It was 12 years ago, on March 14, 1983, that the commandant of

the Marine Corps sent a highly unusual letter to the secretary of

defense expressing frustration and anger at Israel. General R.H.

Barrow charged that Israeli troops were deliberately threatening

the lives of Marines serving as peacekeepers in Lebanon. There

was, he wrote, a systematic pattern of harassment by Israel

Defense Forces (IDF) that was resulting in "life‑threatening

situations, replete with verbal degradation of the officers, their

uniform and country."

Barrow's letter added: "It is inconceivable to me why Americans

serving in peacekeeping roles must be harassed, endangered

by an ally...It is evident to me, and the opinion of the U.S.

commanders afloat and ashore, that the incidents between the

Marines and the IDF are timed, orchestrated, and executed for

obtuse Israeli political purposes."1

Israel's motives were less obtuse than the diplomatic general

pretended. It was widely believed then, and now, that Israeli

Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, one of Israel's most

Machiavellian politician‑generals, was creating the incidents

deliberately in an effort to convince Washington that the two

forces had to coordinate their actions in order to avoid such

tensions. This, of course, would have been taken by the Arabs as

proof that the Marines were not really in Lebanon as neutral

peacekeepers but as allies of the Israelis, a perception that

would have obvious advantages for Israel.2

Barrow's extraordinary letter was indicative of the frustrations

and miseries the Marines suffered during their posting to

Lebanon starting on Aug. 25, 1982, as a result of Israel's

invasion 11 weeks earlier. Initially a U.S. unit of 800 men was

sent to Beirut harbor as part of a multinational force to monitor

the evacuation of PLO guerrillas from Beirut. The Marines,

President Reagan announced, "in no case... would stay longer

than 30 days."3 This turned out to be only partly true. They did

withdraw on Sept. 10, but a reinforced unit of 1,200 was rushed

back 15 days later after the massacres at the Palestinian

refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila that accompanied the

Israeli seizure of West Beirut. The U.S. forces remained until

Feb. 26, 1984.4

During their‑year‑and‑a‑half posting in Lebanon, the Marines

suffered 268 killed.5 The casualties started within a week of the

return of the Marines in September 1982. On the 30th, a

U.S.‑made cluster bomb left behind by the Israelis exploded,

killing Corporal David Reagan and wounding three other

Marines.6

Corporal Reagan's death represented the dangers of the new

mission of the Marines in Lebanon. While their first brief stay had

been to separate Israeli forces from Palestinian fighters

evacuating West Beirut, their new mission was as part of a

multinational force sent to prevent Israeli troops from attacking

the Palestinian civilians left defenseless there after the

withdrawal of PLO forces. As President Reagan said: "For this

multinational force to succeed, it is essential that Israel withdraw

from Beirut."7

"Incidents are timed, orchestrated, and

executed for Israeli political purposes."

Israel's siege of Beirut during the summer of 1982 had been

brutal and bloody, reaching a peak of horror on Aug. 12, quickly

known as Black Thursday. On that day, Sharon's forces launched

at dawn a massive artillery barrage that lasted for 11 straight

hours and was accompanied by saturation air bombardment.8

As many as 500 persons, mainly Lebanese and Palestinian

civilians, were killed.9

On top of the bombardment came the massacres the next month

at Sabra and Shatila, where Sharon's troops allowed Lebanese

Maronite killers to enter the camps filled with defenseless

civilians. The massacres sickened the international community

and pressure from Western capitals finally forced Israel to

withdraw from Beirut in late September. Troops from Britain,

France, Italy and the United States were interposed between the

Israeli army and Beirut, with U.S. Marines deployed in the most

sensitive area south of Beirut at the International Airport, directly

between Israeli troops and West Beirut.

It was at the airport that the Marines would suffer their Calvary

over the next year. Starting in January 1983, small Israeli units

began probing the Marine lines. At first the effort appeared

aimed at discovering the extent of Marine determination to resist

penetration. The lines proved solid and the Marines'

determination strong. Israeli troops were politely but firmly turned

away. Soon the incidents escalated, with both sides pointing

loaded weapons at each other but no firing taking place.

Tensions were high enough by late January that a special

meeting between U.S. and Israeli officers was held in Beirut to try

to agree on precise boundaries beyond which the IDF would not

penetrate.10

No Stranger to the Marines

However, on Feb. 2 a unit of three Israeli tanks, led by Israeli Lt.

Col. Rafi Landsberg, tried to pass through Marine/Lebanese

Army lines at Rayan University Library in south Lebanon. By this

time, Landsberg was no stranger to the Marines. Since the

beginning of January he had been leading small Israeli units in

probes against the Marine lines, although such units would

normally have a commander no higher than a sergeant or

lieutenant. The suspicion grew that Sharon's troops were

deliberately provoking the Marines and Landsberg was there to

see that things did not get out of hand. The Israeli tactics were

aimed more at forcing a joint U.S.‑Israeli strategy than merely

probing lines.

In the Feb. 2 incident, the checkpoint was commanded by Marine

Capt. Charles Johnson, who firmly refused permission for

Landsberg to advance. When two of the Israeli tanks ignored his

warning to halt, Johnson leaped on Landsberg's tank with pistol

drawn and demanded Landsberg and his tanks withdraw. They

did.11

Landsberg and the Israeli embassy in Washington tried to laugh

off the incident, implying that Johnson was a trigger‑happy John

Wayne type and that the media were exaggerating a routine

event. Landsberg even went so far as to claim that he smelled

alcohol on Johnson's breath and that drunkenness must have

clouded his reason. Marines were infuriated because Johnson

was well known as a teetotaler. Americans flocked to Johnson's

side. He received hundreds of letters from school children,

former Marines and from Commandant Barrow.12 It was a losing

battle for the Israelis and Landsberg soon dropped from sight.

But the incidents did not stop. These now included "helicopter

harassment," by which U.S.‑made helicopters with glaring

spotlights were flown by the Israelis over Marine positions at

night, illuminating Marine outposts and exposing them to

potential attack. As reports of these incidents piled up, Gen.

Barrow received a letter on March 12 from a U.S. Army major

stationed in Lebanon with the United Nations Truce Supervisory

Organization (UNTSO). The letter described a systematic pattern

of Israeli attacks and provocations against UNTSO troops,

including instances in which U.S. officers were singled out for

"near‑miss" shootings, abuse and detention.13 That same day

two Marine patrols were challenged and cursed by Israeli

soldiers.14

Two days later Barrow wrote his letter to Secretary of Defense

Caspar W. Weinberger, who endorsed it and sent it along to the

State Department. High‑level meetings were arranged and the

incidents abated, perhaps largely because by this time Ariel

Sharon had been fired as defense minister. He had been found

by an Israeli commission to have had "personal responsibility"

for the Sabra and Shatila massacres.15

Despite the bad taste left from the clashes with the Israelis, in

fact no Marines had been killed in the incidents and their lines

had been secure up to the end of winter in 1983. Then Islamic

guerrillas, backed by Iran, became active. On the night of April

17, 1983, an unknown sniper fired a shot that went through the

trousers of a Marine sentry but did not harm him. For the first

time, the Marines returned fire.16

The next day, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was blown up by a

massive bomb, with the loss of 63 lives. Among the 17

Americans killed were CIA Mideast specialists, including Robert

C. Ames, the agency's top Middle East expert.17 Disaffected

former Israeli Mossad case officer Victor Ostrovsky later claimed

that Israel had advance information about the bombing plan but

had decided not to inform the United States, a claim denied by

Israel.18 The Iranian‑backed Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

Veteran correspondent John Cooley considered the attack "the

day [Iranian leader Ayatollah] Khomeini's offensive against

America in Lebanon began in earnest." 19

Still, it was not until four months later, on Aug. 28, that Marines

came under direct fire by rocket‑propelled grenades and

automatic weapons at International Airport. They returned fire

with M‑16 rifles and M‑60 machine guns. The firefight resumed

the next day with Marines firing 155mm artillery, 81mm mortars

and rockets from Cobra helicopter gunships against Shi'i Muslim

positions. Two Marines were killed and 14 wounded in the

exchange, the first casualties in actual combat since the Marines

had landed the previous year.20

From this time on, the combat involvement of the Marines grew.

Their actions were generally seen as siding with Israel against

Muslims, slowly changing the status of the Marines as neutral

peacekeepers to opponents of the Muslims.21 Israel could hardly

have wished for more. The polarization meant that increasingly

the conflict was being perceived in terms of the U.S., Israel and

Lebanon's Christians against Iran, Islam and Lebanon's Shi'i

Muslims.

Accelerating the Conflict

Israel accelerated the building conflict on Sept. 3, 1993 by

unilaterally withdrawing its troops southward, leaving the Marines

exposed behind their thin lines at the airport. The United States

had asked the Israeli government to delay its withdrawal until the

Marines could be replaced by units of the Lebanese army, but

Israel refused.22 The result was as feared. Heavy fighting

immediately broke out between the Christian Lebanese Forces

and the pro‑Syrian Druze units, both seeking to occupy positions

evacuated by Israel, while the Marines were left in the crossfire.

23On Sept. 5, two Marines were killed and three wounded as

fighting escalated between Christian and Muslim militias.24

In an ill‑considered effort to subdue the combat, the Sixth Fleet

frigate Bowen fired several five‑inch naval guns, hitting Druze

artillery positions in the Chouf Mountains that were firing into the

Marine compound at Beirut airport.25 It was the first time U.S.

ships had fired into Lebanon, dramatically raising the level of

combat. But the Marines' exposed location on the flat terrain of

the airport left them in an impossible position. On Sept. 12, three

more Marines were wounded. 26

On Sept. 13, President Reagan authorized what was called

aggressive self‑defense for the Marines, including air and naval

strikes.27 Five days later the United States essentially joined the

war against the Muslims when four U.S. warships unleashed the

heaviest naval bombardment since Vietnam into Syrian and

Druze positions in eastern Lebanon in support of the Lebanese

Christians.28 The bombardment lasted for three days and was

personally ordered by National Security Council director Robert

McFarlane, a Marine Corps officer detailed to the White House

who was in Lebanon at the time and was also a strong supporter

of Israel and its Lebanese Maronite Christian allies. McFarlane

issued the order despite the fact that the Marine commander at

the airport, Colonel Timothy Geraghty, strenuously argued

against it because, in the words of correspondent Thomas L.

Friedman, "he knew that it would make his soldiers party to what

was now clearly an intra‑Lebanese fight, and that the Lebanese

Muslims would not retaliate against the Navy's ships at sea but

against the Marines on shore." 29

By now, the Marines were under daily attack and Muslims were

charging they were no longer neutral.30 At the same time the

battleship USS New Jersey, with 16‑inch guns, arrived off

Lebanon, increasing the number of U.S. warships offshore to 14.

Similarly, the Marine contingent at Beirut airport was increased

from 1,200 to 1,600.31

A Tragic Climax

The fight now was truly joined between the Shi'i Muslims and the

Marines, who were essentially pinned down in their airport

bunkers and under orders not to take offensive actions. The

tragic climax of their predicament came on Oct. 23, when a

Muslim guerrilla drove a truck past guards at the Marine airport

compound and detonated an explosive with the force of 12,000

pounds of dynamite under a building housing Marines and other

U.S. personnel. Almost simultaneously, a car‑bomb exploded at

the French compound in Beirut. Casualties were 241 Americans

and 58 French troops killed. The bombings were the work of

Hezbollah, made up of Shi'i Muslim guerrillas supported by

Iran.32

America's agony increased on Dec. 3, when two carrier planes

were downed by Syrian missiles during heavy U.S. air raids on

eastern Lebanon.33On the same day, eight Marines were killed

in fighting with Muslim militiamen around the Beirut airport.34

By the start of 1984, an all‑out Shi'i Muslim campaign to rid

Lebanon of all Americans was underway. The highly respected

president of the American University of Beirut, Dr. Malcolm Kerr,

a distinguished scholar of the Arab world, was gunned down on

Jan. 18 outside his office by Islamic militants aligned with Iran.35

On Feb. 5, Reagan made one of his stand‑tall speeches by

saying that "the situation in Lebanon is difficult, frustrating and

dangerous. But this is no reason to turn our backs on friends and

to cut and run."36

The next day Professor Frank Regier, a U.S. citizen teaching at

AUB, was kidnapped by Muslim radicals.37 Regier's kidnapping

was the beginning of a series of kidnappings of Americans in

Beirut that would hound the Reagan and later the Bush

administrations for years and lead to the eventual expulsion of

nearly all Americans from Lebanon where they had prospered for

more than a century. Even today Americans still are prohibited

from traveling to Lebanon.

The day after Regier's kidnapping, on Feb. 7, 1984, Reagan

suddenly reversed himself and announced that all U.S. Marines

would shortly be "redeployed." The next day the battleship USS

New Jersey fired 290 rounds of one‑ton shells from its 16‑inch

guns into Lebanon as a final act of U.S. frustration.38 Reagan's

"redeployment" was completed by Feb. 26, when the last of the

Marines retreated from Lebanon.

The mission of the Marines had been a humiliating failure—not

because they failed in their duty but because the political

backbone in Washington was lacking. The Marines had arrived

in 1982 with all sides welcoming them. They left in 1984

despised by many and the object of attacks by Muslims. Even

relations with Israel were strained, if not in Washington where a

sympathetic Congress granted increased aid to the Jewish state

to compensate it for the costs of its bungled invasion, then

between the Marines and Israeli troops who had confronted each

other in a realpolitik battlefield that was beyond their competence

or understanding. The Marine experience in Lebanon did not

contribute toward a favorable impression of Israel among many

Americans, especially since the Marines would not have been in

Lebanon except for Israel's unprovoked invasion.

This negative result is perhaps one reason a number of Israelis

and their supporters today oppose sending U.S. peacekeepers

to the Golan Heights as part of a possible Israeli‑Syrian peace

treaty. A repeat of the 1982‑84 experience would certainly not be

in Israel's interests at a time when its supporters are seeking to

have a budget‑conscious Congress continue unprecedented

amounts of aid to Israel.