees, destroying or sealing the homes of Arab suspects and their relatives, confiscating land, destroying crops, and
diverting precious water from thirsty Palestinians in the desert to fill the swimming pools and water the lawns of Israeli settlers.13
This conduct is condoned, embraced, and encouraged by the United States through its steadfast financial and military support
of Israel. Today, US tax payers spend approximately $3 billion annually to subsidize, support, and arm Israel. Although Israel is
a wealthy country by western standards, it receives the highest amount of American foreign aid money, 28 percent.14
Jewish scholars Michael Kazin and Maurice Isserman described in their book, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s,
the passion ignited within American Jews by the Six Day War. They wrote the following:
The swift, complete victory was followed by a long and wrenching
occupation of Palestinian lands. For many American Jews, the 1967
conflict awakened and inspired passions that did much to transform the
meaning of their identity. No longer was Israel just a reason for Jewish
pride, a desert miracle of orange groves and thriving kibbutzes, whose
creation was romanticized in Exodus‑a popular novel and film of the late
'50s and early '60s. Israel was now the homeland of fellow Jews who
had fought alone for their survival and were resigned to living in
perpetual danger. The threat came not just from Arab militants but from
communist powers, their Third World allies, and a good many American
leftists who were eager to prove their "anti‑imperialist" credentials. In the
face of extinction, Israel became "the ultimate reality in the life of every
Jew living today," as a young professor at Brandeis University put it, "In
dealing with those who oppose Israel, we are not reasonable and we
are not rational. Nor should we be."15
Those are troubling words, but they reflect the true agenda of those who support the Jewish state of Israel.
Background on the Six Day War
Understanding the Six Day War requires some background regarding the politics of the Middle East in 1967. The following
men were heads of state for the countries involved in the Six Day War:
Nation
Head of State
Egypt
President Gamal Abdel Nasser
Sryia
General Salah al‑Jadid
Jordan
King Hussein [ibn Talal]
Israel
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
US
President Lyndon Baines Johnson
USSR
Chairman Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin
UN
Secretary General U Thant (of Burma, now Myanmar)
Egyptian President Nasser was a key figure in Middle Eastern affairs for seventeen years. In 1954 he became prime minister of
Egypt, and in 1956 he became that country’s president—remaining in that position until his sudden death in 1970.16 Nasser had
been Israel’s primary enemy because he was a charismatic Muslim leader who advocated Arab unity (also known as
pan‑Arabism).
Egypt has no oil of any consequence, but it has a more advanced culture than the other oil‑producing Arab nations. It was the
home of one of the principal civilizations of the ancient Middle East. It is also one of the earliest urban and literate societies.17
Consequently, the other Arab nations have historically looked to Egypt for leadership.
The original antagonist of Israel in the Six Day War was Syria, led by General Salah al‑Jadid, head of the Ba‘th regime.18
Although Syria—under the Ba‘th regime—was an aggressive enemy of Israel, Syria’s erratic behavior toward other Arab
nations actually helped Israel. In fact, Israel used Syrian raids along the its border as a pretext for attacking Egypt and starting
the Six Day War.
In March 1963 Ba‘thist supporters seized power from the "secessionist" regime in a military coup. With the Ba‘th in power,
Nasser had three Arab nations against him. Those nations were Saudi Arabia and Jordan (because they supported the ousted
Imam in the Yemen war) and Syria.
In April 1967 Syrian bombardments of Israeli villages had been intensified. When the Israeli Air Force shot down six Syrian
MiG planes in reprisal, Egypt mobilized its forces near the Sinai border.19 Egypt had a mutual defense agreement with the
Syrians, who now felt themselves in danger. As an advocate of pan‑Arabism, Nasser felt obliged to help Syria. He ordered
part of the Egyptian Army to move into Sinai. He thought that the presence of Egyptian forces would discourage the Israelis
from attacking Syria. It was a purely defensive move designed to draw off Israeli forces from Syria. If Israel had attacked
Syria, then the Egyptian Army would have carried out operations in support of the Syrians. But no offensive operations against
Israel were consider.20
A standoff between Egypt and Israel ensued, and tensions mounted between the superpowers. The Soviet Union supported
Egypt and the United States supported Israel. This raced the stakes considerably because it introduced the possibility of
nuclear war.21
Historians now know that Israel secretly launched an attack against Egypt, but lied about it claiming that Nasser had launched
the attack first. In fact Israeli Prime Minister Menachem
Begin made this admission in a speech on August 8, 1982 before the National Defense College in Jerusalem. He stated that the
Six Day War was not a "war of necessity" but rather a "war of choice¼ Nasser did not attack us. We decided to attack
him."22 This was a major admission by Begin.
On June 3, 1967, just two days before the Israelis attacked, the United States sent the aircraft carrier Intrepid through the Suez
Canal with all its planes lined up on deck. Nasser thought this was an unnecessary show of force. The Egyptian people became
furious. They lined the bank of the Canal and threw old shoes at the carrier. At the same time the Sixth Fleet flexed its muscles
and prepared for a war situation. It was an excessive show of force by the United States.23
After Israel’s victory, Nasser was disgusted with Johnson. He felt that Johnson was dishonest and had colluded with Israel to
strike first and blame it on Egypt. He was suspicious of America’s UN ambassador Arthur Goldberg, an ardent Zionist.
Goldberg had immediately backed Israel in the UN when it claimed that Egypt "fired the first shot." Nasser accused Johnson of
collusion, broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, and ordered all Americans out of Egypt. Several other Arab
states did the same. Soon Johnson, already angered by the charge of collusion, had to watch the humiliating spectacle of
twenty‑four thousand American men, women, and children being thrown out of the Middle East. Johnson never forgot and
never forgave.24
After Egypt’s humiliating defeat in the Six Day War, Nasser attempted to resign, but massive street demonstrations and a vote
of confidence by the National Assembly induced him to remain in office. The Soviet Union immediately began replacing all the
destroyed war equipment and installed surface‑to‑air missiles along the Suez as a cover for Egypt’s artillery installations.25
An important footnote to the Six Day War is an incident that occurred in Yemen months earlier. In early 1967, fighting in
Yemen still continued. One day there was shooting in Taiz (in Yemen). Direction finders indicated that two bazooka shots came
from the headquarters of the United States Point Four Aid Program—which was the CIA's cover organization. Yemeni
government forces attacked the building and arrested the four people inside. The safes were opened and an enormous number
of documents were found and subsequently photographed by Egyptian intelligence experts.(Footnote 29) The United States was
furious at the attack on the building and demanded the documents. They were returned three weeks later, but by that time their
secrets were known. Many people within the United States military became extremely hostile toward Nasser because of this
event. Some believe the Six Day War was a form of retribution.26
UN Resolution 242
Within six months after the Six Day War, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 242 which called for "withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." In theory the UN should enforce the resolution itself, but
unfortunately, reality is much different. The sad truth is the UN is unable to enforce much of anything without the support of the
United States, and the United States has maintained a "passionate attachment" to Israel ever since President Johnson was in
office.
Ironically, Resolution 242 was issued on the fourth anniversary of President Kennedy’s death, November 22, 1967.27 It is an
extremely important document because virtually all disputes between Israel and the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states
could be resolved by its enforcement.
In addition, the Israelis managed to secure ambiguous, legalistic wording for Resolution 242 which makes even more difficult to
enforce;28 however, the resolution remains a highly sensitive area for American presidents and politicians to roam. The
following is the entire text of the resolution:
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle
East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and
the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the
area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the
Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in
accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which
should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for
and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international
waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence
of every State in the area, through measures including the
establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary‑General to designate a Special
Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain
contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and
assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary‑General to report to the Security Council on
the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as
possible.
(UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967)
Jun. 8, 1967: Israel Attacked the USS Liberty
In the midst of the Six Day War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty spy vessel killing 34 American sailors and wounding 75.
George Ball wrote a riveting account of Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967. Ball’s comments are significant
because he was undersecretary of state in the Johnson and Kennedy administrations. The following text is an excerpt from
Ball’s book, The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement With Israel, 1947 to the Present:
During the [Six Day] War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty. The Liberty
was an American intelligence‑gathering vessel, then cruising in
international waters near Egypt and reading the radio transmissions on
both sides. It flew the American flag and was painted in US Navy colors,
complete with number and name.
On the fourth day of the war [June 8, 1967], with both Jordan and Egypt
routed, the Israelis turned their attention to Syria, the original cause of all
this trouble. Guns mounted on the Golan Heights had subjected Galilee
to sporadic bombardment for years and the Israelis had every intention
of capturing those Heights before hostilities were over. Meanwhile, the
United Nations had adopted a cease‑fire resolution and they feared
there might not be enough time to accomplish this objective without, as
it were, going into overnight.
The Liberty’s presence and function were known to Israeli leaders. They
presumably thought it vital that the Liberty be prevented from informing
Washington of their intentions to violate any cease‑fire before they had
completed their occupation of the Golan. Their solution was brutal and
direct.
Israel aircraft determined the exact location of the ship and undertook a
combined air‑naval attack. Apprised of Israel’s plans from various
sources, the US Navy Department faced a delicate problem. Due
regard for the lives of America’s naval personnel should have impelled
the Navy to urge the State Department to warn off Israel in no uncertain
terms; meanwhile, the Navy have alerted the Liberty to its danger and
dispatched ships or planes for its protection. But none of these actions
was taken in time.
There has, for years, been a continuing argument about the tragic
lapse. Some say that a warning to Israel might have exposed U.S.
sources of secret intelligence. Whatever the motive, the President or
one of his aides took the decision to risk the ship and its crew, and
merely ordered them, without explanation, to steam west at top speed.
Unhappily, that notice was too little and taken too late. Israeli ships and
planes attacked, killing 34 American sailors, wounding 75, and leaving
821 rocket and machine‑gun holes in the Liberty. It was only when the
Israelis were preparing to board the ship that American planes belatedly
appeared from the west and forced them to retire.
The sequel was unedifying. The [Johnson] administration tried
vigorously to downplay the whole matter. Although it silenced the crew,
casualties to the sailors and damage to the ship could not possibly be
concealed. Thus, an elaborate charade was performed. The United
States complained pro forma to Israel, which reacted by blaming the
victims. The ship, they rejoined, had not been clearly marked but looked
like an Arab ship—which was definitely untrue. Nor did the Israelis even
pretend that they had queried the American Embassy in Tel Aviv
regarding the status of the well‑marked ship. In the end, the Israelis
tendered a reluctant and graceless apology; indemnities for the victims
and damaged ship were both parsimonious and slow in coming. The
sordid affair has still not been erased from the history books; an
organization of devoted survivors has kept the cause alive over the
years by publishing a newsletter and holding well‑advertised meetings.
Yet the ultimate lesson of the Liberty attack had far more effect on policy
in Israel than America. Israel’s leaders concluded that nothing they
might do would offend the Americans to the point of reprisal. If
America’s leaders did not have the courage to punish Israel for the
blatant murder of American citizens, it seemed that their American
friends would let them get away with almost anything.
(George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 57 ‑ 58)
Arthur Goldberg, UN Point Man
As previously stated, Adlai Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14, 1965.29 Until his untimely death, Stevenson
had represented the United States in the UN. Arthur Goldberg was a Supreme Court Justice appointed by Kennedy to a
traditionally Jewish slot in the high court.(Footnote 30) At President Johnson’s request, Goldberg resigned from his position as
Supreme Court justice to take the lower position of US ambassador to the UN.30 This was an extraordinary move.
Goldberg was an interesting figure. In addition to serving on the Supreme Court and as a UN diplomat, he had an impressive
background in the world of espionage. During World War II, he worked with Haganah and OSS in Palestine.
After the events of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a
military spy agency and precursor to the CIA.31 New York attorney William Donovan was appointed to run the newly formed
agency. With Donovan in charge of the OSS, Roosevelt had created the first civilian‑run spy organization in modern US
history. Donovan immediately recruited another New York attorney, Allen Dulles, to help establish the organization. Goldberg
was given the rank of major and he assisted Donovan and Dulles establish an OSS field office in New York. Shortly thereafter,
Goldberg became—for all intents and purposes—an international spy working for the OSS. He was assigned various spy
missions in Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Morocco.32
With the experience he acquired in espionage, he returned to Washington, DC and created an intelligence gathering operation.
After that, he was sent on a secret mission in Palestine where he met with leaders of the illegal army of Jewish settlers,
Haganah. This operation meant a great deal to Goldberg personally because he had become a Zionist rather late in life. The
Haganah worked with him to coordinate a joint OSS‑Haganah parachute mission into Italy to gather critical intelligence
information. After the Palestine encounter, Goldberg was sent to London to recruit anti‑Nazi Germans, who had been captured
as spies when the allies invaded France.33
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Endnotes
1.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 43 ‑ 45
2.ibid, pp. 45 ‑ 46
3.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Canal
4.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 46
5.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Crisis
6.Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, Chapter 1
7.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 251. Eisenhower’s instructions to Dulles were on p. 47 of Ball’s book. The Hammarskjöld
quote regarding Ben‑Gurion and Israel was on p. 251. Ball cited Brian Urquhart’s biography of Dag Hammarskjöld: Hammarskjöld, p.
157.
8.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 47
9.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 46 ‑ 49; multiple articles about Senate Majority Leader Johnson’s support for Israel in the
New York Times on February 20, 1957
10.ibid
11.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War
12.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 58
13.ibid, p. 179
14.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 256
15.Kazin and Isserman, America Divided, p. 253
16.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser
17.Encyclopedia Britannica: Egypt
18.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War; Salah al‑Jadid; George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 53‑56; Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo
Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249
19.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War
20.Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249
21.ibid
22.Ball, p 56
23.Heikal
24.ibid
25.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser
26.Heikal
27.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 62
28.ibid, pp. 62‑63
29.Encyclopedia Britannica: Adlai Stevenson
30.ibid, Arthur Goldberg
31.Edward B. Shils, Ph.D, Monthly Labor Review (January 1997), pp. 59 ‑ 60 (excerpt from Arthur Goldberg: proof of the American dream)
32.ibid
33.ibid
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Chapter 10: LBJ’s "Passionate Attachment" to Israel
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Background
As some readers may know, the term "passionate attachment" was used by George Washington in his farewell address in
1796. Washington advised citizens of the new republic to renounce any "passionate attachment"(Footnote 23) with another
nation, and also to repudiate "inveterate hatred" toward another country. In the Twentieth Century, the United States failed to
heed Washington’s warnings on both counts. Shortly after World War II, we developed an "inveterate hatred" of the Soviet
Union and formed a "passionate attachment" to Israel, although the latter accelerated dramatically under the Johnson
Administration.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was the last American president in the Twentieth Century to successfully stand up to the
pressures and unyielding annoyances of the Israeli government and its American supporters. Although President Kennedy
shared his predecessor’s views intellectually, he entered the White House after an extremely close election. Consequently, he
had to assume a more cautious approach.
The Eisenhower administration’s Middle East policy is important for two reasons. First of all, it demonstrated that a strong
American president can stand up to Israel. Secondly, it reveals that Lyndon Johnson—then Senate Majority Leader—was
Eisenhower’s most influential political adversary regarding Israel.
Two major incidents occurred on Eisenhower’s watch where Israel acted as an aggressor toward its neighbors and toward
Palestinians living in the region. The first incident occurred in 1953 and involved Israel’s effort to secretly divert waters of the
Jordan. The second incident occurred in 1957 when Israel conspired with France and Britain to attack Egypt and overthrow
that country’s leader, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, after he nationalized the Suez Canal in defiance of Israel and the Western
powers. In the latter incident, Lyndon Johnson used all of his political muscle as Senate Majority Leader to prevent the UN
from imposing sanctions on Israel—the sanctions were fully supported by the Eisenhower administration—for its flagrant
disregard for international law. In both instances, Eisenhower forced Israel to behave by temporarily cutting off American aid.
1953: The Jordan River Diversion
Israel secretly planned to use the Palestinian village of Banat Ya’qub for a major water diversion project that would move
waters of the Jordan Valley to central Israel and the North Negev. The UN, the US, and the Palestinians who lived in that area
were unaware of Israel’s plans. Earlier, the Eisenhower administration had offered to implement an American‑sponsored
regional water‑usage plan, and Israel had promised to cooperate in that effort. But in reality, Israel secretly wanted complete
control of the flow of water in the region, despite its commitments to the Americans. Consequently, a dispute ensued over the
control of Palestinian territory near Banat Ya’qub.
Unaware of Israel’s hidden agenda, UN Representative, Dr. Ralph Bunche, worked out a truce agreement where disputed
lands would be evacuated by Syrian forces. The agreement stipulated that Israel must allow Arab inhabitants to continue
farming there. Israel also agreed that it would not occupy the disputed area, but would allow it to be a neutral zone.
Immediately after the Syrian troops withdrew, the Israelis broke their promise and drove the Palestinian farmers from the land.
The Syrian troops responded by opening fire to drive out the settlers. Israel responded by complaining that the Syrians had
violated the truce and asserted a right to occupy the areas. UN Truce Observers immediately cited Israel as the instigator and
essentially stated that the Syrian troops were justified in retaliating against Israel for violating the truce agreement.
The Israelis took the strategy that if they completed the water diversion project at Banat Ya’qub, then the UN would back
down because the work simply could not be undone. So the Israelis began working aggressively on the project. They worked
non‑stop, twenty‑four hours a day using searchlights at night to hasten completion. But secrecy was still key. They omitted
appropriations for the project from their published budget. In addition, they did not mention it to Americans working with them
on other water projects; however, US intelligence soon detected their activity.
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles realized that Israel had openly deceived them and had no
intention of keeping its earlier promise to cooperate in the American‑sponsored regional water‑usage plan. To show its
displeasure, the Eisenhower administration withheld $26 million under the Mutual Security Act and suspended economic aid
until Israel agreed to cooperate with UN observers. In addition, President Eisenhower directed the Treasury to prepare an
Executive Order removing tax‑deductible status from contributions by Jewish Americans to such Zionist organizations as the
United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Eisenhower did not make these actions public because he did not want to humiliate the Israelis;
however, the Israelis interpreted his magnanimous gesture as a sign of weakness. As a result, they continued work on the
project—convinced that the Americans would back down.
Israel’s strategy might have worked had Israel not launched a bloody raid on the village of Kibya on the night of October 14,
1953. In that attack, twenty‑five‑year‑old Ariel Sharon and his three hundred Israeli commandos, known as Force 101,
massacred fifty‑three Palestinian civilians. According to a UN report, Sharon’s forces drove the villagers into their homes then
blew them up.
The Eisenhower administration condemned the raid and, for the first time, publicly revealed that it had already suspended
construction funds for Israel’s water supply. Their was a huge backlash against Eisenhower. The US government was
denounced by Hadassah, a Jewish charitable organization. An attaché at the Israeli Embassy attempted to divert attention from
the water controversy by claiming—in a widely publicized speech—that the Kibya raid was in response to Jordanian
aggression. Pro‑Israeli congressmen and David Ben‑Gurion accused Eisenhower and his advisers of anti‑Semitism.
But Eisenhower stood firm and continued to withhold funds from Israel. Fearing a financial burden, Israeli representatives
informed President Eisenhower—on October 19—that work had ceased on the water diversion project and that Israel would
cooperate with the Security Counsil’s efforts to solve the Jordan River Development problem. Within twenty‑four hours,
America restored aid to Israel.
Eisenhower demonstrated that Israel responded faster to cutting off the money flow than anything else; however, the Israelis
interpreted America’s quick restoration of aid as proof that they could manipulate the superpower by applying adequate
pressure. Ultimately, Israel completed the project in a slightly altered manner.1
Nov. 1956: The Suez Crisis
The stage was set for the Suez Crisis in 1955 when the Eisenhower administration began pressuring Israel to demonstrate its
commitment to peace in the Middle East.
On February 28, 1955, President Gamal Adbel Nasser made a speech full of warnings against Israeli atrocities. He emphasized
a bloody raid on the Gaza Strip by the Israelis, allegedly a retaliation for raids made from Gaza. Nasser was also upset with the
United States for denying his request for arms a few months earlier. In his speech he repeated the request for Egypt to buy
arms but was ignored.
On September 4, 1955, Egypt announced that it had received a proposal from the Soviet Union for an arms sale. The
Eisenhower administration treated this as an idle threat which angered Nasser. As a result, he brokered a cotton‑for‑arms
barter agreement with Czechoslovakia on September 27 in which Egypt received $200 million worth of arms—tanks, MiG
planes, artillery, submarines, and small arms.
Israel immediately renewed its joint arms agreement with the United States, France, and Britain. In addition, Israel requested a
treaty guaranteeing its security, but it was denied by the Western powers because they knew that Israel’s military strength was
vastly superior to the neighboring Arab nations.
On August 26, 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a speech before the Council of Foreign Relations in New
York in which he outlined terms for peace in the Middle East. He stated that the problem of Palestinian refugees could be
solved, but Israel should not be expected to assume the full cost. He proposed that Congress approve an international loan to
finance the resettlement or repatriating of Palestinian refugees. The loan would also help develop irrigation projects to assist
refugees in cultivating their land for growing crops.
The Israelis were somewhat agitated by Dulles’s speech because he mentioned a possible boundary revision. Dulles promptly
responded to clarify the American position. He stated in no uncertain terms that if Sharett and Ben‑Gurion (Israeli leaders)
wanted American diplomatic, political, and military aid, they would have to demonstrate their peaceful intentions by helping
resolve the sensitive problems of Palestinian refugees and boundary disputes. On November 9, President Eisenhower—who
was in a Denver hospital convalescing from a heart attack—confirmed Dulles’s position in a formal statement made from his
hospital bed.2
At that point, it became clear that the United States could no longer be counted on to support Israel’s continuing efforts to
expand its borders. Consequently, Israel turned to the European powers for support. Over the next year, trouble began to arise
over the Suez Canal.
The Suez Canal is a sea‑level waterway running north‑south across the Isthmus of Suez in Egypt to connect the Mediterranean
and the Red seas. The canal separates the African continent from Asia, and it provides the shortest seagoing route between
Europe and the lands lying around the Indian and western Pacific oceans. It is one of the world's most heavily used shipping
lanes.3
On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Nasser angered Israel and the European powers when he nationalized the Suez Canal.
He took this bold action because he felt that friends of Israel in America had cheated him out of US aide for the Aswan Dam
that Egypt needed for irrigation and power. The dam cost $1.3 billion and Nasser had been given the impression by the
Eisenhower administration that US aide would be forthcoming; however, friends of Israel in America pressured the Senate
Appropriations Committee into blocking funding for the dam. On July 16, 1956, funding was officially denied—much to the
chagrin of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. To make matters worse, the State Department
issued a statement, on July 19, critically appraising Egypt’s international credit. Nasser felt that this was a ruse created by
friends of Israel in America, and he responded by seizing control of the canal and nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in
order to obtain funds for the dam.4
On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt and advanced toward the Suez Canal. On November 1, British and French
forces also invaded Egypt and began occupation of the canal zone, but growing opposition from President Eisenhower,
Secretary of State Dulles, UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskjöld, and Soviet threats of intervention put an immediate stop
to British and French support, but Israeli troops still occupied the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip in defiance of a UN
resolution.5 Eisenhower was so angered by European involvement in the attack that he telephoned British Prime Minister
Anthony Eden and gave him such a tongue‑lashing that the Prime Minister was reduced to tears.6 (Footnote 24)
Eisenhower told Dulles: "Foster, you tell’em, goddamn it, we’re going to apply sanctions, we’re going to the United Nations,
we’re going to do everything that there is to stop this thing." He later explained, "We just told the Israelis it was absolutely
indefensible and that if they expect our support in the Middle East and in maintaining their position, they had better behave¼
We went to town right away to give them hell."
UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld shared Eisenhower’s view that Israel needed to learn to behave. Consequently,
Hammarskjöld and Ben‑Gurion engaged in some heated exchanges after the UN Secretary General publicly condemned Israel
for its retaliatory actions against Palestinians. In 1956 Ben‑Gurion complained that Hammarskjöld’s remarks had encouraged
assaults on Israel by Egypt and Jordan. Hammarskjöld replied as follows:
You are convinced that the threat of retaliation has a deterrent effect. I
am convinced that it is more of an incitement to individual members of
the Arab forces than even what has been said by their own
governments. You are convinced that acts of retaliation will stop further
incidents. I am convinced that they will lead to further incidents¼.You
believe that this way of creating respect for Israel will pave the way for
sound coexistence with the Arab people. I believe that the policy may
postpone indefinitely the time for such coexistence¼. I think the
discussion of this question can be considered closed since you, in spite
of previous discouraging experiences, have taken the responsibility of
large‑scale tests of the correctness of your belief.7
On February 2, 1957, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding Israel’s withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba
and the Gaza Strip, but Ben‑Gurion refused. Fed up with Israel’s treachery, Eisenhower wrote a strong letter to Ben‑Gurion
demanding Israel’s withdrawal. Still Ben‑Gurion refused.8
Feb. 1957: LBJ Rescued Israel From UN Sanctions
It had been rumored that UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden was quietly pushing for sanctions—with the
full support of the Eisenhower administration—against Israel if it continued to maintain troops in the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza in
defiance of US and UN demands for immediate withdrawal. In response, Lyndon Johnson—then Senate Majority
Leader—wrote a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urging the Eisenhower Administration not to support UN
sanctions against Israel. Johnson’s letter to Dulles appeared in the New York Times on February 20, 1957. The Senate
Majority Leader’s argument was that it was an unfair double‑standard to punish a small country like Israel when large countries
like the Soviet Union were allowed to openly defy UN resolutions without being punished.9
In addition, Johnson rallied Senate Democrats to oppose Israel sanctions.(Footnote 25) He used partisan politics to pressure
Eisenhower into retreating from principle, but Eisenhower stood his ground and kept applying pressure to Israel by cutting off
or delaying financial assistance. When Israel began to run out of money, in March 1957, Prime Minister David Ben‑Gurion
finally agreed to withdraw troops from the occupied territories. President Eisenhower triumphed, but Johnson had protected
Israel from the humiliation of UN sanctions. Sadly, Eisenhower was the last US president to stand up to the Israeli government
and it’s American supporters. At least he proved it could be done.10
Ironically, one of the best accounts of Lyndon Johnson’s involvement in the Suez Crisis was written by Louis Bloomfield in his
1957 book entitled Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba. In the ensuing years, Johnson’s involvement in that conflict has been
erased from history. Although his pro‑Israel stance appeared on the front page of the New York Times on February 20, 1957,
his name is not mentioned in Western history books about the Suez Crisis (none that I have found anyway, except
Bloomfield’s). The power elite within the book publishing industry have apparently been concealing Johnson’s loyalty to Israel
as a means of preventing inquiries by historians, researchers, and investigators about a possible Jewish conspiracy behind the
assassination of President Kennedy years later.
This is how Bloomfield described Johnson’s pro‑Israel stance during the Suez/Gulf of Aqaba Crisis:
On February 11th, 1957, Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States
Secretary of State, submitted certain Proposals to the Israeli
Government which were, in effect, that:
"Israel should withdraw her troops from the Gulf of Aqaba region and the
Gaza Strip, in accordance with the recommendations of the United
Nations General Assembly.
The United States should use all its influence to establish the Strait of
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway for the
innocent passage of all nations, including Israel.
Meanwhile the United States should do everything it could to see that
United Nations troops replaced the Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip and
that that area should become a kind of de facto United Nations
trusteeship where United Nations officials would watch and if possible
stop any fighting between Israel and Egypt."
Subsequent discussion between the United States Secretary of State
and Mr. Abba Eban did not bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli
forces from these two areas and rumours began to circulate in the
American press that the Afro‑Asian bloc would introduce resolutions
calling for economic and military sanctions to force Israel to comply with
the withdrawal resolutions.
On February 19th, 1957, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate
Majority Leader, wrote to Mr. John Foster Dulles urging that the United
States oppose imposing of economic sanctions against Israel by the
United Nations. The letter was endorsed by the Senate Democratic
Policy Committee.
(Louis Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf of Aqaba, p. 152)
Jul. 2, 1957: Senator Kennedy Made a Controversial Speech About Algeria
On July 2, 1957, John F. Kennedy—then a US Senator—made a speech, "Facing Facts on Algeria," which denounced
France’s colonial occupation of Algeria and the brutality of the French‑Algerian War. The speech also demonstrated an
understanding of Indochina that would likely have prevented him from escalating US military involvement in Vietnam had he not
been killed.
Historian Richard Mahoney summarized the speech and events that preceded and followed it:
Early in 1957, Kennedy decided to make a major critique of the
[Eisenhower] administration’s position on France’s colonial war in
Algeria. By 1957, the French had committed over 500,000 troops to the
effort to suppress the nationalist rebellion. Torture, atrocity, and terror
on both sides had turned the pride of France’s empire into a chamber of
horrors. ¼the Eisenhower administration had been maintaining a policy
of strict silence in Algeria – at least until Kennedy’s attack, which The
New York Times called "the most comprehensive and outspoken
arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an
American in public office."
On July 2, 1957, Kennedy accused the Eisenhower administration of
courting disaster in Algeria. He charged that Eisenhower’s policy of
non‑involvement in Africa and Asia was really made up of "tepid
encouragement and moralizations to both sides, cautious neutrality on
all the real issues, and a restatement of our obvious dependence upon
our European friends, and our obvious dedication nevertheless to the
principles of self‑determination, and our obvious desire not to become
involved." The result, Kennedy said, was that, "We have deceived
ourselves into believing that we have thus pleased both sides and
displeased no one ¼ when, in truth, we have earned the suspicion of
all."
The previous decade had proven that the tide of nationalism in the Third
World – from Indochina to India to Indonesia – was "irresistible,"
Kennedy declared. It was time for France to face the fact that Algeria
had to be freed. When would the West learn, he asked, that colonies
"are like fruit that cling to the tree only till they ripen?" Didn’t the French
debacle in Indochina, which ended at Dien Bien Phu, serve as a
warning of what lay ahead for France in Algeria if something were not
done?
[Referring to lessons that should have been learned from France’s
Indochina debacle, Kennedy stated,]
"Did that tragic episode not teach us whether France likes it or not,
admits it or not, or has our support or not, that their overseas territories
are sooner or later, one by one, going to break free and look with
suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to
independence? ¼ Nationalism in Africa cannot be evaluated purely in
terms of the historical and legal niceties argued by the French and thus
far accepted by the State Department. National self‑identification
frequently takes place by quick combustion which the rain of repression
simply cannot extinguish."
In the United States, a storm of protest greeted Kennedy’s address on
"Facing Facts on Algeria." President Eisenhower complained about
"young men getting up and shouting about things." Secretary [of State
John Foster] Dulles commented acidly that if the senator wanted to tilt
against colonialism, perhaps he might concentrate on the communist
variety. Most prominent Democrats were equally scornful. Adlai
Stevenson dismissed Kennedy’s speech as "terrible." Dean Acheson
described the speech as "foolish words that wound ¼ a dispirited ally."
In France, the speech provoked an even more furious outcry. Paris’s
largest daily, "Le Figaro," remarked: "It is shameful that our business is
so badly directed that we are forced to endure such idiocies." U.S.
News and World Report noted that "An American has unified France –
against himself!" Responding to Kennedy’s speech, French President
Rene Coty told the French Senate that France would "never negotiate
with cutthroats since independence would give the 1,200,000
Europeans living in Algeria one alternative – leaving their homeland or
living at the mercy of fanaticism." French Defense Minister Andre Morice
publicly wondered whether Kennedy was "having nightmares." Talk of
independence, Morice said, "will cost many more innocent lives,"
Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. reported to Kennedy from
Paris that summer that "Algeria is beginning to poison France."
In Algeria itself, feeling among the European colonists against the
speech ran so high that French authorities warned American newsmen
and residents to stay off the streets to avoid reprisals. Two days after
the speech a bomb exploded outside the American consulate in Algiers.
The French Resident Minister in Algiers, Robert Lacoste, called the
bomb "a Communist joke" and challenged Kennedy to come to Algeria.
The senator declined.
¼Practically no one in the American foreign‑policy establishment
regarded the Algeria speech as anything more than a partisan political
blast designed to attract attention. But foreign correspondents such as
Alistair Cooke of the Manchester Guardian and Henri Pierre of Le Monde
recognized what their American counterparts had not – that Kennedy
knew what he was talking about on Third World issues. In a letter to the
editor of The New York Times, Pierre wrote: "Strangely enough, as a
Frenchman I feel that on the whole Mr. Kennedy is more to be
commended than blamed for his forthright, frank and provocative
speech."
Although Le Monde opposed Kennedy’s call for Algerian independence,
it identified the senator as one of the few serious students of history in
American politics: "The most striking point of the speech of Mr. Kennedy
is the important documentation it revealed and his thorough knowledge
of the French milieu."
(Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, pp. 19‑22)
Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Algeria
In his 1957 speech about Algeria, "Senator" Kennedy was highly critical of the Eisenhower administration; however, the
political dynamic involved must be considered. Kennedy’s views about Israel and the Middle East in general were closer to
Eisenhower’s than Johnson’s. Having stated that, it is significant to understand that Kennedy’s public endorsement of an
independent Algeria was a subtle criticism of Israel. It is widely known that Israel opposed Algeria’s independence because it
(Israel) wanted to oppress or dominate all Muslim/Arab states. Although Eisenhower had not publicly supported Algerian
independence, it seems plausible that he may have agreed with Kennedy but lacked the political courage to denounce France
as the young Senator had boldly done in his speech. Upon reflection, Eisenhower may have secretly admired Kennedy for
publicly denouncing America’s World War II ally. After all, France had recently betrayed Eisenhower by secretly conniving
with Israel and Britain to attack Egypt after President Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal.(Footnote 26)
Kennedy surely understood how much he and Eisenhower agreed on Middle Eastern issues, but Eisenhower belonged to the
opposing political party; and Kennedy and Johnson both had their eyes on the White House in the upcoming 1960 presidential
campaign. Consequently, one of Kennedy’s objectives when making the Algerian speech was likely to differentiate himself from
the sitting Republican President and his Democratic adversary, Johnson. Although Kennedy and Johnson held opposing views
about Israel, they could not openly criticize each other because they were both Democrats. But since Eisenhower was a
Republican, it made sense politically for a Democratic Senator to criticize him for not supporting Algerian independence. The
speech also sent a message to informed political observers that unlike Johnson, Kennedy would not be a minion for Israel if
elected president.
Even more important, Kennedy’s Algerian speech made the front page of the New York Times which put him in the same
league as Senate Majority Leader Johnson. Recall that Johnson had made the front page of the New York Times five months
earlier (Feb. 1957) for opposing Eisenhower’s efforts to place UN sanctions on Israel in the wake of that country’s failed
attempt to seize land from Egypt and overthrow Nasser in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and 57.
Jun. 5, 1967: The Six Day War
Ten years after the Suez Crisis, Israel attacked Egypt again; but this time with success. The event is known as the Six Day War
which began on June 5, 1967. Things had changed a great deal over the ten years leading up to the Six Day War. Israel’s most
influential adversaries had either died or left public office. Eisenhower had retired years earlier and was in failing health. John
Foster Dulles had died of cancer in 1959. Dag Hammarskjöld had been killed in a mysterious plane crash in the Congolese
province of Katanga in 1961. President Kennedy of course had been assassinated in Dallas in 1963. And Israel’s old ally,
Lyndon Johnson, had become Commander‑in‑Chief of the United States. In July of 1965, President Johnson had appointed
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg as US ambassador to the UN. Goldberg—a Jew and ardent supporter of
Israel—replaced Adlai Stevenson as US delegate to the UN after Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14,
1965.(Footnote 27) The Yemen War had been eroding Arab unity since the conflict began in 1962.(Footnote 28) By 1967,
Egyptian forces had suffered heavy losses and were weakened after five years of military involvement in the Yemen War.
Whether these events were random or planned is anyone’s guess, but they were definitely advantageous to Israel by the time
the Six Day War occurred in 1967.
The Six Day War was a watershed event that transformed Israel from a small nation into a colonial empire. Although Israel
became a nation in 1948, it expanded dramatically after the Six Day War. Israel took from the Arabs—through military
force—the Old City of Jerusalem, the Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River known as the
West Bank, and the Golan Heights, on the Israeli‑Syrian border.11 In addition to acquiring new land, Israel gained control of an
additional 900,000 Arabs who became the discontented subjects of the new Israeli empire. Since 1967, the number of Arabs
under Israel’s military control has grown to over 1.75 million.12
Amnesty International has documented Israel’s inhumane treatment of its Palestinian subjects citing arbitrary arrests, torturing
detainees, destroying or sealing the homes of Arab suspects and their relatives, confiscating land, destroying crops, and
diverting precious water from thirsty Palestinians in the desert to fill the swimming pools and water the lawns of Israeli settlers.13
This conduct is condoned, embraced, and encouraged by the United States through its steadfast financial and military support
of Israel. Today, US tax payers spend approximately $3 billion annually to subsidize, support, and arm Israel. Although Israel is
a wealthy country by western standards, it receives the highest amount of American foreign aid money, 28 percent.14
Jewish scholars Michael Kazin and Maurice Isserman described in their book, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s,
the passion ignited within American Jews by the Six Day War. They wrote the following:
The swift, complete victory was followed by a long and wrenching
occupation of Palestinian lands. For many American Jews, the 1967
conflict awakened and inspired passions that did much to transform the
meaning of their identity. No longer was Israel just a reason for Jewish
pride, a desert miracle of orange groves and thriving kibbutzes, whose
creation was romanticized in Exodus‑a popular novel and film of the late
'50s and early '60s. Israel was now the homeland of fellow Jews who
had fought alone for their survival and were resigned to living in
perpetual danger. The threat came not just from Arab militants but from
communist powers, their Third World allies, and a good many American
leftists who were eager to prove their "anti‑imperialist" credentials. In the
face of extinction, Israel became "the ultimate reality in the life of every
Jew living today," as a young professor at Brandeis University put it, "In
dealing with those who oppose Israel, we are not reasonable and we
are not rational. Nor should we be."15
Those are troubling words, but they reflect the true agenda of those who support the Jewish state of Israel.
Background on the Six Day War
Understanding the Six Day War requires some background regarding the politics of the Middle East in 1967. The following
men were heads of state for the countries involved in the Six Day War:
Nation
Head of State
Egypt
President Gamal Abdel Nasser
Sryia
General Salah al‑Jadid
Jordan
King Hussein [ibn Talal]
Israel
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
US
President Lyndon Baines Johnson
USSR
Chairman Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin
UN
Secretary General U Thant (of Burma, now Myanmar)
Egyptian President Nasser was a key figure in Middle Eastern affairs for seventeen years. In 1954 he became prime minister of
Egypt, and in 1956 he became that country’s president—remaining in that position until his sudden death in 1970.16 Nasser had
been Israel’s primary enemy because he was a charismatic Muslim leader who advocated Arab unity (also known as
pan‑Arabism).
Egypt has no oil of any consequence, but it has a more advanced culture than the other oil‑producing Arab nations. It was the
home of one of the principal civilizations of the ancient Middle East. It is also one of the earliest urban and literate societies.17
Consequently, the other Arab nations have historically looked to Egypt for leadership.
The original antagonist of Israel in the Six Day War was Syria, led by General Salah al‑Jadid, head of the Ba‘th regime.18
Although Syria—under the Ba‘th regime—was an aggressive enemy of Israel, Syria’s erratic behavior toward other Arab
nations actually helped Israel. In fact, Israel used Syrian raids along the its border as a pretext for attacking Egypt and starting
the Six Day War.
In March 1963 Ba‘thist supporters seized power from the "secessionist" regime in a military coup. With the Ba‘th in power,
Nasser had three Arab nations against him. Those nations were Saudi Arabia and Jordan (because they supported the ousted
Imam in the Yemen war) and Syria.
In April 1967 Syrian bombardments of Israeli villages had been intensified. When the Israeli Air Force shot down six Syrian
MiG planes in reprisal, Egypt mobilized its forces near the Sinai border.19 Egypt had a mutual defense agreement with the
Syrians, who now felt themselves in danger. As an advocate of pan‑Arabism, Nasser felt obliged to help Syria. He ordered
part of the Egyptian Army to move into Sinai. He thought that the presence of Egyptian forces would discourage the Israelis
from attacking Syria. It was a purely defensive move designed to draw off Israeli forces from Syria. If Israel had attacked
Syria, then the Egyptian Army would have carried out operations in support of the Syrians. But no offensive operations against
Israel were consider.20
A standoff between Egypt and Israel ensued, and tensions mounted between the superpowers. The Soviet Union supported
Egypt and the United States supported Israel. This raced the stakes considerably because it introduced the possibility of
nuclear war.21
Historians now know that Israel secretly launched an attack against Egypt, but lied about it claiming that Nasser had launched
the attack first. In fact Israeli Prime Minister Menachem
Begin made this admission in a speech on August 8, 1982 before the National Defense College in Jerusalem. He stated that the
Six Day War was not a "war of necessity" but rather a "war of choice¼ Nasser did not attack us. We decided to attack
him."22 This was a major admission by Begin.
On June 3, 1967, just two days before the Israelis attacked, the United States sent the aircraft carrier Intrepid through the Suez
Canal with all its planes lined up on deck. Nasser thought this was an unnecessary show of force. The Egyptian people became
furious. They lined the bank of the Canal and threw old shoes at the carrier. At the same time the Sixth Fleet flexed its muscles
and prepared for a war situation. It was an excessive show of force by the United States.23
After Israel’s victory, Nasser was disgusted with Johnson. He felt that Johnson was dishonest and had colluded with Israel to
strike first and blame it on Egypt. He was suspicious of America’s UN ambassador Arthur Goldberg, an ardent Zionist.
Goldberg had immediately backed Israel in the UN when it claimed that Egypt "fired the first shot." Nasser accused Johnson of
collusion, broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, and ordered all Americans out of Egypt. Several other Arab
states did the same. Soon Johnson, already angered by the charge of collusion, had to watch the humiliating spectacle of
twenty‑four thousand American men, women, and children being thrown out of the Middle East. Johnson never forgot and
never forgave.24
After Egypt’s humiliating defeat in the Six Day War, Nasser attempted to resign, but massive street demonstrations and a vote
of confidence by the National Assembly induced him to remain in office. The Soviet Union immediately began replacing all the
destroyed war equipment and installed surface‑to‑air missiles along the Suez as a cover for Egypt’s artillery installations.25
An important footnote to the Six Day War is an incident that occurred in Yemen months earlier. In early 1967, fighting in
Yemen still continued. One day there was shooting in Taiz (in Yemen). Direction finders indicated that two bazooka shots came
from the headquarters of the United States Point Four Aid Program—which was the CIA's cover organization. Yemeni
government forces attacked the building and arrested the four people inside. The safes were opened and an enormous number
of documents were found and subsequently photographed by Egyptian intelligence experts.(Footnote 29) The United States was
furious at the attack on the building and demanded the documents. They were returned three weeks later, but by that time their
secrets were known. Many people within the United States military became extremely hostile toward Nasser because of this
event. Some believe the Six Day War was a form of retribution.26
UN Resolution 242
Within six months after the Six Day War, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 242 which called for "withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." In theory the UN should enforce the resolution itself, but
unfortunately, reality is much different. The sad truth is the UN is unable to enforce much of anything without the support of the
United States, and the United States has maintained a "passionate attachment" to Israel ever since President Johnson was in
office.
Ironically, Resolution 242 was issued on the fourth anniversary of President Kennedy’s death, November 22, 1967.27 It is an
extremely important document because virtually all disputes between Israel and the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states
could be resolved by its enforcement.
In addition, the Israelis managed to secure ambiguous, legalistic wording for Resolution 242 which makes even more difficult to
enforce;28 however, the resolution remains a highly sensitive area for American presidents and politicians to roam. The
following is the entire text of the resolution:
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle
East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and
the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the
area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the
Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in
accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which
should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for
and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international
waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence
of every State in the area, through measures including the
establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary‑General to designate a Special
Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain
contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and
assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary‑General to report to the Security Council on
the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as
possible.
(UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967)
Jun. 8, 1967: Israel Attacked the USS Liberty
In the midst of the Six Day War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty spy vessel killing 34 American sailors and wounding 75.
George Ball wrote a riveting account of Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967. Ball’s comments are significant
because he was undersecretary of state in the Johnson and Kennedy administrations. The following text is an excerpt from
Ball’s book, The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement With Israel, 1947 to the Present:
During the [Six Day] War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty. The Liberty
was an American intelligence‑gathering vessel, then cruising in
international waters near Egypt and reading the radio transmissions on
both sides. It flew the American flag and was painted in US Navy colors,
complete with number and name.
On the fourth day of the war [June 8, 1967], with both Jordan and Egypt
routed, the Israelis turned their attention to Syria, the original cause of all
this trouble. Guns mounted on the Golan Heights had subjected Galilee
to sporadic bombardment for years and the Israelis had every intention
of capturing those Heights before hostilities were over. Meanwhile, the
United Nations had adopted a cease‑fire resolution and they feared
there might not be enough time to accomplish this objective without, as
it were, going into overnight.
The Liberty’s presence and function were known to Israeli leaders. They
presumably thought it vital that the Liberty be prevented from informing
Washington of their intentions to violate any cease‑fire before they had
completed their occupation of the Golan. Their solution was brutal and
direct.
Israel aircraft determined the exact location of the ship and undertook a
combined air‑naval attack. Apprised of Israel’s plans from various
sources, the US Navy Department faced a delicate problem. Due
regard for the lives of America’s naval personnel should have impelled
the Navy to urge the State Department to warn off Israel in no uncertain
terms; meanwhile, the Navy have alerted the Liberty to its danger and
dispatched ships or planes for its protection. But none of these actions
was taken in time.
There has, for years, been a continuing argument about the tragic
lapse. Some say that a warning to Israel might have exposed U.S.
sources of secret intelligence. Whatever the motive, the President or
one of his aides took the decision to risk the ship and its crew, and
merely ordered them, without explanation, to steam west at top speed.
Unhappily, that notice was too little and taken too late. Israeli ships and
planes attacked, killing 34 American sailors, wounding 75, and leaving
821 rocket and machine‑gun holes in the Liberty. It was only when the
Israelis were preparing to board the ship that American planes belatedly
appeared from the west and forced them to retire.
The sequel was unedifying. The [Johnson] administration tried
vigorously to downplay the whole matter. Although it silenced the crew,
casualties to the sailors and damage to the ship could not possibly be
concealed. Thus, an elaborate charade was performed. The United
States complained pro forma to Israel, which reacted by blaming the
victims. The ship, they rejoined, had not been clearly marked but looked
like an Arab ship—which was definitely untrue. Nor did the Israelis even
pretend that they had queried the American Embassy in Tel Aviv
regarding the status of the well‑marked ship. In the end, the Israelis
tendered a reluctant and graceless apology; indemnities for the victims
and damaged ship were both parsimonious and slow in coming. The
sordid affair has still not been erased from the history books; an
organization of devoted survivors has kept the cause alive over the
years by publishing a newsletter and holding well‑advertised meetings.
Yet the ultimate lesson of the Liberty attack had far more effect on policy
in Israel than America. Israel’s leaders concluded that nothing they
might do would offend the Americans to the point of reprisal. If
America’s leaders did not have the courage to punish Israel for the
blatant murder of American citizens, it seemed that their American
friends would let them get away with almost anything.
(George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 57 ‑ 58)
Arthur Goldberg, UN Point Man
As previously stated, Adlai Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14, 1965.29 Until his untimely death, Stevenson
had represented the United States in the UN. Arthur Goldberg was a Supreme Court Justice appointed by Kennedy to a
traditionally Jewish slot in the high court.(Footnote 30) At President Johnson’s request, Goldberg resigned from his position as
Supreme Court justice to take the lower position of US ambassador to the UN.30 This was an extraordinary move.
Goldberg was an interesting figure. In addition to serving on the Supreme Court and as a UN diplomat, he had an impressive
background in the world of espionage. During World War II, he worked with Haganah and OSS in Palestine.
After the events of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a
military spy agency and precursor to the CIA.31 New York attorney William Donovan was appointed to run the newly formed
agency. With Donovan in charge of the OSS, Roosevelt had created the first civilian‑run spy organization in modern US
history. Donovan immediately recruited another New York attorney, Allen Dulles, to help establish the organization. Goldberg
was given the rank of major and he assisted Donovan and Dulles establish an OSS field office in New York. Shortly thereafter,
Goldberg became—for all intents and purposes—an international spy working for the OSS. He was assigned various spy
missions in Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Morocco.32
With the experience he acquired in espionage, he returned to Washington, DC and created an intelligence gathering operation.
After that, he was sent on a secret mission in Palestine where he met with leaders of the illegal army of Jewish settlers,
Haganah. This operation meant a great deal to Goldberg personally because he had become a Zionist rather late in life. The
Haganah worked with him to coordinate a joint OSS‑Haganah parachute mission into Italy to gather critical intelligence
information. After the Palestine encounter, Goldberg was sent to London to recruit anti‑Nazi Germans, who had been captured
as spies when the allies invaded France.33
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Endnotes
1.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 43 ‑ 45
2.ibid, pp. 45 ‑ 46
3.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Canal
4.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 46
5.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Crisis
6.Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, Chapter 1
7.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 251. Eisenhower’s instructions to Dulles were on p. 47 of Ball’s book. The Hammarskjöld
quote regarding Ben‑Gurion and Israel was on p. 251. Ball cited Brian Urquhart’s biography of Dag Hammarskjöld: Hammarskjöld, p.
157.
8.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 47
9.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 46 ‑ 49; multiple articles about Senate Majority Leader Johnson’s support for Israel in the
New York Times on February 20, 1957
10.ibid
11.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War
12.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 58
13.ibid, p. 179
14.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 256
15.Kazin and Isserman, America Divided, p. 253
16.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser
17.Encyclopedia Britannica: Egypt
18.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War; Salah al‑Jadid; George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 53‑56; Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo
Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249
19.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War
20.Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249
21.ibid
22.Ball, p 56
23.Heikal
24.ibid
25.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser
26.Heikal
27.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 62
28.ibid, pp. 62‑63
29.Encyclopedia Britannica: Adlai Stevenson
30.ibid, Arthur Goldberg
31.Edward B. Shils, Ph.D, Monthly Labor Review (January 1997), pp. 59 ‑ 60 (excerpt from Arthur Goldberg: proof of the American dream)
32.ibid
33.ibid
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Chapter 10: LBJ’s "Passionate Attachment" to Israel
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Background
As some readers may know, the term "passionate attachment" was used by George Washington in his farewell address in
1796. Washington advised citizens of the new republic to renounce any "passionate attachment"(Footnote 23) with another
nation, and also to repudiate "inveterate hatred" toward another country. In the Twentieth Century, the United States failed to
heed Washington’s warnings on both counts. Shortly after World War II, we developed an "inveterate hatred" of the Soviet
Union and formed a "passionate attachment" to Israel, although the latter accelerated dramatically under the Johnson
Administration.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was the last American president in the Twentieth Century to successfully stand up to the
pressures and unyielding annoyances of the Israeli government and its American supporters. Although President Kennedy
shared his predecessor’s views intellectually, he entered the White House after an extremely close election. Consequently, he
had to assume a more cautious approach.
The Eisenhower administration’s Middle East policy is important for two reasons. First of all, it demonstrated that a strong
American president can stand up to Israel. Secondly, it reveals that Lyndon Johnson—then Senate Majority Leader—was
Eisenhower’s most influential political adversary regarding Israel.
Two major incidents occurred on Eisenhower’s watch where Israel acted as an aggressor toward its neighbors and toward
Palestinians living in the region. The first incident occurred in 1953 and involved Israel’s effort to secretly divert waters of the
Jordan. The second incident occurred in 1957 when Israel conspired with France and Britain to attack Egypt and overthrow
that country’s leader, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, after he nationalized the Suez Canal in defiance of Israel and the Western
powers. In the latter incident, Lyndon Johnson used all of his political muscle as Senate Majority Leader to prevent the UN
from imposing sanctions on Israel—the sanctions were fully supported by the Eisenhower administration—for its flagrant
disregard for international law. In both instances, Eisenhower forced Israel to behave by temporarily cutting off American aid.
1953: The Jordan River Diversion
Israel secretly planned to use the Palestinian village of Banat Ya’qub for a major water diversion project that would move
waters of the Jordan Valley to central Israel and the North Negev. The UN, the US, and the Palestinians who lived in that area
were unaware of Israel’s plans. Earlier, the Eisenhower administration had offered to implement an American‑sponsored
regional water‑usage plan, and Israel had promised to cooperate in that effort. But in reality, Israel secretly wanted complete
control of the flow of water in the region, despite its commitments to the Americans. Consequently, a dispute ensued over the
control of Palestinian territory near Banat Ya’qub.
Unaware of Israel’s hidden agenda, UN Representative, Dr. Ralph Bunche, worked out a truce agreement where disputed
lands would be evacuated by Syrian forces. The agreement stipulated that Israel must allow Arab inhabitants to continue
farming there. Israel also agreed that it would not occupy the disputed area, but would allow it to be a neutral zone.
Immediately after the Syrian troops withdrew, the Israelis broke their promise and drove the Palestinian farmers from the land.
The Syrian troops responded by opening fire to drive out the settlers. Israel responded by complaining that the Syrians had
violated the truce and asserted a right to occupy the areas. UN Truce Observers immediately cited Israel as the instigator and
essentially stated that the Syrian troops were justified in retaliating against Israel for violating the truce agreement.
The Israelis took the strategy that if they completed the water diversion project at Banat Ya’qub, then the UN would back
down because the work simply could not be undone. So the Israelis began working aggressively on the project. They worked
non‑stop, twenty‑four hours a day using searchlights at night to hasten completion. But secrecy was still key. They omitted
appropriations for the project from their published budget. In addition, they did not mention it to Americans working with them
on other water projects; however, US intelligence soon detected their activity.
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles realized that Israel had openly deceived them and had no
intention of keeping its earlier promise to cooperate in the American‑sponsored regional water‑usage plan. To show its
displeasure, the Eisenhower administration withheld $26 million under the Mutual Security Act and suspended economic aid
until Israel agreed to cooperate with UN observers. In addition, President Eisenhower directed the Treasury to prepare an
Executive Order removing tax‑deductible status from contributions by Jewish Americans to such Zionist organizations as the
United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Eisenhower did not make these actions public because he did not want to humiliate the Israelis;
however, the Israelis interpreted his magnanimous gesture as a sign of weakness. As a result, they continued work on the
project—convinced that the Americans would back down.
Israel’s strategy might have worked had Israel not launched a bloody raid on the village of Kibya on the night of October 14,
1953. In that attack, twenty‑five‑year‑old Ariel Sharon and his three hundred Israeli commandos, known as Force 101,
massacred fifty‑three Palestinian civilians. According to a UN report, Sharon’s forces drove the villagers into their homes then
blew them up.
The Eisenhower administration condemned the raid and, for the first time, publicly revealed that it had already suspended
construction funds for Israel’s water supply. Their was a huge backlash against Eisenhower. The US government was
denounced by Hadassah, a Jewish charitable organization. An attaché at the Israeli Embassy attempted to divert attention from
the water controversy by claiming—in a widely publicized speech—that the Kibya raid was in response to Jordanian
aggression. Pro‑Israeli congressmen and David Ben‑Gurion accused Eisenhower and his advisers of anti‑Semitism.
But Eisenhower stood firm and continued to withhold funds from Israel. Fearing a financial burden, Israeli representatives
informed President Eisenhower—on October 19—that work had ceased on the water diversion project and that Israel would
cooperate with the Security Counsil’s efforts to solve the Jordan River Development problem. Within twenty‑four hours,
America restored aid to Israel.
Eisenhower demonstrated that Israel responded faster to cutting off the money flow than anything else; however, the Israelis
interpreted America’s quick restoration of aid as proof that they could manipulate the superpower by applying adequate
pressure. Ultimately, Israel completed the project in a slightly altered manner.1
Nov. 1956: The Suez Crisis
The stage was set for the Suez Crisis in 1955 when the Eisenhower administration began pressuring Israel to demonstrate its
commitment to peace in the Middle East.
On February 28, 1955, President Gamal Adbel Nasser made a speech full of warnings against Israeli atrocities. He emphasized
a bloody raid on the Gaza Strip by the Israelis, allegedly a retaliation for raids made from Gaza. Nasser was also upset with the
United States for denying his request for arms a few months earlier. In his speech he repeated the request for Egypt to buy
arms but was ignored.
On September 4, 1955, Egypt announced that it had received a proposal from the Soviet Union for an arms sale. The
Eisenhower administration treated this as an idle threat which angered Nasser. As a result, he brokered a cotton‑for‑arms
barter agreement with Czechoslovakia on September 27 in which Egypt received $200 million worth of arms—tanks, MiG
planes, artillery, submarines, and small arms.
Israel immediately renewed its joint arms agreement with the United States, France, and Britain. In addition, Israel requested a
treaty guaranteeing its security, but it was denied by the Western powers because they knew that Israel’s military strength was
vastly superior to the neighboring Arab nations.
On August 26, 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a speech before the Council of Foreign Relations in New
York in which he outlined terms for peace in the Middle East. He stated that the problem of Palestinian refugees could be
solved, but Israel should not be expected to assume the full cost. He proposed that Congress approve an international loan to
finance the resettlement or repatriating of Palestinian refugees. The loan would also help develop irrigation projects to assist
refugees in cultivating their land for growing crops.
The Israelis were somewhat agitated by Dulles’s speech because he mentioned a possible boundary revision. Dulles promptly
responded to clarify the American position. He stated in no uncertain terms that if Sharett and Ben‑Gurion (Israeli leaders)
wanted American diplomatic, political, and military aid, they would have to demonstrate their peaceful intentions by helping
resolve the sensitive problems of Palestinian refugees and boundary disputes. On November 9, President Eisenhower—who
was in a Denver hospital convalescing from a heart attack—confirmed Dulles’s position in a formal statement made from his
hospital bed.2
At that point, it became clear that the United States could no longer be counted on to support Israel’s continuing efforts to
expand its borders. Consequently, Israel turned to the European powers for support. Over the next year, trouble began to arise
over the Suez Canal.
The Suez Canal is a sea‑level waterway running north‑south across the Isthmus of Suez in Egypt to connect the Mediterranean
and the Red seas. The canal separates the African continent from Asia, and it provides the shortest seagoing route between
Europe and the lands lying around the Indian and western Pacific oceans. It is one of the world's most heavily used shipping
lanes.3
On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Nasser angered Israel and the European powers when he nationalized the Suez Canal.
He took this bold action because he felt that friends of Israel in America had cheated him out of US aide for the Aswan Dam
that Egypt needed for irrigation and power. The dam cost $1.3 billion and Nasser had been given the impression by the
Eisenhower administration that US aide would be forthcoming; however, friends of Israel in America pressured the Senate
Appropriations Committee into blocking funding for the dam. On July 16, 1956, funding was officially denied—much to the
chagrin of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. To make matters worse, the State Department
issued a statement, on July 19, critically appraising Egypt’s international credit. Nasser felt that this was a ruse created by
friends of Israel in America, and he responded by seizing control of the canal and nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in
order to obtain funds for the dam.4
On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt and advanced toward the Suez Canal. On November 1, British and French
forces also invaded Egypt and began occupation of the canal zone, but growing opposition from President Eisenhower,
Secretary of State Dulles, UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskjöld, and Soviet threats of intervention put an immediate stop
to British and French support, but Israeli troops still occupied the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip in defiance of a UN
resolution.5 Eisenhower was so angered by European involvement in the attack that he telephoned British Prime Minister
Anthony Eden and gave him such a tongue‑lashing that the Prime Minister was reduced to tears.6 (Footnote 24)
Eisenhower told Dulles: "Foster, you tell’em, goddamn it, we’re going to apply sanctions, we’re going to the United Nations,
we’re going to do everything that there is to stop this thing." He later explained, "We just told the Israelis it was absolutely
indefensible and that if they expect our support in the Middle East and in maintaining their position, they had better behave¼
We went to town right away to give them hell."
UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld shared Eisenhower’s view that Israel needed to learn to behave. Consequently,
Hammarskjöld and Ben‑Gurion engaged in some heated exchanges after the UN Secretary General publicly condemned Israel
for its retaliatory actions against Palestinians. In 1956 Ben‑Gurion complained that Hammarskjöld’s remarks had encouraged
assaults on Israel by Egypt and Jordan. Hammarskjöld replied as follows:
You are convinced that the threat of retaliation has a deterrent effect. I
am convinced that it is more of an incitement to individual members of
the Arab forces than even what has been said by their own
governments. You are convinced that acts of retaliation will stop further
incidents. I am convinced that they will lead to further incidents¼.You
believe that this way of creating respect for Israel will pave the way for
sound coexistence with the Arab people. I believe that the policy may
postpone indefinitely the time for such coexistence¼. I think the
discussion of this question can be considered closed since you, in spite
of previous discouraging experiences, have taken the responsibility of
large‑scale tests of the correctness of your belief.7
On February 2, 1957, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding Israel’s withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba
and the Gaza Strip, but Ben‑Gurion refused. Fed up with Israel’s treachery, Eisenhower wrote a strong letter to Ben‑Gurion
demanding Israel’s withdrawal. Still Ben‑Gurion refused.8
Feb. 1957: LBJ Rescued Israel From UN Sanctions
It had been rumored that UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden was quietly pushing for sanctions—with the
full support of the Eisenhower administration—against Israel if it continued to maintain troops in the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza in
defiance of US and UN demands for immediate withdrawal. In response, Lyndon Johnson—then Senate Majority
Leader—wrote a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urging the Eisenhower Administration not to support UN
sanctions against Israel. Johnson’s letter to Dulles appeared in the New York Times on February 20, 1957. The Senate
Majority Leader’s argument was that it was an unfair double‑standard to punish a small country like Israel when large countries
like the Soviet Union were allowed to openly defy UN resolutions without being punished.9
In addition, Johnson rallied Senate Democrats to oppose Israel sanctions.(Footnote 25) He used partisan politics to pressure
Eisenhower into retreating from principle, but Eisenhower stood his ground and kept applying pressure to Israel by cutting off
or delaying financial assistance. When Israel began to run out of money, in March 1957, Prime Minister David Ben‑Gurion
finally agreed to withdraw troops from the occupied territories. President Eisenhower triumphed, but Johnson had protected
Israel from the humiliation of UN sanctions. Sadly, Eisenhower was the last US president to stand up to the Israeli government
and it’s American supporters. At least he proved it could be done.10
Ironically, one of the best accounts of Lyndon Johnson’s involvement in the Suez Crisis was written by Louis Bloomfield in his
1957 book entitled Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba. In the ensuing years, Johnson’s involvement in that conflict has been
erased from history. Although his pro‑Israel stance appeared on the front page of the New York Times on February 20, 1957,
his name is not mentioned in Western history books about the Suez Crisis (none that I have found anyway, except
Bloomfield’s). The power elite within the book publishing industry have apparently been concealing Johnson’s loyalty to Israel
as a means of preventing inquiries by historians, researchers, and investigators about a possible Jewish conspiracy behind the
assassination of President Kennedy years later.
This is how Bloomfield described Johnson’s pro‑Israel stance during the Suez/Gulf of Aqaba Crisis:
On February 11th, 1957, Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States
Secretary of State, submitted certain Proposals to the Israeli
Government which were, in effect, that:
"Israel should withdraw her troops from the Gulf of Aqaba region and the
Gaza Strip, in accordance with the recommendations of the United
Nations General Assembly.
The United States should use all its influence to establish the Strait of
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway for the
innocent passage of all nations, including Israel.
Meanwhile the United States should do everything it could to see that
United Nations troops replaced the Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip and
that that area should become a kind of de facto United Nations
trusteeship where United Nations officials would watch and if possible
stop any fighting between Israel and Egypt."
Subsequent discussion between the United States Secretary of State
and Mr. Abba Eban did not bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli
forces from these two areas and rumours began to circulate in the
American press that the Afro‑Asian bloc would introduce resolutions
calling for economic and military sanctions to force Israel to comply with
the withdrawal resolutions.
On February 19th, 1957, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate
Majority Leader, wrote to Mr. John Foster Dulles urging that the United
States oppose imposing of economic sanctions against Israel by the
United Nations. The letter was endorsed by the Senate Democratic
Policy Committee.
(Louis Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf of Aqaba, p. 152)
Jul. 2, 1957: Senator Kennedy Made a Controversial Speech About Algeria
On July 2, 1957, John F. Kennedy—then a US Senator—made a speech, "Facing Facts on Algeria," which denounced
France’s colonial occupation of Algeria and the brutality of the French‑Algerian War. The speech also demonstrated an
understanding of Indochina that would likely have prevented him from escalating US military involvement in Vietnam had he not
been killed.
Historian Richard Mahoney summarized the speech and events that preceded and followed it:
Early in 1957, Kennedy decided to make a major critique of the
[Eisenhower] administration’s position on France’s colonial war in
Algeria. By 1957, the French had committed over 500,000 troops to the
effort to suppress the nationalist rebellion. Torture, atrocity, and terror
on both sides had turned the pride of France’s empire into a chamber of
horrors. ¼the Eisenhower administration had been maintaining a policy
of strict silence in Algeria – at least until Kennedy’s attack, which The
New York Times called "the most comprehensive and outspoken
arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an
American in public office."
On July 2, 1957, Kennedy accused the Eisenhower administration of
courting disaster in Algeria. He charged that Eisenhower’s policy of
non‑involvement in Africa and Asia was really made up of "tepid
encouragement and moralizations to both sides, cautious neutrality on
all the real issues, and a restatement of our obvious dependence upon
our European friends, and our obvious dedication nevertheless to the
principles of self‑determination, and our obvious desire not to become
involved." The result, Kennedy said, was that, "We have deceived
ourselves into believing that we have thus pleased both sides and
displeased no one ¼ when, in truth, we have earned the suspicion of
all."
The previous decade had proven that the tide of nationalism in the Third
World – from Indochina to India to Indonesia – was "irresistible,"
Kennedy declared. It was time for France to face the fact that Algeria
had to be freed. When would the West learn, he asked, that colonies
"are like fruit that cling to the tree only till they ripen?" Didn’t the French
debacle in Indochina, which ended at Dien Bien Phu, serve as a
warning of what lay ahead for France in Algeria if something were not
done?
[Referring to lessons that should have been learned from France’s
Indochina debacle, Kennedy stated,]
"Did that tragic episode not teach us whether France likes it or not,
admits it or not, or has our support or not, that their overseas territories
are sooner or later, one by one, going to break free and look with
suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to
independence? ¼ Nationalism in Africa cannot be evaluated purely in
terms of the historical and legal niceties argued by the French and thus
far accepted by the State Department. National self‑identification
frequently takes place by quick combustion which the rain of repression
simply cannot extinguish."
In the United States, a storm of protest greeted Kennedy’s address on
"Facing Facts on Algeria." President Eisenhower complained about
"young men getting up and shouting about things." Secretary [of State
John Foster] Dulles commented acidly that if the senator wanted to tilt
against colonialism, perhaps he might concentrate on the communist
variety. Most prominent Democrats were equally scornful. Adlai
Stevenson dismissed Kennedy’s speech as "terrible." Dean Acheson
described the speech as "foolish words that wound ¼ a dispirited ally."
In France, the speech provoked an even more furious outcry. Paris’s
largest daily, "Le Figaro," remarked: "It is shameful that our business is
so badly directed that we are forced to endure such idiocies." U.S.
News and World Report noted that "An American has unified France –
against himself!" Responding to Kennedy’s speech, French President
Rene Coty told the French Senate that France would "never negotiate
with cutthroats since independence would give the 1,200,000
Europeans living in Algeria one alternative – leaving their homeland or
living at the mercy of fanaticism." French Defense Minister Andre Morice
publicly wondered whether Kennedy was "having nightmares." Talk of
independence, Morice said, "will cost many more innocent lives,"
Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. reported to Kennedy from
Paris that summer that "Algeria is beginning to poison France."
In Algeria itself, feeling among the European colonists against the
speech ran so high that French authorities warned American newsmen
and residents to stay off the streets to avoid reprisals. Two days after
the speech a bomb exploded outside the American consulate in Algiers.
The French Resident Minister in Algiers, Robert Lacoste, called the
bomb "a Communist joke" and challenged Kennedy to come to Algeria.
The senator declined.
¼Practically no one in the American foreign‑policy establishment
regarded the Algeria speech as anything more than a partisan political
blast designed to attract attention. But foreign correspondents such as
Alistair Cooke of the Manchester Guardian and Henri Pierre of Le Monde
recognized what their American counterparts had not – that Kennedy
knew what he was talking about on Third World issues. In a letter to the
editor of The New York Times, Pierre wrote: "Strangely enough, as a
Frenchman I feel that on the whole Mr. Kennedy is more to be
commended than blamed for his forthright, frank and provocative
speech."
Although Le Monde opposed Kennedy’s call for Algerian independence,
it identified the senator as one of the few serious students of history in
American politics: "The most striking point of the speech of Mr. Kennedy
is the important documentation it revealed and his thorough knowledge
of the French milieu."
(Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, pp. 19‑22)
Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Algeria
In his 1957 speech about Algeria, "Senator" Kennedy was highly critical of the Eisenhower administration; however, the
political dynamic involved must be considered. Kennedy’s views about Israel and the Middle East in general were closer to
Eisenhower’s than Johnson’s. Having stated that, it is significant to understand that Kennedy’s public endorsement of an
independent Algeria was a subtle criticism of Israel. It is widely known that Israel opposed Algeria’s independence because it
(Israel) wanted to oppress or dominate all Muslim/Arab states. Although Eisenhower had not publicly supported Algerian
independence, it seems plausible that he may have agreed with Kennedy but lacked the political courage to denounce France
as the young Senator had boldly done in his speech. Upon reflection, Eisenhower may have secretly admired Kennedy for
publicly denouncing America’s World War II ally. After all, France had recently betrayed Eisenhower by secretly conniving
with Israel and Britain to attack Egypt after President Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal.(Footnote 26)
Kennedy surely understood how much he and Eisenhower agreed on Middle Eastern issues, but Eisenhower belonged to the
opposing political party; and Kennedy and Johnson both had their eyes on the White House in the upcoming 1960 presidential
campaign. Consequently, one of Kennedy’s objectives when making the Algerian speech was likely to differentiate himself from
the sitting Republican President and his Democratic adversary, Johnson. Although Kennedy and Johnson held opposing views
about Israel, they could not openly criticize each other because they were both Democrats. But since Eisenhower was a
Republican, it made sense politically for a Democratic Senator to criticize him for not supporting Algerian independence. The
speech also sent a message to informed political observers that unlike Johnson, Kennedy would not be a minion for Israel if
elected president.
Even more important, Kennedy’s Algerian speech made the front page of the New York Times which put him in the same
league as Senate Majority Leader Johnson. Recall that Johnson had made the front page of the New York Times five months
earlier (Feb. 1957) for opposing Eisenhower’s efforts to place UN sanctions on Israel in the wake of that country’s failed
attempt to seize land from Egypt and overthrow Nasser in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and 57.
Jun. 5, 1967: The Six Day War
Ten years after the Suez Crisis, Israel attacked Egypt again; but this time with success. The event is known as the Six Day War
which began on June 5, 1967. Things had changed a great deal over the ten years leading up to the Six Day War. Israel’s most
influential adversaries had either died or left public office. Eisenhower had retired years earlier and was in failing health. John
Foster Dulles had died of cancer in 1959. Dag Hammarskjöld had been killed in a mysterious plane crash in the Congolese
province of Katanga in 1961. President Kennedy of course had been assassinated in Dallas in 1963. And Israel’s old ally,
Lyndon Johnson, had become Commander‑in‑Chief of the United States. In July of 1965, President Johnson had appointed
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg as US ambassador to the UN. Goldberg—a Jew and ardent supporter of
Israel—replaced Adlai Stevenson as US delegate to the UN after Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14,
1965.(Footnote 27) The Yemen War had been eroding Arab unity since the conflict began in 1962.(Footnote 28) By 1967,
Egyptian forces had suffered heavy losses and were weakened after five years of military involvement in the Yemen War.
Whether these events were random or planned is anyone’s guess, but they were definitely advantageous to Israel by the time
the Six Day War occurred in 1967.
The Six Day War was a watershed event that transformed Israel from a small nation into a colonial empire. Although Israel
became a nation in 1948, it expanded dramatically after the Six Day War. Israel took from the Arabs—through military
force—the Old City of Jerusalem, the Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River known as the
West Bank, and the Golan Heights, on the Israeli‑Syrian border.11 In addition to acquiring new land, Israel gained control of an
additional 900,000 Arabs who became the discontented subjects of the new Israeli empire. Since 1967, the number of Arabs
under Israel’s military control has grown to over 1.75 million.12
Amnesty International has documented Israel’s inhumane treatment of its Palestinian subjects citing arbitrary arrests, torturing
detainees, destroying or sealing the homes of Arab suspects and their relatives, confiscating land, destroying crops, and
diverting precious water from thirsty Palestinians in the desert to fill the swimming pools and water the lawns of Israeli settlers.13
This conduct is condoned, embraced, and encouraged by the United States through its steadfast financial and military support
of Israel. Today, US tax payers spend approximately $3 billion annually to subsidize, support, and arm Israel. Although Israel is
a wealthy country by western standards, it receives the highest amount of American foreign aid money, 28 percent.14
Jewish scholars Michael Kazin and Maurice Isserman described in their book, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s,
the passion ignited within American Jews by the Six Day War. They wrote the following:
The swift, complete victory was followed by a long and wrenching
occupation of Palestinian lands. For many American Jews, the 1967
conflict awakened and inspired passions that did much to transform the
meaning of their identity. No longer was Israel just a reason for Jewish
pride, a desert miracle of orange groves and thriving kibbutzes, whose
creation was romanticized in Exodus‑a popular novel and film of the late
'50s and early '60s. Israel was now the homeland of fellow Jews who
had fought alone for their survival and were resigned to living in
perpetual danger. The threat came not just from Arab militants but from
communist powers, their Third World allies, and a good many American
leftists who were eager to prove their "anti‑imperialist" credentials. In the
face of extinction, Israel became "the ultimate reality in the life of every
Jew living today," as a young professor at Brandeis University put it, "In
dealing with those who oppose Israel, we are not reasonable and we
are not rational. Nor should we be."15
Those are troubling words, but they reflect the true agenda of those who support the Jewish state of Israel.
Background on the Six Day War
Understanding the Six Day War requires some background regarding the politics of the Middle East in 1967. The following
men were heads of state for the countries involved in the Six Day War:
Nation
Head of State
Egypt
President Gamal Abdel Nasser
Sryia
General Salah al‑Jadid
Jordan
King Hussein [ibn Talal]
Israel
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
US
President Lyndon Baines Johnson
USSR
Chairman Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin
UN
Secretary General U Thant (of Burma, now Myanmar)
Egyptian President Nasser was a key figure in Middle Eastern affairs for seventeen years. In 1954 he became prime minister of
Egypt, and in 1956 he became that country’s president—remaining in that position until his sudden death in 1970.16 Nasser had
been Israel’s primary enemy because he was a charismatic Muslim leader who advocated Arab unity (also known as
pan‑Arabism).
Egypt has no oil of any consequence, but it has a more advanced culture than the other oil‑producing Arab nations. It was the
home of one of the principal civilizations of the ancient Middle East. It is also one of the earliest urban and literate societies.17
Consequently, the other Arab nations have historically looked to Egypt for leadership.
The original antagonist of Israel in the Six Day War was Syria, led by General Salah al‑Jadid, head of the Ba‘th regime.18
Although Syria—under the Ba‘th regime—was an aggressive enemy of Israel, Syria’s erratic behavior toward other Arab
nations actually helped Israel. In fact, Israel used Syrian raids along the its border as a pretext for attacking Egypt and starting
the Six Day War.
In March 1963 Ba‘thist supporters seized power from the "secessionist" regime in a military coup. With the Ba‘th in power,
Nasser had three Arab nations against him. Those nations were Saudi Arabia and Jordan (because they supported the ousted
Imam in the Yemen war) and Syria.
In April 1967 Syrian bombardments of Israeli villages had been intensified. When the Israeli Air Force shot down six Syrian
MiG planes in reprisal, Egypt mobilized its forces near the Sinai border.19 Egypt had a mutual defense agreement with the
Syrians, who now felt themselves in danger. As an advocate of pan‑Arabism, Nasser felt obliged to help Syria. He ordered
part of the Egyptian Army to move into Sinai. He thought that the presence of Egyptian forces would discourage the Israelis
from attacking Syria. It was a purely defensive move designed to draw off Israeli forces from Syria. If Israel had attacked
Syria, then the Egyptian Army would have carried out operations in support of the Syrians. But no offensive operations against
Israel were consider.20
A standoff between Egypt and Israel ensued, and tensions mounted between the superpowers. The Soviet Union supported
Egypt and the United States supported Israel. This raced the stakes considerably because it introduced the possibility of
nuclear war.21
Historians now know that Israel secretly launched an attack against Egypt, but lied about it claiming that Nasser had launched
the attack first. In fact Israeli Prime Minister Menachem
Begin made this admission in a speech on August 8, 1982 before the National Defense College in Jerusalem. He stated that the
Six Day War was not a "war of necessity" but rather a "war of choice¼ Nasser did not attack us. We decided to attack
him."22 This was a major admission by Begin.
On June 3, 1967, just two days before the Israelis attacked, the United States sent the aircraft carrier Intrepid through the Suez
Canal with all its planes lined up on deck. Nasser thought this was an unnecessary show of force. The Egyptian people became
furious. They lined the bank of the Canal and threw old shoes at the carrier. At the same time the Sixth Fleet flexed its muscles
and prepared for a war situation. It was an excessive show of force by the United States.23
After Israel’s victory, Nasser was disgusted with Johnson. He felt that Johnson was dishonest and had colluded with Israel to
strike first and blame it on Egypt. He was suspicious of America’s UN ambassador Arthur Goldberg, an ardent Zionist.
Goldberg had immediately backed Israel in the UN when it claimed that Egypt "fired the first shot." Nasser accused Johnson of
collusion, broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, and ordered all Americans out of Egypt. Several other Arab
states did the same. Soon Johnson, already angered by the charge of collusion, had to watch the humiliating spectacle of
twenty‑four thousand American men, women, and children being thrown out of the Middle East. Johnson never forgot and
never forgave.24
After Egypt’s humiliating defeat in the Six Day War, Nasser attempted to resign, but massive street demonstrations and a vote
of confidence by the National Assembly induced him to remain in office. The Soviet Union immediately began replacing all the
destroyed war equipment and installed surface‑to‑air missiles along the Suez as a cover for Egypt’s artillery installations.25
An important footnote to the Six Day War is an incident that occurred in Yemen months earlier. In early 1967, fighting in
Yemen still continued. One day there was shooting in Taiz (in Yemen). Direction finders indicated that two bazooka shots came
from the headquarters of the United States Point Four Aid Program—which was the CIA's cover organization. Yemeni
government forces attacked the building and arrested the four people inside. The safes were opened and an enormous number
of documents were found and subsequently photographed by Egyptian intelligence experts.(Footnote 29) The United States was
furious at the attack on the building and demanded the documents. They were returned three weeks later, but by that time their
secrets were known. Many people within the United States military became extremely hostile toward Nasser because of this
event. Some believe the Six Day War was a form of retribution.26
UN Resolution 242
Within six months after the Six Day War, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 242 which called for "withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." In theory the UN should enforce the resolution itself, but
unfortunately, reality is much different. The sad truth is the UN is unable to enforce much of anything without the support of the
United States, and the United States has maintained a "passionate attachment" to Israel ever since President Johnson was in
office.
Ironically, Resolution 242 was issued on the fourth anniversary of President Kennedy’s death, November 22, 1967.27 It is an
extremely important document because virtually all disputes between Israel and the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states
could be resolved by its enforcement.
In addition, the Israelis managed to secure ambiguous, legalistic wording for Resolution 242 which makes even more difficult to
enforce;28 however, the resolution remains a highly sensitive area for American presidents and politicians to roam. The
following is the entire text of the resolution:
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle
East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and
the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the
area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the
Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in
accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which
should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for
and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international
waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence
of every State in the area, through measures including the
establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary‑General to designate a Special
Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain
contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and
assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary‑General to report to the Security Council on
the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as
possible.
(UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967)
Jun. 8, 1967: Israel Attacked the USS Liberty
In the midst of the Six Day War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty spy vessel killing 34 American sailors and wounding 75.
George Ball wrote a riveting account of Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967. Ball’s comments are significant
because he was undersecretary of state in the Johnson and Kennedy administrations. The following text is an excerpt from
Ball’s book, The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement With Israel, 1947 to the Present:
During the [Six Day] War, Israel attacked the USS Liberty. The Liberty
was an American intelligence‑gathering vessel, then cruising in
international waters near Egypt and reading the radio transmissions on
both sides. It flew the American flag and was painted in US Navy colors,
complete with number and name.
On the fourth day of the war [June 8, 1967], with both Jordan and Egypt
routed, the Israelis turned their attention to Syria, the original cause of all
this trouble. Guns mounted on the Golan Heights had subjected Galilee
to sporadic bombardment for years and the Israelis had every intention
of capturing those Heights before hostilities were over. Meanwhile, the
United Nations had adopted a cease‑fire resolution and they feared
there might not be enough time to accomplish this objective without, as
it were, going into overnight.
The Liberty’s presence and function were known to Israeli leaders. They
presumably thought it vital that the Liberty be prevented from informing
Washington of their intentions to violate any cease‑fire before they had
completed their occupation of the Golan. Their solution was brutal and
direct.
Israel aircraft determined the exact location of the ship and undertook a
combined air‑naval attack. Apprised of Israel’s plans from various
sources, the US Navy Department faced a delicate problem. Due
regard for the lives of America’s naval personnel should have impelled
the Navy to urge the State Department to warn off Israel in no uncertain
terms; meanwhile, the Navy have alerted the Liberty to its danger and
dispatched ships or planes for its protection. But none of these actions
was taken in time.
There has, for years, been a continuing argument about the tragic
lapse. Some say that a warning to Israel might have exposed U.S.
sources of secret intelligence. Whatever the motive, the President or
one of his aides took the decision to risk the ship and its crew, and
merely ordered them, without explanation, to steam west at top speed.
Unhappily, that notice was too little and taken too late. Israeli ships and
planes attacked, killing 34 American sailors, wounding 75, and leaving
821 rocket and machine‑gun holes in the Liberty. It was only when the
Israelis were preparing to board the ship that American planes belatedly
appeared from the west and forced them to retire.
The sequel was unedifying. The [Johnson] administration tried
vigorously to downplay the whole matter. Although it silenced the crew,
casualties to the sailors and damage to the ship could not possibly be
concealed. Thus, an elaborate charade was performed. The United
States complained pro forma to Israel, which reacted by blaming the
victims. The ship, they rejoined, had not been clearly marked but looked
like an Arab ship—which was definitely untrue. Nor did the Israelis even
pretend that they had queried the American Embassy in Tel Aviv
regarding the status of the well‑marked ship. In the end, the Israelis
tendered a reluctant and graceless apology; indemnities for the victims
and damaged ship were both parsimonious and slow in coming. The
sordid affair has still not been erased from the history books; an
organization of devoted survivors has kept the cause alive over the
years by publishing a newsletter and holding well‑advertised meetings.
Yet the ultimate lesson of the Liberty attack had far more effect on policy
in Israel than America. Israel’s leaders concluded that nothing they
might do would offend the Americans to the point of reprisal. If
America’s leaders did not have the courage to punish Israel for the
blatant murder of American citizens, it seemed that their American
friends would let them get away with almost anything.
(George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 57 ‑ 58)
Arthur Goldberg, UN Point Man
As previously stated, Adlai Stevenson died suddenly of a heart attack on July 14, 1965.29 Until his untimely death, Stevenson
had represented the United States in the UN. Arthur Goldberg was a Supreme Court Justice appointed by Kennedy to a
traditionally Jewish slot in the high court.(Footnote 30) At President Johnson’s request, Goldberg resigned from his position as
Supreme Court justice to take the lower position of US ambassador to the UN.30 This was an extraordinary move.
Goldberg was an interesting figure. In addition to serving on the Supreme Court and as a UN diplomat, he had an impressive
background in the world of espionage. During World War II, he worked with Haganah and OSS in Palestine.
After the events of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a
military spy agency and precursor to the CIA.31 New York attorney William Donovan was appointed to run the newly formed
agency. With Donovan in charge of the OSS, Roosevelt had created the first civilian‑run spy organization in modern US
history. Donovan immediately recruited another New York attorney, Allen Dulles, to help establish the organization. Goldberg
was given the rank of major and he assisted Donovan and Dulles establish an OSS field office in New York. Shortly thereafter,
Goldberg became—for all intents and purposes—an international spy working for the OSS. He was assigned various spy
missions in Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Morocco.32
With the experience he acquired in espionage, he returned to Washington, DC and created an intelligence gathering operation.
After that, he was sent on a secret mission in Palestine where he met with leaders of the illegal army of Jewish settlers,
Haganah. This operation meant a great deal to Goldberg personally because he had become a Zionist rather late in life. The
Haganah worked with him to coordinate a joint OSS‑Haganah parachute mission into Italy to gather critical intelligence
information. After the Palestine encounter, Goldberg was sent to London to recruit anti‑Nazi Germans, who had been captured
as spies when the allies invaded France.33
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Endnotes
1.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 43 ‑ 45
2.ibid, pp. 45 ‑ 46
3.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Canal
4.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 46
5.Encyclopedia Britannica: Suez Crisis
6.Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, Chapter 1
7.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 251. Eisenhower’s instructions to Dulles were on p. 47 of Ball’s book. The Hammarskjöld
quote regarding Ben‑Gurion and Israel was on p. 251. Ball cited Brian Urquhart’s biography of Dag Hammarskjöld: Hammarskjöld, p.
157.
8.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 47
9.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 46 ‑ 49; multiple articles about Senate Majority Leader Johnson’s support for Israel in the
New York Times on February 20, 1957
10.ibid
11.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War
12.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 58
13.ibid, p. 179
14.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 256
15.Kazin and Isserman, America Divided, p. 253
16.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser
17.Encyclopedia Britannica: Egypt
18.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War; Salah al‑Jadid; George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, pp. 53‑56; Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo
Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249
19.Encyclopedia Britannica: Six Day War
20.Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, Chapter VII: Johnson and Violence, pp. 225 ‑ 249
21.ibid
22.Ball, p 56
23.Heikal
24.ibid
25.Encyclopedia Britannica: Gamal Abdel Nasser
26.Heikal
27.George Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p. 62
28.ibid, pp. 62‑63
29.Encyclopedia Britannica: Adlai Stevenson
30.ibid, Arthur Goldberg
31.Edward B. Shils, Ph.D, Monthly Labor Review (January 1997), pp. 59 ‑ 60 (excerpt from Arthur Goldberg: proof of the American dream)
32.ibid
33.ibid
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Chapter 11: Vietnam, Johnson’s Opium War
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American Heroin Trafficking was Introduced by Jewish Gangsters
In the 1920s, heroin smuggling and prostitution were introduced and run primarily by Jewish gangsters. Alfred McCoy made
the following observation in his book, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia:
At first the American Mafia ignored this new business opportunity [heroin
trafficking]. Steeped in the traditions of the Sicilian "honored society,"
which absolutely forbade involvement in either narcotics or prostitution,
the Mafia left the heroin business to the powerful Jewish
gangsters—such as "Legs" Diamond, "Dutch" Schultz, and Meyer
Lansky—who dominated organized crime in the 1920s. The Mafia
contented itself with the substantial profits to be gained from controlling
the bootleg liquor industry.1
However, in 1930‑1931, only seven years after heroin was legally
banned, a war erupted in the Mafia ranks. Out of the violence that left
more than sixty gangsters dead came a new generation of leaders with
little respect for the traditional code of honor.2
The leader of this mafioso youth movement was the legendary
Salvatore C. Luciana, known to the world as Charles "Lucky" Luciano.
Charming and strikingly handsome, Luciano must rank as one of the
most brilliant criminal executives of the modern age.(Footnote 31) For, at
a series of meetings shortly following the last of the bloodbaths that
completely eliminated the old guard, Luciano outlined his plans for a
modern, nationwide crime cartel. His modernization scheme quickly
won total support from the leaders of America's twenty‑four Mafia
"families," and within a few months the National Commission was
functioning smoothly. This was an event of historic proportions: almost
single‑handedly, Luciano built the Mafia into the most powerful criminal
syndicate in the United States and pioneered organizational techniques
that are still the basis of organized crime today. Luciano also forged an
alliance between the Mafia and Meyer Lansky's Jewish gangs that has
survived for almost 40 years and even today is the dominant
characteristic of organized crime in the United States.
(Alfred McCoy, et al, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 17 ‑ 18)
Lucky Luciano died on January 26, 1962. Therefore he was not directly involved in President Kennedy’s assassination. A
more likely candidate is Meyer Lansky. As previously stated, in 1979, the House Select Committee on Assassinations linked
Jack Ruby to Meyer Lansky.3 This supports my overall thesis that President Kennedy’s assassination was ultimately a Jewish
conspiracy into which various underworld elements were lured by the promise of opium smuggling from Southeast Asia for
heroin production in Marseilles, France and Hong Kong.
China’s Vietnam Strategy in 1965
On June 23, 1965, Chinese Premier Chou En‑lai dined with Egyptian President Nasser in Alexandria, Egypt. The two men
reportedly enjoyed each other’s company. According to Arab scholar Mohamed Heikal,(Footnote 32) Chou made the following
comments to Nasser about American involvement in Vietnam:
"We are afraid some American militarists may press for a nuclear
attack on China and we think that the American involvement in
Indochina is an insurance policy against such an attack because we will
have a lot of their flesh close to our nails.
"So the more troops they send to Vietnam, the happier we will be, for we
feel that we will have them in our power, we can have their blood. So if
you want to help the Vietnamese, you should encourage the Americans
to throw more and more soldiers into Vietnam.
"We want them there. They will be close to China. And they will be in
our grasp. They will be so close to us, they will be our hostages. ¼
"Some of them are trying opium. And we are helping them. We are
planting the best kinds of opium especially for the American soldiers in
Vietnam. Do you remember when the West imposed opium on us?
They fought us with opium. And we are going to fight them with their
own weapons. We are going to use their own methods against them.
We want them to have a big army in Vietnam which will be hostage to
us and we want to demoralize them. The effect this demoralization is
going to have on the United States will be far greater than anyone
realizes.
(Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents, pp. 306 ‑ 307)
Premier Chou’s comments are highly significant because they indicate that the Chinese had a keen interest, in 1965, in the
Golden Triangle and the opium produced there. In my observation, Chou’s thinking was flawed regarding his belief that the
presence of American soldiers in Vietnam would protect China from nuclear attack. Also, his strategy of "helping" the American
soldiers get hooked on opium/heroin as means of weakening the resolve of the American military was somewhat naïve. My
research has convinced me that the last thing the leaders of the American military cared about during the Vietnam was the
personal welfare of its soldiers, particularly during the Johnson administration. This mindset, however, changed a great deal
when President Nixon came into office.
History of Opium Wars
The opium that Premier Chou planned to supply to American soldiers in Vietnam was grown in the Golden Triangle, a
mountainous area of northeastern Burma, northern Thailand, and northern Laos regarded as one of the world’s most important
sources of illicit opium, morphine, and heroin. Chou also made references to two Opium Wars of the Nineteenth Century. The
first opium war (1839‑42) was between Britain and China. The second (1856‑60) involved Britain and France against China.
Both wars originated from China’s efforts to limit opium trade.
Early in the 19th century, British merchants began smuggling opium into China which resulted in social and economic turmoil in
the country due to widespread addiction. In 1839, China began enforcing its prohibitions on the importation of opium. At one
point, the Chinese government confiscated and destroyed a large quantity of opium warehoused by British merchants at
Guangzhou (Canton). Britain responded by sending gunboats to attack several Chinese coastal cities. The two countries were
at war for about three years. Eventually China was defeated and forced to sign the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) and the British
Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue (1843). These provided that the ports of Guangzhou, Jinmen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and
Shanghai should be open to British trade and residence. The agreements also gave Hong Kong to the British. Within a few
years other Western powers signed similar treaties with China and received commercial and residential privileges, and the
Western domination of China's treaty ports began.
In 1856 a second opium war broke out following a Chinese search of a British‑registered ship, the Arrow, in Guangzhou.
British and French troops took Guangzhou and Tianjin and forced the Chinese to accept the treaties of Tianjin (1858), to which
France, Russia, and the United States were also participants. China begrudgingly agreed to open eleven more ports, permit
foreign legations in Beijing, sanction Christian missionary activity, and legalize the import of opium.
There was a brief peace, but China continued to resist British efforts to import opium. In 1859, hostilities were renewed when
China attempted to block the entry of diplomats into Beijing. This time the British and French occupied Beijing and burned the
imperial summer palace (Yuan ming yuan). The Beijing conventions of 1860, by which China was forced to reaffirm the terms
of the Treaty of Tianjin and make additional concessions, marked the end of the second Opium War.4
The Golden Triangle
As previously stated, the Golden Triangle is a mountainous area of northeastern Burma, northern Thailand, and northern Laos.
Alfred McCoy described—in his book, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia—how most of the world’s illicit opium was
grown in that region of the world in 1972:
Almost all of the world's illicit opium [in 1972] is grown in a narrow band
of mountains that stretches along the southern rim of the great Asian
land mass, from Turkey's and Anatolian plateau, through the northern
reaches of the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the rugged mountains
of northern Laos. Within this 4,500‑mile stretch of mountain landscape,
peasants and tribesmen of eight different nations harvest some fourteen
hundred tons a year of raw opium, which eventually reaches the world's
heroin and opium addicts." A small percentage of this fourteen hundred
tons is diverted from legitimate pharmaceutical production in Turkey,
Iran, and India, but most of it is grown expressly for the international
narcotics traffic in South and Southeast Asia. Although Turkey was the
major source of American narcotics through the 1960s, the hundred
tons of raw opium its licensed peasant farmers diverted from legitimate
production never accounted for more than 7 percent of the world's illicit
supply.5 About 24 percent is harvested by poppy farmers in South Asia
(Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India). However, most of this is consumed
by local opium addicts, and only insignificant quantities find their way to
Europe or the United States.6 It is Southeast Asia that has become the
world's most important source of illicit opium. Every year the hill tribe
farmers of Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle region‑northeastern
Burma, northern Thailand, and northern Laos‑harvest approximately
one thousand tons of raw opium, or about 70 percent of the world's illicit
supply.7
(Alfred McCoy, et al, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 9)
McCoy’s description of the region where most opium was grown is intriguing. He portrayed it in geographic and visual terms,
rather than merely a division of man‑made nation states. Again, this is how he described it: "4,500‑mile stretch of mountain
landscape¼in a narrow band of mountains that stretches along the southern rim of the great Asian land mass, from Turkey's
and Anatolian plateau, through the northern reaches of the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the rugged mountains of northern
Laos." From that description, it becomes obvious why the Western powers were so interested in dominating that area of the
world.
McCoy also implied that market forces were causing "peasants and tribesmen of eight different nations to harvest some
fourteen hundred tons a year of raw opium" which was ultimately sold to heroin and opium addicts across the world.
Given that the world’s opium supply was grown in a central geographic region over which several nations ruled, it becomes
significant that by the mid‑1960s, the countries of Southeast Asia were the only ones left where opium production was still
legal. In 1955, the Iranian government announced the complete abolition of opium growing.8 In 1967, the Turkish government
announced plans to follow suit.9
It apparently became known within the worldwide heroin cartel that Turkey and Iran would eventually abolish opium
production. Consequently, the CIA began supporting opium and heroin production in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 60s.
Alfred McCoy described—in his book, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia—how Cold War politics influenced heroin
trafficking from World War II through the Vietnam era.
The cold war was waged in many parts of the world, but Europe was
the most important battleground in the 1940s and 1950s. Determined to
restrict Soviet influence in western Europe, American clandestine
operatives intervened in the internal politics of Germany, Italy, and
France. In Sicily, the forerunner of the CIA, the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), formed an alliance with the Sicilian Mafia to limit the
political gains of the Italian Communist party on this impoverished
island. In France the Mediterranean port city of Marseille became a
major battleground between the CIA and the French Communist party
during the late 1940s. To tip the balance of power in its favor, the CIA
recruited Corsican gangsters to battle Communist strikers and backed
leading figures in the city's Corsican underworld who were at odds with
the local Communists. Ironically, both the Sicilian Mafia and the
Corsican underworld played a key role in the growth of Europe's
postwar heroin traffic and were to provide most of the heroin smuggled
into the United States for the next two decades.
However, the mid‑1960s marked the peak of the European heroin
industry, and shortly thereafter it went into a sudden decline. In the early
1960s the Italian government launched a crackdown on the Sicilian
Mafia, and in 1967 the Turkish government announced that it would
begin phasing out cultivation of opium poppies on the Anatolian plateau
in order to deprive Marseille's illicit heroin laboratories of their most
important source of raw material. Unwilling to abandon their profitable
narcotics racket, the American Mafia and Corsican syndicates shifted
their sources of supply to Southeast Asia, where surplus opium
production and systematic government corruption created an ideal
climate for large‑scale heroin production.
And once again American foreign policy played a role in creating these
favorable conditions. During the early 1950s the CIA had backed the
formation of a Nationalist Chinese guerrilla army in Burma, which still
controls almost a third of the world's illicit opium supply, and in Laos the
CIA created a Meo mercenary army whose commander manufactured
heroin for sale to Americans GIs in South Vietnam. The State
Department provided unconditional support for corrupt governments
openly engaged in the drug traffic. In late 1969 new heroin laboratories
sprang up in the tri‑border area where Burma, Thailand, and Laos
converge, and unprecedented quantities of heroin started flooding into
the United States. Fueled by these seemingly limitless supplies of
heroin, America's total number of addicts skyrocketed.
(Alfred McCoy, et al, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 7‑8)
It should be noted that the group of Americans hit hardest by heroin addition was poor blacks living in the inner cities. Given
that right‑wing extremists like Joseph Milteer apparently joined the coup against Kennedy (reference Chapter 7), the targeting
of black communities for illicit heroin sales was likely no accident.
Origins of the Vietnam War
The Vietnam War began in 1955 and ended in 1975. During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, American
involvement in Vietnam was limited to clandestine espionage and training the South Vietnamese army. Kennedy increased the
number of "military advisors" from about 800 to 16,000; however, this was done primarily as a show of strength to the Soviet
Union during the height of the Cold War. As tensions eased between the two superpowers in the spring, summer, and fall of
1963, Kennedy announced plans to withdraw forces from South Vietnam, starting with a thousand men by the end of 1963.
Immediately after Kennedy’s death, President Johnson rescinded the withdrawal plan and began sending more troops to that
country.
On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese patrol boats fired on the U.S. destroyer Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin, and, after
President Johnson asserted that there had been a second attack on August 4—a claim later shown to be false—the U.S.
Congress almost unanimously endorsed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing the president to take "all necessary measures
to repel attacks . . . and prevent further aggression." The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in effect gave the president carte blanche to
wage war in Southeast Asia without Congressional approval. This marked the beginning of full‑scale American involvement in
the Vietnam War. When Johnson left office in January 1969, there were about 540,00010 American soldiers—mostly
draftees—in Vietnam in sharp contrast to the 16,000 military advisers—non‑draftees—present when Kennedy was killed in
1963.
Reasons for the War
There are three popular explanations for the Vietnam War. Western diplomats, politicians, and historians state that it was an
unsuccessful effort by South Vietnam and the United States to prevent the communists of North Vietnam from uniting South
Vietnam with North Vietnam under their leadership. The Vietnamese government would have us believe it was merely a civil
war that occurred after Vietnam declared its independence from Japan(Footnote 33) at the end of World War II. But in Alfred
McCoy’s book, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, he suggested that the war was as much about the illicit export of
opium as anything else. My research indicates that it was a combination of all three, but was intensified by the assassination of
President Kennedy.
Furthermore, historical evidence indicates that the Vietnam War was a continuation of the two Opium Wars of the Nineteenth
Century in which the Western powers forced China to import opium. As governments learned more about the dangers of
opium and heroin, it became unnacceptable—purely for public relations reasons—for the Western powers to overtly export
narcotics to China and other countries. Over time, drug trafficking continued but its management shifted to international
espionage services and organized crime which were secretly sanctioned by the Western governments. Eventually drug
smuggling began to drive the foreign policies of the Western powers, and vice‑versa. This entanglement, in my view, became
the impetus behind Western involvement in the Vietnam War. It also appears that this situation was exploited by friends of
Israel as a means of setting up the assassination of President Kennedy.
As previously stated, it was Jewish gangsters—such as "Legs" Diamond, "Dutch" Schultz, and Meyer Lansky—who introduced
the heroin business to the American Mafia in the 1920s. In addition, the American Mafia—which was primarily of Sicilian origin
in the 1920s—forbade involvement of either narcotics or prostitution. Such activity was left to the Jewish gangsters.11 This is a
critical fact that further supports my conclusion that a Jewish conspiracy as the ultimate sponsor of the Kennedy assassination.
Vietnam History, From 1941 to 1963
In 1941, the League for the Independence of Vietnam—generally known as the Viet Minh—was organized as a nationalistic
party seeking Vietnamese independence from France.
On September 2, 1945, less than a month after the Japanese surrendered in World War II, Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Viet
Minh, formally declared Vietnam's independence. The Viet Minh had a strong base of popular support in northern Vietnam.
The French wanted to reassert control in Indochina, however, and would recognize Vietnam only as a free state within the
French Union.
In the mid‑1950s, Vietnam became openly communist. In 1946, fighting between the French and the Viet Minh broke
out—and continued until 1954—when the French were badly defeated in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. An international
conference in Geneva in 1954 negotiated a cease‑fire. To separate the warring forces, the conferees decided that the French
and the Vietnamese fighting under French command would move south of the 17th parallel and the Viet Minh would go north of
the 17th parallel, which was established as a military demarcation line surrounded by a demilitarized zone (DMZ). Thousands of
people accordingly moved north or south away from their homes, and the French began their final departure from Vietnam. The
agreement left the communist‑led Viet Minh in control of the northern half of Vietnam, which came to be known as North
Vietnam, while the noncommunist southern half became South Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Diem became South Vietnam's prime
minister during the armistice negotiations.
The Geneva Accords stipulated that free elections be held throughout Vietnam in 1956 under the supervision of an International
Control Committee with the aim of reunifying North and South Vietnam under a single popularly elected government. North
Vietnam expected to win this election thanks to the broad political organization that it had built up in both parts of Vietnam. But
Diem, who had solidified his control over South Vietnam, refused in 1956 to hold the scheduled elections. The United States
supported his position. In response, the North Vietnamese decided to unify South with North Vietnam through military force
rather than by political means.
U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, fearing the spread of communism in Asia, persuaded the U.S. government to
provide economic and military assistance to the Diem regime, which became increasingly unpopular with the people of South
Vietnam. Diem replaced the traditionally elected village councils with Saigon‑appointed administrators. He also aroused the ire
of the Buddhists by selecting his fellow Roman Catholics (most of whom had moved to South Vietnam from the North) for top
government positions. Diem’s government began mistreating the Buddhists to the point that there were riots in the streets;
Buddhists monks publicly committed suicide by setting themselves on fire.
Guerrilla warfare spread as Viet Minh soldiers who were trained and armed in the North—the Viet Cong—returned to their
homes in the South to assassinate, ambush, sabotage, and proselytize. The Diem government asked for and received more
American military advisers and equipment to build up the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the police force, but it
could not halt the growing presence of the South Vietnamese communist forces, or Viet Cong.12
From 1962 until 1963, President Kennedy increased the number noncombat military advisers from 800 to 16,000.13
Vietnam was a Divisive Issue Within JFK’s Government
The Vietnam War was obviously a divisive issue during the Johnson and Nixon years, but few people realize how divisive it
was while Kennedy was still president. Historian Michael Beschloss wrote that Vietnam was tearing Kennedy’s government
apart in the summer of 1963:
Kennedy later told Charles Bartlett, "My God, my government’s coming
apart!" Robert Kennedy recalled that week [end of August 1963] as "the
only time, really, in three years that the government was broken in two in
a disturbing way." He later said, ‘Diem was corrupt and a bad leader¼
but we inherited him." He thought it bad policy to "replace somebody we
didn’t like with somebody we do because it would just make every other
country nervous as can be that we were running coups in and out."
(Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years, p. 653)
Oct. 31, 1963: Kennedy Announced Withdrawal From Vietnam
On October 31, 1963 in a press conference, Kennedy publicly announced his intention to withdraw a thousand men from
South Vietnam by the end of 1963. A reporter asked him about troop reductions in the far east. Here is the entire question and
Kennedy’s response:
[REPORTER:] Mr. President, back to the question of troop reductions,
are any intended in the far east at the present time – particularly in
Korea and is there any speedup in the withdrawal from Vietnam
intended?
[PRESIDENT KENNEDY:] Well as you know, when Secretary
McNamara and General Taylor came back, they announced that we
would expect to withdraw a thousand men from South Vietnam before
the end of the year. And there has been some reference to that by
General Harkins. If we’re able to do that, that will be our schedule. I think
the first unit, the first contingent, would be 250 men who are not involved
in what might be called front‑line operations. It would be our hope to
lesson the number of Americans there by a thousand as the training
intensifies and is carried on in South Vietnam.
(from JFK’s press conference, October 31, 1963)
[An audio cassette tape recording of the referenced press conference was provided by the John F. Kennedy Library,
audio‑visual department, Columbia Point, Boston, MA 02125.]
Nov. 1, 1963: Diem Assassinated in CIA Backed Coup
The very next day, on Nov. 1, 1963, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem was killed in a CIA backed coup. As
previously stated, Diem—a Roman Catholic—had upset the Buddhists by selecting fellow Roman Catholics (most of whom
had moved to South Vietnam from the North) for top government positions. There was a public backlash—riots in the streets;
Buddhists monks publicly committed suicide by setting themselves on fire. Diem became an embarrassment to the United States
and was encouraged to resign, but he refused.
Diem’s assassination pulled the US deeper into the Vietnam conflict, a conflict Kennedy was trying to pull away from. There is
a question as to whether Kennedy had approved the coup. Some historians claim that he knew of it; however, he was
extremely upset at hearing of Diem’s murder. Here are some cites:
The news of Diem’s death outraged Kennedy. General [Maxwell] Taylor
wrote that he "leaped to his feet and rushed from the room with a look of
shock and dismay on his face which I had never seen before." George
Smathers remembered that Jack Kennedy blamed the CIA, saying "I’ve
got to do something about those bastards;" they should be stripped of
their exorbitant power. Mike Forrestal called Kennedy’s reaction "both
personal and religious," and especially troubled by the implication that a
Catholic President had participated in a plot to assassinate a
coreligionist. Every account of Kennedy’s response is in complete
agreement. Until the very end he had hoped Diem’s life could be spared.
(Herbert Parmet, JFK: the Presidency of John F. Kennedy, p. 335.)
I saw the President soon after he heard that Diem and Nhu were dead.
He was somber and shaken. I had not seen him so depressed since the
Bay of Pigs.
(Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 997]
In the Situation Room, Kennedy was monitoring the coup when told of
the murders. He rushed out of the room. Forrestal felt that the
assassination "shook him personally" and "bothered him as a moral and
religious matter. It shook his confidence, I think, in the kind of advice he
was getting about South Vietnam."
(Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years, p. 657)
Over the next year, countless CIA backed governments rose and fell in South Vietnam.14
Nov. 24, 1963: Johnson Rescinded Kennedy’s Withdrawal Order
On November 24, 1963, two days after Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson quietly rescinded Kennedy’s order to
withdraw a thousand men from Vietnam by the end of the year.
On Sunday afternoon, November 24, [1963], Lyndon Johnson kept the
dead President’s appointment with [U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot]
Lodge and told him that he was not willing to ‘lose Vietnam.’: ‘Tell those
generals in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word.’
(Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years, p. 680)
Aug. 2, 1964: Gulf of Tonkin Incident Occurred. The Vietnam War Began.
On August 2, 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was subsequently ratified by
Congress. This was the beginning of large‑scale military involvement in Vietnam. Here is a summary of the Gulf of Tonkin
incident:
[On August 2, 1964,] three North Vietnamese boats fired torpedoes at
[U.S. destroyer Maddox]. Maddox gunners and jets from the nearby
Ticonderoga fired back, crippling two of the vessels and sinking the
third.
President Johnson rejected further reprisals. Using the hot line to
Moscow for the first time, he cabled Khruschev that he did not wish to
widen the conflict but hoped that North Vietnam would not attack other
American vessels in international waters.
The Maddox and another destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, were ordered to
sail eight miles off the North Vietnamese coast, four miles off the
offshore islands. The commandos from the South resumed their
operations. On Sunday evening, intercepted radio messages gave the
Maddox commander, Captain John Herrick, the ‘impression’ that
Communist patrol boats were about to attack. With air support from the
Ticonderoga, the Maddox and Turner Joy began firing.
Maddox officers reported twenty‑two enemy torpedoes, none of which
scored a hit, and two or three enemy vessels sunk. But when the firing
stopped, Herrick warned his superiors that the ‘entire action leaves
many doubts’; no sailor on the destroyer had seen or heard enemy
gunfire. An ‘overeager’ young sonar operator who had counted
torpedoes may have been misled by ‘freak weather effects.’
Nevertheless the President ordered bombing of North Vietnam for the
first time and unveiled the document now christened the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution. Language was broadened to authorize Johnson to ‘take all
necessary measures’ to protect American forces and ‘prevent further
aggression.’ The Senate passed it [on August 7, 1964] with only two
dissenters.
(Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years, p. 694)
Johnson also made a false claim—supported by the news media—that on August 4, 1964, the North Vietnamese attacked US
destroyers a second time.15
Here is a transcript of President Johnson describing the Gulf of Tonkin Incident to Robert Anderson, former Secretary of
Treasury in the Eisenhower administration, the day after the attack.
[MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1964:]
There have been some covert operations in that area that we have been
carrying on – blowing up some bridges and things of that kind, roads
and so forth. So I imagine they wanted to put a stop to it. So they ¼fired
and we respond immediately with five‑inch [artillery shells] from the
destroyer and with planes overhead. And we ¼ knock one of ‘em out
and cripple the other two. Then we go right back where we were with
that destroyer and with another one, plus plenty of planes standing by¼
(Transcript of LBJ per Michael Beschloss, Taking Charge, pp. 493‑494.)
Four days later on August 7, 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed unanimously in the House of Representatives and
88‑to‑2 in the Senate. Here is a transcript of a telephone conversation, after the vote, between President Johnson and Speaker
of the House, John McCormack:
[FRIDAY, AUGUST 7, 1964:]
LBJ: That was a good vote you had today.
McCormack: Yes, it was very good. Four hundred fourteen to nothing.
One present. What’d the Senate do?
LBJ: Eighty‑eight to 2 – [Wayne] Morse and [Ernest] Gruening.
McCormack: Can’t understand Gruening.
LBJ: Oh, he’s no good. He’s worse than Morse. He’s just no good. I’ve
spent millions on him up in Alaska [Gruening’s home state] ¼ And
Morse is just undependable and erratic as he can be.
McCormack: A radical.
LBJ: I just wanted to point out this little shit‑ass [Edgar] Foreman today
got up and said that we acted impulsively by announcing [in a Tuesday
night televised statement] that we had an answer on the way before the
planes dropped their bombs ¼ It’s just a pure lie and smoke
screen.(Footnote 34)
(Michael Beschloss, Taking Charge, p. 508)
Aug. 25, 1964: Johnson got Cold Feet and Wanted to Resign.
A few weeks later on August 25, 1964, Johnson began to lose his nerve and planned to announce that he would withdraw his
name as Democratic presidential candidate. Here is a transcript of a telephone conversation with Press Secretary George
Reedy where Johnson was clearly shaken over a walk‑out by Southern delegations, on the previous day, at the Democratic
Convention in Atlantic City:
[TUESDAY, AUGUST 25, 1964:]
Reedy:
I’m set to brief.
LBJ:
Good.
Reedy:
What should I tell ‘em about this morning?
LBJ:
I don’t know, George. There’s really not much to tell ‘em¼ I’m just
writing out a little statement that I think I’m gonna make either at a press
conference or go up to Atlantic City this afternoon to make. But I don’t
think we can tell ‘em about it now. ¼. Here’s what I’m gonna say to ‘em.
[reading from a handwritten statement:]
"[Forty‑four months ago] I was selected to be the Democratic Vice
President ¼ On that fateful November day last year, I accepted the
responsibility of the President, asking God’s guidance and the help of all
our people. For nine months, I’ve carried on as effectively as I could.
Our country faces grave dangers. These dangers must be faced and
met by a united people under a leader they do not doubt. After
thirty‑three years in political life, most men acquire enemies as ships
accumulate barnacles. The times require leadership about which there
is no doubt and a voice that men of all parties and sections and color
can follow. I’ve learned, after trying very hard, that I am not that voice or
that leader. Therefore¼ I suggest that the representatives from all
states of the Union selected for the purpose of selecting a Democratic
nominee for President and Vice President proceed to do their duty. And
that no consideration be given to me because I am absolutely
unavailable."
[LBJ then vents:]
Then they can just pick the two they want for the two places. We’ll ¼ do
the best we can to help till January. Then, if he’s elected ¼ they can
have a new and fresh fellow without any of the old scars. And I don’t
want this power of the Bomb. I just don’t want these decisions I’m
required to make. I don’t want the conniving that’s required. I don’t want
the disloyalty that’s around. I don’t want the bungling and the
inefficiencies of our people. ¼
Reedy:
This will throw the nation into quite an uproar, sir.
LBJ:
Yeah, I think so. And I think that now is the time, though. I don’t know any
better time ¼ I am absolutely positive that I cannot lead the South and
the North ¼ And I don’t want to lead the nation without my own state
and without my own section. I am very convinced that the Negroes will
not listen to me. They’re not going to follow a white Southerner. And the
stakes are too big to try to compromise. ¼ [He complains about various
newspaper articles.]
Reedy:
I think it’s too late, sir. I know it’s your decision, because you’re the man
that has to bear the brunt. But right now I think this just gives the country
to Goldwater.
LBJ:
That’s all right. I don’t care. I’m just willing to ‑‑‑ I don’t think that. I don’t
agree with that a‑tall. But I think he could do better than I can because
‑‑‑
Reedy:
He can’t, sir. He’s just a child. And look at our side. We don’t have
anybody. The only man around I’d trust to be President would be
McNamara, and he wouldn’t stand a chance.
LBJ:
No, but we didn’t trust any of the rest of ‘em. You know, we didn’t trust
Eisenhower or Jack Kennedy. That’s a matter for them [the delegates].
Anyway they’ve been running their business for a couple hundred years,
and I’ll leave it up to them. ¼
[A few minutes later, Johnson was on the phone with Walter Jenkins
and expressed frustration over the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,
suggesting that he did not have a mandate to wage war in Southeast
Asia.]
LBJ:
I don’t believe there’ll be many attacks on the orders I issue on Tonkin
Gulf if I’m not a candidate. And then I think the people will give the man
that they want ¼ a mandate. And he might continue the work we’ve
done. ¼
(Michael Beschloss, Taking Charge, pp. 529‑531)
As we know, Johnson changed his mind, was re‑elected in 1964, and served four more years as president. Nevertheless, it is
important to remember that Johnson got cold feet just 18 days after Congress ratified the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which was
basically a declaration of war against North Vietnam after we had clearly provoked them into attacking us (or not attacking us
as some believe). While Johnson complained mostly about racial problems and not being able do deal with Southern whites or
Negroes in general, he also mentioned Tonkin Gulf. Clearly it was on his mind.
Oct. 14, 1964: Khrushchev Toppled
It is interesting that Khrushchev was toppled from power on October 14, 1964, less than a year after Kennedy was killed.
Equally interesting, Khrushchev’s political demise occurred less than two and a half months after the Gulf of Tonkin incident and
the subsequent ratification of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by Congress (August 2‑7, 1964).
Another point of interest is that the term "Cold War" was coined by Bernard Baruch,16 an influential Wall Street financier, top
advisor to President Roosevelt, and ardent Zionist.
I am intrigued that two other world leaders mentioned by Kennedy in the American University speech left their positions as
heads of state within a close proximity in time to Kennedy’s assassination.
¼ Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan, and I have agreed
that high‑level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking toward
early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hopes must
be tempered with the caution of history—but with our hopes go the
hopes of all mankind. ¼
(JFK, American University, June 10, 1963)
As previously stated, Khrushchev was toppled from power in a coup on October 14, 1964, less than a year after Kennedy
was killed. British Prime Minister Macmillan resigned—ostensibly for health reasons—on October 18, 1963, about one month
before Kennedy was killed. Health problems notwithstanding, Macmillan lived another twenty‑three years. He died on
December 29, 1986. It seems must intriguing that three heads of state who framed the nuclear test ban treaty stepped down or
were removed from power within a year.
Johnson Escalated the War
After 1965 U.S. involvement in the war escalated rapidly. On the night of Feb. 7, 1965, the Viet Cong attacked the U.S. base
at Pleiku, killing 8 soldiers and wounding 126 more. Johnson in response ordered another reprisal bombing of North Vietnam.
Three days later the Viet Cong raided another U.S. military installation at Qui Nhon, and Johnson ordered more aerial attacks
against Hanoi. On March 6, two battalions of Marines landed on the beaches near Da Nang to relieve that beleaguered city. By
June 50,000 U.S. troops had arrived to fight with the ARVN. Small contingents of the North Vietnamese army began fighting
with the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, which they reached via the Ho Chi Minh Trail west of the Cambodian border.
The government in Saigon was now headed by Air Vice‑Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, but he was unable to check the rapidly
deteriorating military situation. NLF forces were gaining control of more and more areas of the countryside, and a communist
victory seemed imminent. President Johnson's response was to pledge the United States to defend South Vietnam and to send
more troops. By the end of 1965, 180,000 Americans were serving in South Vietnam under the command of General William
C. Westmoreland.
After mid‑1966 the United States and the ARVN initiated a series of new tactics in their intensifying counterinsurgency effort,
but their efforts to drive the Viet Cong from the countryside and separate them from their civilian supporters were only partly
successful. The U.S. troops depended heavily on superior firepower and on helicopters for rapid deployment into targeted rural
areas. The Viet Cong depended on stealth, concealment, and surprise attacks and ambushes.
U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam rose to 389,000 men in 1967, but, despite their sophisticated weapons, the Americans
could not eradicate the skillful and determined insurgents. More North Vietnamese troops arrived to bolster the NLF forces in
the South. A presidential election, in which all candidates who favored negotiating with the NLF were banned, was held in
South Vietnam in September, and General Nguyen Van Thieu became president, with Ky as vice president.
On January 30, 1968, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong launched a massive surprise offensive during the Tet (lunar new
year) Vietnamese festival. They attacked 36 major South Vietnamese cities and towns. The fighting at this time was especially
fierce in Saigon and in the city of Hue, which the NLF held for several weeks. The NLF suffered heavy losses (33,000 killed)
in the Tet Offensive, and the ranks of the Viet Cong were so decimated by the fighting that, from 1968 on, the majority of the
insurgents in South Vietnam were actually North Vietnamese soldiers who had infiltrated into the South. Although the general
uprising that the NLF had expected in support had not materialized, the offensive had an important strategic effect, because it
convinced a number of Americans that, contrary to their government's claims, the insurgency in South Vietnam could not be
crushed and the war would continue for years to come.
In the United States, sentiment against U.S. participation in the war mounted steadily from 1967 on and expressed itself in
peace marches, demonstrations, and acts of civil disobedience. Growing numbers of politicians and ordinary citizens began to
question whether the U.S. war effort could succeed and even whether it was morally justifiable in a conflict that some
interpreted as a Vietnamese civil war.
General Westmoreland requested more troops in order to widen the war after the Tet Offensive, but the shifting balance of
American public opinion now favored "de‑escalation" of the conflict. On March 31, 1968, President Johnson announced in a
television address that bombing north of the 20th parallel would be stopped and that he would not seek reelection to the
presidency in the fall. Hanoi responded to the decreased bombing by de‑escalating its insurgency efforts, and in October
Johnson ordered a total bombing halt. During the interim the United States and Hanoi had agreed to begin preliminary peace
talks in Paris, and General Creighton Abrams became the new commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam.17
When Johnson stepped down from the presidency in January 1969, there were about 540,00018 U.S. military personnel in
South Vietnam.
The Assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King
Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy were likely killed because the latter was about to assume the presidency and
former was endorsing him. Both wanted to end US involvement in the Vietnam War, but several interests would prevail over
their wishes. First, the right‑wing extremists hated both men because of they—along with President Kennedy—had
embarrassed George Wallace in June 1963 when the Alabama National Guard forced him to allow black students to enroll at
the University of Alabama. Second, Israel absolutely did not want the son of Joseph Kennedy to become president. None of
the Kennedys were considered friends of Israel. Consequently, the Irish‑American family could not be counted on to support
Israel’s annexation program of expanding its borders into neighboring Arab territories. Third, American and
French‑Corsican‑Latino crime families wanted the Vietnam War to continue because they were reaping huge profits from the
Golden Triangle from its production of opium. Those profits were apparently being shared with senior military personnel as
well.
In March of 1967 Senator Robert Kennedy announced a peace plan for Vietnam and soon became an outspoken antiwar
advocate.19 Martin Luther King quickly followed the senator’s lead. On April 4, 1967, at Riverside Church in New York City
and again on the 15th at a mammoth peace rally in that city, King committed himself irrevocably to opposing US involvement in
the Vietnam War. Once before, in early January 1966, he had condemned the war, but official outrage from Washington and
strenuous opposition within the black community itself had caused him to acquiesce.20
On Jan. 30, 1968, the Tet Offensive began. It marked a new beginning of anti‑war sentiment amongst many Americans. Gene
McCarthy had been campaigning for the presidency on the Democratic ticket. On March 16, 1968, Robert Kennedy
announced his candidacy for the presidency;21 Martin Luther King immediately endorsed him. On March 31, 1968, President
Johnson startled television viewers with a national address that included three announcements: (1) he had just ordered major
reductions in the bombing of North Vietnam, (2) he was requesting peace talks, and (3) he would neither seek nor accept his
party's renomination for the presidency.22 On April 4 King was killed by a sniper's bullet while standing on the balcony of a
motel in Memphis, Tennessee where he and his associates were staying. On March 10, 1969, the accused assassin, James Earl
Ray, pleaded guilty to the murder and was sentenced to 99 years in prison.23 Ray later recanted his confession.
By June 4, 1968 Robert Kennedy had won five out of six presidential primaries, including one that day in California. Shortly
after midnight on June 5(Footnote 35) he spoke to his followers in Los Angeles' Ambassador Hotel. As he left through a kitchen
hallway he was fatally wounded by a Palestinian immigrant, Sirhan Bishara Sirhan; at least that’s the official story. Robert
Kennedy died the next day on June 6, 1968.24
1968: LBJ Attempted to Appoint Abe Fortas as Chief Justice
One of the last things President Johnson attempted while in the White House was to nominate a Jewish American, Abe Fortas,
as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In 1965, President Johnson appointed Fortas—a longtime political crony—to the
Jewish slot in the Supreme Court, replacing Arthur Goldberg. As previously stated, Goldberg had resigned from the high
court—at Johnson’s request—to serve as US delegate to the UN following the death of the Adlai Stevenson who held that
post until his untimely demise. Stevenson had died unexpectedly of a heart attack on July 14, 1965.
Three years later, in 1968, Johnson nominated Fortas to replace retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren. When the nomination came
to the Senate floor, a filibuster ensued. On October 1, 1968, the Senate failed to vote because of the filibuster and Johnson
then withdrew the nomination. With that, Fortas became the first nominee for that post since 1795 to fail to receive Senate
approval.25 (Footnote 36)
After sending 540,00026 U.S. military personnel to South Vietnam, then declining to run for a second term, one of the last
things the lame duck President Johnson attempted was to appoint Abe Fortas—a Jewish crony—as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. This incident, combined with his long‑standing passionate attachment to Israel (Chapter 10), further supports
my earlier assertion that the 36th President of the United States, and his wife, were both secretly Jewish (Chapter 9).
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Endnotes
1.Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 17 ‑ 18. McCoy cited the following source: US Congress, Senate Committee
on Government Operations, Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics, 88 Cong. 1st and 2nd sess., 1964, pt. 4, p. 913
2.Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 17 ‑ 18. McCoy cited the following source: Nicholas Gage, "Mafioso's
Memoirs Support Valachi's Testimony About Crime Syndicate," in The New York Times, April 11, 1971.
3.Encyclopedia Britannica: Meyer Lansky
4.Encyclopedia Britannica: Opium Wars
5.Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 9. McCoy cited the following source: U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, "The World Opium Situation," October 1970, p. 10
6.Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 9. McCoy cited the following sources and made comments as indicated: In
1969 Iran resumed legal pharmaceutical production of opium after thirteen years of prohibition. It is not yet known how much of Iran's
legitimate production is being diverted to illicit channels. However, her strict narcotics laws (execution by firing squad for convicted
traffickers) have discouraged the illicit opium traffic and prevented any of Iran's production from entering the international market. (John
Hughes, The Junk Merchants [Boston: The Christian Science Publishing Company, 19711 pp. 17‑20; U.S. Congress, House Committee
on Foreign Relations, International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem, 92nd Cong., I st sess., 197 1, p. 74.)
7.Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 9. McCoy cited the following sources and made comments as indicated:
Report of the United Nations Survey Team on the Economic and Social Needs of the Opium Producing Areas in Thailand (Bangkok:
Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 59, 64, 68; The New York Times, September 17, 1968, p. 45; ibid., June 6, 1971, p. 2. Estimates for
illicit opium production made by the U.N. and the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics vary widely and fluctuate from year to year as conditions in
the opium‑producing nations change and statistical data improve. In general, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics estimates have tended to
underestimate the scope of illicit production in Southeast Asia, while the U.N. has tended to minimize production in South Asia, The
statistics used above are compiled from both U.N. and U.S. Bureau of Narcotics figures in an attempt to correct both imbalances.
However, even if we accept the Bureau's maximum figures for 1968 and 1971, the differences are not that substantial: India, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan (South Asia) have a combined illicit production of 525 tons, or 29 percent of the world's total illicit supply; Burma (1,000
tons), Thailand (150 tons), and Laos (35 tons) have a combined production of 1,185 tons, or roughly 66 percent of the world's illicit
supply; and Turkey accounts for 100 illicit tons, or about 5 percent of the world supply. (U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, "The World Opium Situation," p. 10; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related
Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, 92nd Cong., Ist sess., 1971, pp. 578‑584.
8.Alfred McCoy, et al, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 89
9.ibid, pp. 53 ‑ 54
10.Encyclopedia Britannica: Vietnam War
11.Alfred McCoy, et al, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 17 ‑ 18
12.Encyclopedia Britannica: Vietnam War
13.Military advisers in Vietnam during the Kennedy administration, 800 to 16,000 per John Pilger’s website, 3/11/02,
http://pilger.carlton.com/vietnam/chronology2. The final number, 16,000, is corroborated per Think Quest website,
http://library.thinkquest.org/10826/vietnam.htm. 16,000 is corroborated again by Motts Military Museum,
http://www.mottsmilitarymuseum.org/vietnam.html.
14.Encyclopedia Britannica: Vietnam War
15.ibid; corroborated in an article by Jeff Cohen and Norman Solomon entitled "30‑Year Anniversary: Tonkin Gulf Lie Launched Vietnam
War" (July 27, 1994), published in Media Beat, http://www.fair.org/media‑beat/940727.html
16.Encyclopedia Britannica: Cold War
17.Encyclopedia Britannica: Vietnam War
18.ibid
19.Michael Jay Friedman, Congress, the President, and the Battle of Ideas: Vietnam Policy, 1965‑1969, (1999),
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH41/Friedman41.html
20.Encyclopedia Britannica: Martin Luther King, Jr.
21.Encyclopedia Britannica: Robert F. Kennedy
22.Encyclopedia Britannica: Lyndon Johnson
23.Encyclopedia Britannica: Martin Luther King, Jr.
24.Encyclopedia Britannica: Robert F. Kennedy
25.Encyclopedia Britannica: Abe Fortas. The date, October 1, 1968, was provided in an article about the Fortas filibuster on the Senate
Learning Website. The article was entitled, "October 1, 1968 Filibuster Derails Supreme Court Appointment."
(http://www.senate.gov/learning/min_6hhhh.html)
26.Encyclopedia Britannica: Vietnam War
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JEWS. Jews have been a part of the warp and woof of the Lone Star State since the period of Spanish
Texas.qv To the untamed future state came Jewish seekers of fortune and freedom. Heirs to the Spanish and
European forms of Jewish ritual practice, the Jews of Texas adapted their seminal faith to the new ambience
without damaging the integrity of a 5,000‑year‑old tradition. Though some abandoned their roots, most were
tenacious in the nurturing of their heritage. Before 1821, Jews who openly practiced their religion could not
legally live in Texas, a Spanish colony where only Catholics could take up residence. Samuel Isaacksqv had
settled on the Brazos River by December 1821, however, N. Adolphus Sterneqv moved to East Texas in
1826, and by 1838 Jews were living in Velasco, Bolivar, Nacogdoches, Goliad, San Antonio, and Galveston.
Their settlement pattern was repeated numerous times: first the formation of a cemetery‑benevolent society,
followed by a synagogue, formal or informal. Jewish cemeteries were established in Galveston in 1852,
Houston in 1854, San Antonio in 1856, Victoria in 1858 and Jefferson in 1862. The first chartered Jewish
congregation in Texas was Congregation Beth Israel, Houston,qv founded in 1859. It began as an Orthodox
synagogue, but became a Reform congregation some fifteen years later. The oldest Reform congregation,
Temple B'nai Israel, Galveston,qv was established in 1868. By the turn of the century, numerous congregations
had been organized: Hebrew Sinai Congregation of Jefferson in 1873, Beth El of San Antonio in 1874, Temple
Emanu‑Elqv of Dallas in 1875, Beth Israel of Austin in 1876, Rodef Shalom of Waco in 1879, United Hebrew
Congregation of Gainesville in 1881, Shearith Israel of Dallas in 1884, B'nai Abraham of Brenham in 1885,
Beth El of Tyler in 1887, Temple Moses Montefiore Adath Israel of Marshall in 1887, Tiferet Israel of Dallas
in 1890, Mount Sinai Congregation of Texarkana in 1890, Ahavath Sholom of Fort Worth in 1892, and Beth
El of Corsicana in 1898. Beth El of Fort Worth followed in 1902 and Ahavath Achim of Tyler in 1903.
In addition to cemeteries and synagogues, beginning in the 1870s various Jewish communities organized
benevolent associations such as chapters of the International Order of B'nai B'rith, aid societies with
predominantly female members, literary societies, community lecture series, Sunday schools, and afternoon
schools. M. N. Nathan of New Orleans possibly became the first rabbi to officiate in Texas when Rosanna D.
Ostermanqv brought him to dedicate the Galveston Jewish cemetery in 1852. In 1860 the first resident rabbi,
Zachariah Emmich, began service at Beth Israel in Houston. Of all the rabbis to serve in Texas, Henry Cohenqv
of Galveston's B'nai Israel left the most well‑known legacy; his service began in 1888 and lasted sixty‑two
years. In the late 1800s, Rabbi Cohen's first colleagues included Aaron Suhler (Dallas, Emanu El, 1875),
Nehemiah Mosessohn (Dallas, Sherith Israel, 1893), Moses Sadovsky (San Antonio, Agudas Achim, 1889),
Tobias Schanfarber (Austin, Beth Israel, 1884), Abraham Levy (Waco, Rodef Shalom, 1887), Heinrich
Schwarz (Hempstead, 1875), and Hyman Saft (Marshall, 1887).
The earliest Jews, who arrived with the conquistadors, came from Sephardic (Spanish‑North African‑Israel)
communities. After the Mexican period, Jewry in Texas was essentially populated by immigrants from
Germany, eastern Europe, and the Americas. The same broadsides that attracted their non‑Jewish fellow
immigrants from other countries and from other states attracted the Jews. Texas was a land of promise with
seemingly limitless potential. For many Jews, Texas and the United States also offered more religious freedom
than they had known in Europe. The movement of Jewish settlers followed the standard patterns of movement
throughout the state. Trade routes, railroad lines, new towns, established communities, and relatives who had
already arrived drew Jewish settlers to diverse areas of Texas. As a result, the Jewish population remained
heterogeneous, geographically scattered and stronger for it.
No aspect of nineteenth‑century Texas history is without the involvement of committed Jewish Texans.
Adolphus Sterne of Nacogdoches served as alcalde,qv treasurer, and postmaster in 1826, Albert Moses
Levyqv was surgeon in chief in the revolutionary armyqv in 1835, Jacob and Phineas De Cordovaqqv sold land
and developed Waco, Simon Mussinaqv founded Brownsville in 1848, Henri Castroqv founded several towns,
Michael Seeligsonqv was elected mayor of Galveston in 1853, Rosanna Osterman funded significant religious
and charitable activities through her will, Sid Samuels and Belle Doppelmayer were in the first graduating class
at the University of Texas in 1881, Olga B. Kohlbergqv started the first private kindergarten in Texas in 1892,
and Morris Laskerqv was elected to the state Senate in 1895. Jews also established themselves in Beaumont,
Brenham, Corsicana, Gainesville, Hempstead, Marshall, Palestine, Texarkana, Tyler, Port Arthur, Wichita
Falls, Baytown, Corpus Christi, Brownsville, New Braunfels, McAllen, Alice, Amarillo, Columbus, Wharton,
Giddings, Navasota, Crockett, Lubbock, Longview, Jefferson, San Angelo, and Schulenberg.
With the turn of the century the Jewish population began to increase more rapidly in response to new outbreaks
of anti‑Semitism in Russia and the significant movement of eastern European Jewry to the United States. Leo
N. Leviqv framed the famous Kishinev petition, cabled by President Theodore Roosevelt to the Russian Czar to
protest massacres of Jews. Between 1900 and 1920 estimates of the Jewish population of Texas grew from
15,000 to 30,000. In particular the major cities, Houston, Dallas, Fort Worth, and San Antonio, saw
mushrooming populations of Jews. This growth resulted in a concomitant increase in the membership of
religious, educational, and social‑service organizations, as well as the building of synagogues. The Jewish
Herald Voice began publication in Houston in 1906, and was eventually followed by the Jewish Journal and
Jewish Record of San Antonio and the Texas Jewish Postqv of Dallas‑Fort Worth. Many new immigrants
came through the port of Galveston. From 1907 to 1914, the Galveston Movement,qv locally spearheaded by
Rabbi Henry Cohen, settled some 10,000 Jewish immigrants. Though the plan called for them to settle in the
middle states of the country, most remained in the Southwest.
A number of the great Jewish mercantile establishments date from the early years of the twentieth century.
Many of the Jewish immigrants who settled in the state began as backpack peddlers of goods they acquired by
selling their possessions at the port of entry. If the community to which such a peddler traveled was hospitable,
and if the potential for earning a livelihood was optimal, the new immigrant usually set down roots, opened a
small store, and established a chain linking him to his supplier at the port of entry. In turn, as relatives arrived,
they were sent out as peddlers from the new location to newer areas, where they opened stores. In this way
the chains were extended. This entrepreneurial spirit gave rise to small businesses and larger ones that became
well known. A small but diverse sampling includes Joseph Weingarten,qv Schwarz, Proler, Weiner, Aronoff,
Abraham M. Levy,qv Finger, Farb, Schnitzer, Simon and Tobias Sakowitz,qqv and Axelrod of Houston;
Roger's Texas State Optical and Edwin Gale of Beaumont; Zale Jewelry Corporation,qv Neiman‑Marcus,qv the
Lorch Company,qv Bernard Gold, Pearle, Elsie Frankfort, and Sanger Brothersqv of Dallas; Schwarts of El
Paso; Levines of Lubbock; Bettins and Lacks of Victoria; Kanes of Corpus Christi; Avigael of Laredo; Roosth
and Genecov of Tyler; Appel and Brachman of Fort Worth; Michael Riskindqv of Eagle Pass; Harris and Isaac
Kempner,qqv Seinsheimer, and Morris Laskerqv of Galveston; Smith of Austin; Rapoport and Smith of Waco;
Louis Kariel of Marshall; Wolens and Goldens of Corsicana; and Arons, Moskowitzs, and Wilkenfelds of
Baytown.
Immigration ended for a time with the 1920s immigration‑quota acts. In that decade Texas Jews opposed the
rise of the Ku Klux Klan,qv and in the 1930s they watched with growing concern the growth of anti‑Semitism in
Germany and elsewhere. Organizations were founded in the national Jewish community before World War IIqv
to respond to the needs of persecuted Jews in Europe, and branches of these were established in Texas.
Houston established its Jewish Community Council in 1936 under the presidency of Max Nathan and enhanced
its Jewish Family Service under Ruth Fred. Dallas was well organized by Jack Kravitz. After the war the Jews
of Texas became involved in the resettlement of Holocaust survivors who sought refuge in the United States.
Their memory has been carefully preserved by the Dallas Memorial Center for Holocaust Studies.qv The
number of Jews in the state continued to grow after the war, from an estimated 50,000 in 1945 to 71,000 in
the mid‑1970s and 92,000 in 1988. This population was increasingly concentrated in the larger urban areas of
the state, as the small‑town Jewish communities faded away. Texas Jews continued to demonstrate significant
concern for the welfare of Jews outside the state and around the world. Perhaps the most significant community
effort since World War II was support for the establishment of the state of Israel, though not initially with
unanimity. The belief of some Jews elsewhere that such an establishment was unwise was echoed in Texas.
Concerns beyond a regional level have led to national service, as exemplified by Helen Smith of Austin, past
international president of B'nai B'rith Women, and Dolores Wilkenfeld of Houston, past president of the
National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods. In addition to these community activities in the international arena,
local and regional efforts have included youth camps such as Echo Hill Ranch, Camp Bonim, Camp Young
Judea, and Greene Family Camp. On the college campuses the Jewish presence is found at Hillel foundations,
Chabad houses, fraternities such as Tau Delta Phi, Sigma Alpha Mu, Alpha Epsilon Pi, Zeta Beta Tau, and
sororities such as Alpha Epsilon Phi, Delta Phi Epsilon and Sigma Delta Tau.
The freedom experienced by Jews in Texas encouraged them to become active in many fields. Among those
who served as mayors were Isaac H. Kempner and Adrian Levy, Sr., of Galveston. Some of their more recent
counterparts include Barbara Crews and Eddie Schreiber of Galveston, Adlene Harris and Annette Strauss of
Dallas, Ruben Edelstein of Brownsville, Abe Lichtenstein of Corpus Christi, Minnie Solomonson of Padre
Island, Bayard Friedman of Fort Worth, Jeff Friedman of Austin, and Veta Winick of Dickinson. Other names
of prominence include Ambassador Robert Strauss, state senator Babe Schwartz, Billy Goldberg, and
Congressman Martin Frost. Hermine Tobolowskyqv was a leading figure in the campaign for the Texas Equal
Rights Amendmentqv in 1972. Jewish federal judges have included Irving Goldberg, Norman Black, and David
Hittner; Hattie Heneberg and Ruby Sondock were state justices. The Texas Jewish community has also been
home to more eclectic souls, including such military men as Samuel Dreben and Maurice Hirsch,qqv 1930s
wrestler Abe Coleman, and country‑western singer Kinky (Richard) Friedman, who not only made headlines
with his Texas Jew Boys but also wrote a series of mysteries. Prominent Texas Jewish authors and journalists
have included Fania F. Kruger, John Rosenfield, Jr., and Rosella H. Werlin.qqv In the later part of the twentieth
century the expansion of Texas universities and the development of high tech industries drew Jewish academics
and professionals to Texas from other parts of the country. Outstanding Texas rabbis who have achieved
national recognition in the twentieth century include Robert Kahn and Samuel Karff of Houston, and Levi A.
Olanqv and David Lefkowitz of Dallas, all of whom served as presidents of the Central Conference of
American Rabbis, and Hyman J. Schachtelqv of Houston, who delivered the invocation at the inauguration of
President Lyndon B. Johnson.qv
The formal preservation of the history of Texas Jewry goes back to Rabbi Henry Cohen of Galveston and
Rabbi David Lefkowitz of Dallas, who set out to interview as many early settlers and their families as possible.
They produced a historical account for the Texas Centennialqv in 1936. Rabbi Floyd Fierman of El Paso and
Rabbi Harvey Wesel of Tyler collected and recounted much of the history of their area. Through the efforts of
Rabbi Jimmy Kessler of Galveston, the Texas Jewish Historical Societyqv came into existence in 1980. The
society has established an archive at the Barker Texas History Centerqv in Austin. The entrepreneurial and
pioneer spirit that pervaded Texas, a reflection of some of the major teachings of Jewish tradition, has been
part of the impetus for the involvement and achievements of Jewish residents. Though Judaism is a religion, it is
also clearly a way of life that calls upon its adherents to be actively involved in the community within which they
live. Jews of Texas have striven successfully to make the world in which they live and particularly the state of
which they are an integral part a better place in which to live.
BIBLIOGRAPHY: Henry Cohen, "The Jews in Texas," Publications of the American Jewish Historical
Society 4 (1896). The Jewish Texans (San Antonio: University of Texas Institute of Texan Cultures, 1974).
Natalie Ornish, Pioneer Jewish Texans (Dallas: Texas Heritage, 1989). Ruthe Winegarten and Cathy
Schechter, Deep in the Heart: The Lives and Legends of Texas Jews (Austin: Eakin Press, 1990).
Rabbi James L. Kessler
Recommended citation:
"JEWS." The Handbook of Texas Online. <http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/JJ/pxj1.html>
[Accessed Sat Jul 13 17:49:56 US/Central 2002 ].
The Handbook of Texas Online is a joint project of The General Libraries at the University of Texas at Austin
(http://www.lib.utexas.edu) and the Texas State Historical Association (http://www.tsha.utexas.edu).
Copyright ©, The Texas State Historical Association, 1997‑2001
Last Updated: July 23, 2001
Comments to: [email protected]
May 11, 2001:
"One person told me, 'My family just doesn't eat
pork ‑‑ we're allergic to pork,'" historian Stan
Hordes said, explaining the pockets of
crypto‑Jews who maintain Jewish traditions
without even realizing it.
photo by John Anderson
Richard Santos is wondering how old you can get and still call
yourself an "angry young man." The San Antonio native, author or
co‑author of 32 books, stands mischievously at the microphone
inside a local hotel reception hall, holds forth his middle‑aged
body, and tells a room full of impeccably dressed Jewish men and
women: "You should hear some of the jokes we tell about Jesus
Christ!"
Yes, his name is Santos. And yes, his skin is brown. So the reason
he's being so ribald with the history of Catholic clerics at the Texas
Jewish Historical Society's 22nd annual conference may not be
readily obvious. As it turns out, though, this fiery academic's blood
is as rich with Jewish heritage as anyone else's in the room today.
A descendant of an ethnic group called "crypto‑Jews" ‑‑ that is,
Sephardic groups of families who secretly retained their religion
and culture after a 15th‑century Spanish royal decree deemed it
punishable by death ‑‑ Santos has spent his entire adult life trying
to educate the masses about the secret history of his bloodline.
"I'm very proud that [my ancestors] chose to be burned at the
stake," said Santos, the author of Silent Heritage: The Sephardim
and the Colonization of the Spanish North American Frontier,
1492‑1600. Since their only other option, of course, was to deny
their identities and heritage, Santos' pride is understandable.
But pride has not been easy. Santos is a sort of rebel, after all,
who repeatedly calls himself an "angry young man" and speaks
without hiding the bitterness in his voice. Endlessly misunderstood
and attacked by various groups throughout his life, he is neither
what one expects from a Latino nor a Jew. At the conference,
though, he is a shining example of both. With his personal drama
and long history of academic work ‑‑ he has taught at San
Antonio's Trinity University and Our Lady of the Lake, among
others ‑‑ Santos is a walking example of the most fascinating part
of this year's gathering. Somewhere between the field trip to the
Dell Jewish Community Center and the communal breakfast
buffets, speakers like Santos are showing how scholarship and
literature can reconfigure public notions of race and identity.
"Nobody taught me that my people signed eight declarations of
independence trying to form a national government," Santos said.
All of this may be a little shocking, of course, for the casual
attendant who was hoping to mingle with friends and hear a word
or two about local Jewish history; after all, there was a panel
devoted specifically to Austinites discussing the Jewish history of
Austin "from a social perspective." But a quick glance around the
room shows that most of the audience is deeply enthralled by
Santos' speech ‑‑ it's as if they, too, can identify with his anger,
sympathize with his life of questioning the meaning of heritage.
"Some of the people here think they might be Jews, some are
crypto‑Jews, and some are your Eastern European Jews," says
Walter Cohen, trying to size up the group. Even Santos alludes to
the deceptively diverse makeup of the attendants in his remarks.
"We have one god and 10 commandments," he said. "Everything
else is negotiable."
Perhaps the most negotiable thing today is history. Former New
Mexico state historian and University of New Mexico professor
Stan Hordes is also in attendance, here to relate his tale of how he
found a number of crypto‑Jews in and around Santa Fe, many of
whom didn't even know they had Semitic ties.
"One person told me, 'My family just doesn't eat pork ‑‑ we're
allergic to pork,'" Hordes says, explaining the pockets of
crypto‑Jews who maintain Jewish traditions without even realizing
it.
For this fascinating group of crypto‑Jews ‑‑ women who light
menorahs without even realizing what they're doing, for instance ‑‑
the story begins in the medieval Iberian peninsula, where an
unprecedented harmony existed between the three major
populations: Muslims, Jews, and Christians. In what will later be
called the Golden Age, each group enjoys extraordinary religious
freedom and contributes significantly to the progress and duties of
Iberian society. Jewish philosophers and poets such as
Maimonedes and Yehuda ha‑Levi flourish. Then come Ferdinand
and Isabel, the infamous Reyes Católicos ("the Catholic
monarchs").
Beginning with their "reconquista" ("reconquest") of Spain in the
name of the church and culminating with the Edict of Expulsion in
1492, the monarchs quickly transformed the peninsula from an
area of tolerance to one of terror. The Muslims were driven down
into North Africa, and Jewish families were forced to convert to
Catholicism or permanently leave the land they'd owned for
centuries.
History, however, is canny in its designs. The same year that the
monarchs reconquer the peninsula, the same year they sign the
Edict of Expulsion, also happens to be the same year that Europe
discovers the vast and virginal Americas. While the Catholic forces
see the lands as a sudden tabula rasa ‑‑ a chance to start anew in
their campaign for salvation ‑‑ the persecuted Jews see it as a nice
place to live without having murderous zealots as neighbors.
Crossing the Atlantic under various pretexts and disguises, the
crypto‑Jews eventually make their way north of Spain's Mexican
settlements, ending up in what is now the American southwest.
"The first settlements in this area were established by crypto‑Jews
escaping the Inquisition," Hordes explains. Officials in Spain,
however, soon realize that Jewish practices are thriving in the area,
and a crackdown involving autos‑da‑fe, immolations, and
harassment begins in the New World.
For families like Richard Santos' predecessors, the impossible
choice appeared again: Convert or die. The fact that
Mexican‑Americans in the region today practice ghostly echoes of
the Jewish cultural and religious habits indicates that they chose a
different and more subversive path instead: to continue their
existence in private, behind closed doors, away from the inquisitive
Catholic eye.
"Many of them [descendants of crypto‑Jews] have gotten so angry
with me because I told the family secret," Santos says.
Fascinating as the presentation by Santos and Hordes may be, it
leaves far more questions than answers. What does it mean for the
surviving crypto‑Jews to discover their lineage, for instance?
Surely the inheritance of these defiant settlers must amount to
something more than curious attitudes towards pork and candles.
Robert Rosen, practicing lawyer and author of The Jewish
Confederates, offered a slightly more thorough evaluation of a
wholly different "crypto" group of Jews during his presentation:
those who supported and died for the Southern Confederacy
during the Civil War. "The irony of Jews owning slaves is not lost,"
Rosen said, calling the southerners "Israelites with Egyptian
principles."
Armed with a steady sense of
humor and forceful energy,
Rosen took great pains to
establish a sense of historical
accuracy for the large group
of attendants who had
gathered for dinner at the end
of the conference. Speaking
over the clinking of glasses
and forks, he described the
antebellum American South
as a "Land of Canaan,"
where Jews enjoyed
freedoms and levels of
participation in society
unheard of since the Golden
Age in Spain. That nobody
knows about the splendor of
old Galveston and New
Orleans is not a fact that
Rosen takes lightly.
"American Jewish history is
one of the most pathetic
intellectual endeavors ever," he said.
The facts to support Rosen's image of the South as a haven for
Jews are there, though. The first three Jews elected to the United
States Senate all hailed from below the Mason‑Dixon Line. The
very first of these men, Benjamin Franklin Jonas, is so poorly
known in American history that Rosen claims there is no
biographical essay in any library detailing his life. Additionally, one
of the wartime South's most powerful leaders, Judah Benjamin,
puts Joseph Lieberman's vice‑presidential nomination in a fuller
context, as he was third in line to the presidency of the
Confederacy a full 135 years before Lieberman's achievement.
However surprising these images provided by the Texas Jewish
Historical Society may have been, they demonstrate the urgent
need for continued scholarship and publishing that tackles
accepted notions of cultural identity. That a man from San Antonio
named Santos has as much to add to the world of Jewish
intellectual pursuits as an attorney named Rosen is as fascinating as
it should be obvious. For the first time, perhaps, an entirely
constructive revision may be taking place in the history of those we
call the "people of the Book."
See Also:
In Person
Carlos Fuentes in
Austin [04‑06‑01]
Palabras: A Latino
Literary Festival
[03‑30‑01]
Writing in Tongues
The Art of Translation
[01‑12‑01]
More by David
Garza:
Cinema of the
Americas
A Festival of Latino
Films Showcases New
Visions of an Old and
Resurging Culture
[04‑13‑01]
Carlos Fuentes in
Austin
Carlos Fuentes in
Austin [04‑06‑01]
India Ink
Reality Meets Fantasy
in Three New Novels
[03‑30‑01]
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